Introduction
Albania will hold local government elections this Sunday, February 18. These will be the sixth local elections since the fall of communism. Hence, one would expect that the elections would be a purely administrative and routine affair. However, the process leading up to the elections indicates the opposite. Events on February 18 and the days right after are likely to have significant implications not only for “who rules what” at local government level but also for Albania’s NATO and European integration, democratic consolidation and the future of the present political coalitions.
More precisely, the elections will have a direct impact on the country’s political stability. There are serious indications that the electoral process will not function smoothly even if there is political will to have free and fair elections. According to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), it is already too late to put the necessary electoral infrastructure in placeشrain the polling station commissioners, clean up voter lists and so on. This will open the way to the loser contesting the results as it has happened in the past. The difference is that this time Albania’s electoral infrastructure seems to be in worse shape than usual because of the protracted struggle over electoral reform.
The elections will also test the maturity of Albanian democracy through the cooperation between the government and opposition in order to produce a free and fair process. Differently than in most democracies, the electoral infrastructure in Albania is wholly politicized. For example, the polling station commissions or the CEC are made up of members of political parties according to a formula agreed to in the Electoral Code. Should one major party fail to cooperate, the whole electoral system infrastructure faces paralysis or worse.
While the process will test both sides severely, the administration of Prime Minister Berisha will likely bear the most responsibility for two reasons. First, the DP is in government and therefore it is likely to pay most of the bill for any handicaps. Secondly, the socialists already passed a test when they organized free elections on July 3rd 2005 that resulted in a peaceful rotation of power.
While the stakes are very high, the importance of having a clean process cannot be overemphasized. By the end of the year, progress in Albania together with Macedonia and Croatia will be closely examined by NATO members to determine if these countries should receive an invitation to join NATO in its next summit. Should Albania fail the local government elections test, that invitation will not be forthcoming.
Alliances and Coalitions
Two large coalitions are competing against each other. On one hand, the governing parties led by the DP have also invited the Movement for National Development led by Dashamir Shehi, which campaigned alone in the 2005 parliamentary elections but failed to win any seats because of Dushk phenomenon.
On the other hand, the opposition is united like never before. The SMI made its peace with the SP and the other “satellite parties” and, so far, they have campaigned together quite well. Despite some dissatisfaction from SP grassroots, the coalition has functioned relatively well so far.
Why are these elections political rather than administrative?
In Albania all local government elections have been highly politicized. However, this time there are two specific characteristics that increase the weight of politics in the process. First, the leader of the opposition SP Edi Rama is asking for a third mandate in the capital, Tirana, not only as a confirmation of his performance as a mayor but especially as a test of his leadership of the SP. Rama is not a member of parliament while his leadership has been challenged by the SP’s previous leader, Fatos Nano, who is now positioning himself to be the country’s next president in mid-2007. This is a challenge to Rama who has made it official SP policy to block the election of the country’s next president thus precipitating early parliamentary elections. Should he fail in his bid for Tirana’s mayor, it is quite likely that his position as SP leader will be shaken badly.
Secondly, the municipality of Tirana has clashed repeatedly with the central government. Differently than in the 2003 LG elections when Tirana was controlled by the same party that held government, now an important part of the political struggle between the government and the opposition is carried out in the streets of Tirana where the two groups try to block each other’s public works and gain the upper hand.
Why is Tirana crucial in these elections?
Both parties have concentrated their “artillery” on Tirana. That is because defeating Edi Rama would validate Berisha’s administration independently of results in the rest of the country. It would almost be like depriving the leader of the opposing party of a seat in parliament. Without a seat in parliament and a seat in the municipality, Rama’s leadership would become extremely vulnerable. Even if he would manage to overcome any leadership challenges, he would lose any institutional support to buttress his political future. In other words, the immediate futures of Berisha, Rama, and Nano depend to a large extent on what happens in Tirana.
Who will win these elections?
In four of the last six LG elections, it was difficult to determine the winner. The structure of the LG made this particularly difficult: one party may win the mayor while the other can control the municipal council. In cases such as these both sides can claim victory.
Secondly, Tirana presently controlled by the SP and Elbasan and Korca controlled by the DP may be the key municipalities. Victory in these three can go either way, and the party which will win at least two may be the winner of these elections.
Nevertheless, if the vote will be close, it will be possible for a party to, say, declare victory because it won Tirana while the other can declare victory because it won in a national scale.
In case the DP wins in Tirana as well as in some main cities such as Durres, Elbasan and Korca, the central government of Berisha will be validated. The socialists would lose any reason to trigger parliamentary elections during the presidential elections. The DP would have a wider field of choice for its own candidates for the presidential seat with the support of some opposition MPs.
Secondly, a DP victory could very well trigger unforeseen internal developments within the SP. Edi Rama would become “homeless” which will make it more difficult for him to fend off any leadership challengers. Such a challenge may well materialize from one of Nano’s supporters at the latter’s bidding. In that event, the position of Nano as a future candidate for president would consolidate. However, the DP may not necessarily be pleased with Nano’s candidacy in such a case. The DP is interested in Nano for as long as Rama presents a challengeةf he loses control of the SP, the DP does not need the “real leader” of the SP to become the country’s president.
In case the SP wins in Tirana and Elbasan and Korca as well as in its own bastions, Rama’s leadership of SP would be consolidated. The government of Berisha would be weakened and uncertainty within DP may spread. The situation would resemble the failed constitutional referendum of 1994. Nevertheless, although the socialists will feel more confident in pushing the country towards early parliamentary elections, it is highly improbable that this will occur for two reasons.
First, the DP may secure the votes of some opposition MPs because the voting process will be secret. Second, many MPs have no chance to get reelected because they lack a specific electorate. Third, Nano’s candidacy for president could provide the majority with the votes necessary to pass the 84 votes necessary to elect the next president of the Republic. This, however, would have to overcome the public opposition of DP’s most popular figures, Bamir Topi and Jozefina Topalli, to the idea of Nano as President.
The third scenario despite having a powerful realistic potential has not been explored enough. There might be a mixed record of the votes, giving two different types of victory to the competing sides. Such a scenario would see Tirana under one coalition and the nation or even the majority of the other key cities under the other. Post-electoral strategies aside, this situation will be quite distressful in the light of short term upcoming political developments. It might lead to instability and other long rounds of international mediation in order to get the country out of yet-another political crisis.
Whatever the possibilities, the country is in an important and delicate crossroad when the only actors that stand to benefit from the ambiguity are the political gamblers.
