President Barack Obama has inherited a heavy foreign policy agenda in addition to having to confront a severe and deepening domestic economic recession. In order to register progress the new president will need to pursue clear priorities in restoring the U.S. economy and the country’s international stature. However, in both economic and foreign policy nobody should expect instant achievements, particularly given the seriousness of the challenges. Indeed, one of the potential pitfalls for President Obama is that so much hope and expectation has been vested in his success that disappointment may start to creep in among the public if he does not begin to deliver. And this may be replicated in the international public arena. We must be patient and not expect overnight success.
The new president has moved swiftly in appointing key officials, especially in the national security arena. This is already a positive indication of Obama’s seriousness concerning the gravity of many international problems. All U.S. foreign and security policies are in the process of thorough review, especially where the U.S. has ongoing military commitments, is engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts, or where the new team feels that U.S. involvement has been insufficient during the Bush years.
It is too early to speak about an “Obama doctrine” as doctrines emerge in practice and not just in theory, in implementation and not merely in intentions. Among the top foreign policy and security challenges facing the new president the following four categories can be outlined:
1) wars or intense conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza);
2) major impending confrontations (Iran, Pakistan, North Korea);
3) critical global security threats (jihadist terrorism, economic recession, energy insecurity, arms proliferation);
4) key international relations (the EU, China, India, Russia).
And of course, a new regional or even global crisis could materialize without any prior warning. Because my work does not cover the whole world and all of its problems let me look in a little more detail at three foreign policy and security challenges that I do cover — the trans-Atlantic alliance, Russia, and the Balkans. I will briefly review what can be expected from the new U.S. government in these three domains..
Trans-Atlanticism
A top priority of the Barack Obama administration, as underscored by the newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is to rebuild Washington’s alliances and America’s international prestige and leadership. This must entail dispelling any resentments of what has been perceived as U.S. unilateralism during President George W. Bush’s two terms and Washington’s evident unwillingness to closely consult with its Allies, including the Europeans. Indeed, given the interconnectedness of many global challenges Washington will need to restore America’s status and revitalize the country’s most important alliances if it is to play a more effective leadership role in countering numerous security threats.
President Obama cannot be depicted as a unilateralist or a militarist. But his emphasis on diplomacy and bridge-building even with regimes that have been considered as international pariahs must not signify weakness in the face of aggression or indicate accommodation when confronting tangible security threats. During the election campaign, Obama signaled that he was willing to engage in dialogue even with the most repressive and threatening regimes if this would help moderate their policies and preclude outright conflict.
Indeed, Tehran and Pyongyang may be given the opportunity for a fresh start to desist from their threatening nuclear programs. But openness to dialogue does not necessarily correspond with surrendering core interests or compromising basic values. I am certain that the Obama White House will seek to avoid any perception of weakness and avoidance of conflict at all costs, as this would encourage various regimes to test his resolve and America’s commitments. Obama’s inaugural address struck a balance between openness to diplomatic breakthroughs and a readiness to protect U.S. interests and defend democratic values.
Because of his popular appeal around the world, Obama may be more difficult to resist by European states if he seeks greater military commitments from other Alliance members in unstable places such as Afghanistan. As the first non-white U.S. president, Obama will also have the opportunity to rebuild trust in the U.S. even in countries where anti-Americanism is prevalent and deep-rooted, including the Muslim world and even parts of Europe.
Reviving the trans-Atlantic relationship will necessitate a thorough review of American and European policies toward a host of global challenges, from the Middle East to East Asia, and from energy security to destabilizing climate change that could also generate conflict in future years.
NATO’s 60th anniversary summit next April and the EU-US summit, planned for the spring of 2009 will provide ideal venues for President Obama to spell out his vision for the future of the West and to give substance to his rhetoric. In practical terms, this could mean a more institutionalized format for closer consultation between the U.S. and the EU, an agenda of common priorities for the alliance whether in Middle East mediation between Israel and Palestine, in dealing with Iran, enhancing energy security, or in handling Russia. It should also entail closer trans-Atlantic coordination and consensus on future NATO enlargement in the wider Europe as well as on NATO’s roles and missions both inside and outside Europe.
Russia
In rebuilding the trans-Atlantic alliance President Obama will also need to confront Moscow’s strategic ambitions to divide Europe into permanent “spheres of influence.” Facing a belligerent Russia and a fractured and often confused European Union, Obama needs to combine practical engagement with the Kremlin on issues of mutual concern or common interest, such as anti-WMD proliferation and counter-terrorism, together with a strategic assertiveness that strengthens the Atlantic community and does not allow Moscow to exploit or deepen any existing divisions.
Practical engagement will certainly be one hallmark of the Obama administration in such questions as arms control treaties, specifically in replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), due to expire in December 2009. However, although they are necessary arms control treaties will not be sufficient to forestall and deter Russia’s expansionist political ambitions throughout its neighborhood in what is depicted in Moscow as the “post-Soviet space,” or more accurately Russia’s new imperial space.
President Obama’s election has been perceived by the Kremlin as an opportunity to undermine America’s global reach and the Russian authorities are likely to purposively test the new president and his resolve. In his “state of the union” address the day after Obama’s election, President Dmitri Medvedev reasserted Russia’s global interests, threatened to position nuclear weapons along Poland’s borders, and accused Washington of provoking conflicts in the Caucasus. In effect, Medvedev challenged Obama to make strategic compromises by withdrawing from the planned Missile Defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic and acquiescing to Moscow’s goal to establish more clearly demarcated “spheres of influence” in Eastern Europe.
However, behind the Kremlin’s rhetoric lurks a lingering fear that the Obama administration may be a potentially grave threat to Russia’s objectives to rebuild its superpower status and diminish U.S. leadership. The new president’s evident popularity could raise America’s global stature, reduce anti-Americanism, increase criticisms of Kremlin authoritarianism and human rights violations, and provide impetus for a renewed Western strategy that could undercut Russia’s expansive ambitions.
Since Russia’s de facto partition of Georgia last August, two broad strategic approaches toward Moscow have been germinating in the European Union: the passive and the active. The passive “spheres of influence” position accommodates Moscow’s goals to delineate Western and Russian zones of predominant influence within Europe, while the active “Wider Europe” approach seeks an expanded Euro-Atlantic community to incorporate all East European states other than Russia. Moscow is anxious that President Obama may embrace the activist position.
Russia remains a serious threat to its weaker neighbors, irrespective of its own structural and fiscal weaknesses and its over-dependence on hydrocarbon revenues. Moscow continues to engage in a policy of subversion and destabilization across the former Soviet empire especially through its control of vital energy resources and supply routes. The recent dispute with Ukraine over energy prices and the cut-off in Russia’s gas supplies to Ukraine and through Ukraine to the EU, contributes to weakening and even fracturing the Ukrainian state and limits Kyiv’s advances toward Western institutions.
Russia’s internal problems during the deepening global recession could actually magnify its external threat. Moscow traditionally manipulates the sense of besiegement to mobilize the populace and applies pressures on neighbors to deflect attention from domestic unrest. The financial crisis is precipitating even tighter state control over the economy and further concentrating power in the Kremlin which may engineer crises in neighboring states to raise Russia’s stature. In other words, Russia’s internal problems could make it even more externally aggressive.
President Obama will therefore face two inter-connected trans-Atlantic challenges: rebuilding the Atlantic alliance and dealing with a neo-imperialist Russia that is active in the European space. Above all, Washington must reject any moves toward redividing Europe into Cold War zones or sacrificing the security of any European state. This can be accomplished by intensifying links with all of Europe’s new democracies and offering NATO aspirants a clearer roadmap toward inclusion.
If handled adroitly by a united West, Moscow’s internal problems and its inability to construct a durable sphere of dominance will also provide an important boost for the reanimation of democratic and pro-Western developments along Russia’s long and over-extended borders.
Western Balkans
The Western Balkans does not figure on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities that I have outlined and indeed the region has not been a priority throughout the Bush administration. And this in itself is not a bad thing if the region is no longer seen as a major security challenge. The problem with a region such as the Western Balkans is that it has also not qualified in recent years in Washington as a positive priority despite the fact that the work of the alliance, both NATO and the EU, in South East Europe has yet to be completed.
The Balkans will not emerge as a top five or even top ten priority for the Obama White House but at the same time there are those in the administration who understand the region and that it should not be neglected, not least because of the political and security investments made by the previous Democratic administration. Indeed, there may be a new push to complete the outstanding goals.
For instance, as chair of the U.S. Senate’s foreign relations committee, Vice President Joe Biden was at the forefront of American policy in Central-Eastern Europe throughout the Clinton years. His input and that of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (who of course is closely linked with the previous Clinton administration) will be important in ensuring that there are no more instabilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosova, Macedonia, and Serbia that could set back progress toward democratic rule and EU-NATO integration. There could also be added thrust to move all states in the region closer toward NATO and EU membership.
The NATO summit in April, which will welcome Albania and Croatia into the Alliance, can also send positive signals to other capitals in the region. This can include a pledged membership invitation for both Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Such moves would underscore Allied commitments to their security and integrity, strengthen centrifugal forces in both countries, weaken the partitioners, and ward off any lingering annexationist ambitions in neighboring capitals. A strong statement is also needed at the NATO summit to advance the resolution of the Greek-Macedonian name dispute in order for Skopje to receive a formal invitation to NATO.
Alliance leaders need to issue a statement that both Serbia and Kosova belong inside the Alliance to complete the security structure of South East Europe. The absence of a NATO consensus for issuing invitations for Ukraine and Georgia can be compensated by a common Allied approach to speed up the entry of all remaining West Balkan countries so that the entire peninsula forms NATO’s south eastern flank. Concurrently, the new U.S. foreign policy team can provide a fresh impetus to multiply Kosova’s international recognition that would enable the young state to join key multi-national institutions and develop into a responsible regional player.
All governments in the region should focus on two priorities: first, actively engaging with the new U.S. administration and two, becoming part of the decision-making process within the Alliance and within the EU by fully meeting the criteria for membership. NATO itself will be reinvigorated with the involvement of all members, including Albania. Each government can offer constructive ideas and assistance in implementing policies for solving the problems that President Obama must now tackle.
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The Author is Director at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.
This speech was delivered at the Security and Foreign Policy Forum organized by Albanian Institute for International Studies on January 26 2009
