Talking about the Balkans, Chris Patten, the former Commissioner for EU External Relations, provided probably the most philosophical description of the Balkans’ technology of change when he said, almost a decade ago that “In the Balkans, like the old English floral dance, it is often a case of two steps forward, one step back”.
While this logic of the technology of change almost prevailed in the region for more than a decade, the year we have just left behind may be a turning point whereby the steps towards the creation and well-functioning of a Balkan order were not necessarily accompanied by steps backwards.
2008 was an important year for security and stability. First of all, the countries of the Balkans, and consequently the Balkan order, confronted the critical test of accomodating the changes of the political map of the region after the declaration of independence of Kosova.
Second, Albania and Croatia were invited by NATO to join the Alliance, a process that is now in its final steps, expected to be wrapped up in the next NATO summit.
Last but not least, all countries in the region have made progress, however modest, in their efforts towards EU integration.
Albania’s and Croatia’s future membership in the Alliance, as well as the steps made towards the preparation of Balkan countries for EU membership, represent fundamental investments for the creation of a functional, liberal democratic order that would make conflict within or between Balkan states impossible and unimaginable.
Though true, such a reading of developments in the Balkans is optimistic, or at least it presents us with only one side of the medal. A simple effort to open up today’s (in)security account shows that the agenda of political, economic developments, the modernisation of Balkan societies, and consequently integration at a regional and European level, are still threatened by security issues.
The Security Agenda at the Inter-State Level
The main schools of thought in International Relations, and some of the contemporary approaches in Security Studies suggest that inter-state relations must be observed in order to understand and explain the process of desecuritisation, which unfortunately at times is accompanied by resecuritisation also.
A careful study of the present relations between states in the Balkans uncovers a series of issues for which one cannot safely exclude the possibility of transformation into security issues.
Alongside a status quo spirit in relations between Balkan states, several issues have emerged, the resolution of which is a prerequisite for further progress. Thus, Croatia, a country very close to EU membership, and Slovenia, one of the newest and most successful members of the EU, are involved in a very controversial border dispute.
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Despite its highly politicised nature, it nevertheless remains unimaginable that the recent dispute will become a security issue.
The failure to reach an agreement over the name issue between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia hindered the latter to join NATO during this current wave of the Alliance’s enlargement, together with Croatia and Albania. Even though the disagreements between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seem entirely politicised, to the extent that they incite nationalistic sentiments, it can be safely asserted that these disagreements are unlikely to become a security issue.
Although there are no security issues between Albania and Serbia, the relations between the two states after the declaration of independence of Kosova are poor. Political and economic exchanges continue to preserve the status quo of the last three-four years.
Albania’s relations with Montenegro and fYROM seem to be on the right track, but the mal-functioning economies of each country limit further progress. In the meantime, there are no security issues between the three countries, but rather, an enhancement of political will to strengthen economic and political cooperation.
Albania is one of the countries that recognised Kosova immediately after the declaration of independence. At present, Albania and Kosova seem to be going through a phase of accomodation of the new state of affairs visible in their political and economic communications but also at a societal level. Albania has offered a supportive political stance towards Kosova and the political elite of Tirana sees future relations with Kosova as those between two future members of the European Union, as opposed to the mistaken theories that see Kosova’s independence as a stepping stone towards Greater Albania.
Last but by no means least, Serbia-Kosova relations stand closer to a resecuritisation process that retains implications for the security and stability of the entire region. Relations between Serbia and the new state of Kosova are utterly and completely politicised. Despite the self-restraint that the governments of the two states have demonstarted since the declaration of independence of Kosova, their entirely politicised relations have very often been on the brink of a dangerous resecuritisation process. Serbia refuses to recognise the new state of Kosova and it has fully invested its diplomatic means in de-legitimising Kosova’s independence and hampering the process of international recognition. By continuing to claim sovereignty over the new state of Kosova, Serbia has encouraged parallel institutions and structures, especially in the north of Kosova where in several occassions the situation has been very close to the eruption of a new conflict.
On the other hand, Kosova’s government and authorities have refrained themselves from the idea of establishing control and authority over the entire territory of the country, especially over the northern part. Furthermore, the international presence, the EULEX mission, has also not been able to establish its full control there.
This is the state of affairs with respect to security issues from an inter-state perspective in the Balkans.
The Security Agenda at the Intrastate Level
However, the other perspective that I would like to discuss here is that, currently, the security agenda of the Balkans depends more on relations within rather than between states. In fact, the domestic (in)security account has been and continues to be decisive for a functional and sustainable order in the Balkans.
This globally dominating trend in the post-Cold War environment applies to the Balkans also, indeed a special case if we keep in mind the political map of the region, which in the words of Pedrag Simic, resembles the leopards’ skin due to the incredibly rich ethnic mix of the various ethnic groups that inhabit the peninsula.
It is precisely due to this reality that more often than not the domestic security issues in each country of the region have the potential to incite a resecuritisation process in inter-state relations.
If we try to open up the state to domestic (in)security accounts, almost in every country in the Balkans we will be able to easily discern that the main security threat is the weak state, lacking the domestic capacity to guarantee its citizens basic political goods, starting with law and order.
The sources of weakness of Balkan states nowadays are varied. They have historical roots and are related to the relatively poor state tradition in the Balkans, to the structure of the economies, the level of industrialisation, the level of modernisation of society, the armed conflicts that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia and last but not least, to the stage of economic development and the nature of the regimes.
Out of all the above-mentioned factors that continue to keep Balkan states weak and mal-functioning, only the nature of the regimes and economic development are relevant to the idea of strengthening the states, making them functional and similar to the state model of the European Union members.
With respect to the nature of the regimes, in the case of the current Balkan states I believe that we can all agree that we mostly find hybrid regimes, or formal, unsubstantial democracies. Please allow me to bring some examples in order to support the argument of a correlation between weak democracies and security issues.
The main reason the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is relatively weak and mal-functioning is the simple fact that it is not yet a unitary state. However, one of the non-negligible causes that keep Bosnia and Herzegovina a weak state I believe must be sought in the nature of the regime and the level of functioning of democracy.
Conflict and the zero-sum logic that has dominated Albania’s transition, having established by now a legacy the political elite of the country has not entirely given up, has seriously threatened security and stability issues of the country.
The establishment of parallel institutions and structures in Albania, FYROM and Kosova is, amongst other things, a result of the nature of the regimes, not quite democratic and functional yet.
Seeking an enemy by all means and preserving the status quo regarding the conflict has served and will continue to serve, not only in the case of the Balkans, the short-term interests of the political establishment in countries where democracy is still feeble and merely formal.
Serbia is opposing the independence of Kosova through diplomatic means but continues in the meantime to encourage and finance parallel institutions and structures within the state of Kosova. While the option of Kosova’s reinstatement under Serbia is not even theoretically possible, the encouragement and funding of Serbian parallel structures in Kosova, including the diplomatic offensive meant to hamper the process of international recognition of the new state, can serve domestic, short-term, political interests in Serbia. Also, it is perhaps the time to address pointed questions:
If military conflicts are almost an impossibility in today’s Balkans, are we heading towards a sustainable peace or towards the creation of a frozen conflict between Albanians and Serbs?
The Economy-Security Nexus
The other impeding factor for strong and functional states in the Balkans – the poor state of the economy and infrastructure, the low level of foreign direct investments, the relatively high levels of unemployment – have the potential to incite a process of resecuritisation.
In the context of a global crisis, the effects of which the economies of the region cannot escape, economic matters ought to be prioritised from a security standpoint.
The discussion of economic issues in light of the need to strengthen the generally weak states of the Balkans can easily fall into a vicious circle. From a theoretical and practical perspective, the question that requires an answer is this:
Does a strong state bring economic development or does the state get stronger as a result of economic development?
The prevailing force for change (and desecuritisation) in the region, the European Union seems to see the strong state as effecting economic development. This is clearly visible in the Union’s assistance priorities for more than a decade now. More concretely, the EU has dedicated much of its funding to capacity/institution-building in the countries of the region. In fact, the rule of law is an essential feature of the EU state model, and needless to say a fundamental pre-requisite for accession. In the Balkans much was needed in this respect and owing to EU assistance there has been good progress in Albanian institutional capacities.
However, the time may have come for a reconsideration of the question in hand, and thus of this strategy. In one way or another, investing in institution-building is a top-down approach. The suggestion here is not to entirely give up this approach, but rather to adopt a combined one: alongside investment in institutional capacity, the weak state in this region can be strengthened through strategic economic investment.
Allow me be more clear by referring here to what a great thinker like Karl Poper reminds us of. In one of his latest interviews, he tells us that Gorbachev did something grotesque, ridiculous: he established a stock exchange in Moscow. We have seen pictures of its formal opening with great celebration. However, the reason the stock exchange was so ridiculous is that there was simply no stock and no money to buy stock at that time in Soviet Union.
Albania did something similar and certainly more ridiculous. It was 1992 when the government decided and established the Bursa in Tirana which is practically still not working, although they have offices and a code of procedures, so basically institutional capacity, just like in other western countries.
What I am trying to say is not that the top-down approach is not any more relevant in the state-building process. Rather, the argument is that, as the Balkan experience shows, a combined perspective of investment in institutional capacities and the economy would really help in strengthening the state in the Balkans.
