By: Eda Derhemi
A leader is different from a petty politician. The leader uses his intelligence and charisma to solve the problems of the moment with his eyes on the future, and for him politics is connected to a universal ideology that helps improve peoples’ lives and culturally advance them. The leader doesn’t run after the politics of image that secure his career at all costs, he doesn’t support a movement just because it is in fashion, he is not two-faced depending on simple petty interests that rule the moment. The leader can even risk his own re-election, the election success of his political party for the sake of the realization of a much larger dream or ideal, even when the ideal can be unappreciated or unattractive to the voters. His position and history as a leader serve to create his (or her) personal legacy as a politician, as well as the practical progress of the ideological group that he represents, but he is not a slave to them. Only thus can the leader remain a figure who even in compromise, even in failure, even with the change of political or strategic line, keeps his dignity and integrity as a person and as a political figure. In fact, I do not have many current leaders in mind as I write, but I have at least one, at least for the moment: the current American president, open like nobody before him to change and compromise, without compromising his position on the public good, remaining faithful to the ideals that he believes in.
The unfortunate fact is that normally we are surrounded by hordes of petty politicians, while the leaders are generally figures of legend, especially in the Balkans. Today I focus on one of the petty politicians with a Balkan voice: Boris Tadi箠More than once he has been hailed by the politicians and the elitist buzz of Europe as a “different” kind of politician, of European caliber, like destiny finally knocking on the door of the Balkans. And this as an old tactic of the powers who are used to knowing the business of others better than the others do themselves, who shush the troublesome countries by supporting the election of leaders with western rhetoric rather than vision. If a consistent rhetoric is missing (as in the case of Tadi穬 they repair it also rhetorically. The many-faced politics of Tadi硩s seen as flexibility, his dancing between liberalism and conservatism as an ability to compromise, and his support of Serbian nationalist rhetoric as tolerance for the various groups within Serbia. In fact, after the experiences with Milosevi笠any Serbian leader better than him would received European applause. What’s important for Europe is that Serbian nationalists not return to their mottos of the 90’s. The rest is of little interest to the Europeans. The double standards in the behavior of Tadi硰ass without remark. Emphasizing them is of interest only to entities lower than Serbia on the European practical scale, like Kosova or Albania. So, “No problem!”
Two weeks ago in a column in the Washington Post, Tadi硴ried to enhance his PR image and that of Serbia before the American and world public, as a champion of ethnic tolerance, understanding, and of peace, “traditional characteristics of the Western Balkans”, and he managed to do this unchallenged by commentators or journalists. We all need heros, don’t we: the masses can’t live without heros. So if the rhetoric goes unchallenged of the leader of a group that has been seen more than once to be peace-breaking, perhaps this leader will be transformed into a true liberal, and thus the group he represents will be transformed as well. Tadi硩n his column says that “the approval by the Serbian parliament of a resolution in which forgiveness is asked for the events of 1995 in Srebrenica…” (certainly without using the word “genocide” that even the International Court of Justice treated with perplexity when it had the chance) “…is the result of the dedication of Serbia to the encouragement of understanding and friendship.” But the Serb President has never asked forgiveness for the crimes carried out in Kosova, and has never directly addressed this subject… and I am not one of those who worry a lot about the legal definition of “genocide”… still, the crimes in Kosova are well-known and proven by experts, with or without the label “genocide”. Why does Tadi硴reat Kosova so differently from Srebrenica? Are the events of Kosova not as well-known all over the world as those of Srebrenica? Do the Albanians of Kosova not deserve to be asked for forgiveness as the “sub-humans” they have always been treated as? Or is it because in Srebrenica the period of the killing of 8000 victims was shorter than that of the killing of almost twice as many in Kosova? Is it because Srebrenica is now a “lost” cause, and no longer arouses the emotions of the electorate, whereas by “defending” Kosova, Tadi硨opes to get the votes of many Serbs who, although have never seen or cared for Kosova, are now ready to fight if the majority of their “Old Serbia” dare to proclaim independence? Tadi硣alculates pragmatically: The world was not completely united behind Kosova, so the struggle to regain it is not completely lost; while Srebrenica could not be denied, so now why not use it to appear as positive heroes.
The answer to the above questions is that disrespect, even contempt, for the Albanian population of Kosova, a traditional characteristic of official Serbia, precisely characterizes Tadi硴oo, and is still active today in Serbian consciousness. And since on this point they have been tolerated internationally, why should they change now? For being like this, it appears that the Serbs will suffer no consequences, and will lose no advantage in their European plans. Then why should they ask forgiveness from the Kosovars? Asking forgiveness is unfortunately a political act among politicians, and not a moral act. I emphasize that Tadi硩n his essay cited with pride the “unprecedented act” of Serbia (as if Serbia did a great honor by condescending so much to Srebrenica…). But he uses this expression in the sense “unprecedented in the Balkans”, and not just for Serbia; so Tadi稳 use of “unprecedented”, does not construct the self-critical discourse that Serbia should have had long ago, on the other events and massacres carried out by Serbian troops or militias. Tadi硩s using it today as a scolding and moralizing discourse against the “other” Balkan countries that haven’t done the same as tolerant Serbia.
In the best case, the message of Tadi硩n The Washington Post will be read as an attempt to share the guilt with all the Balkans, who he considers fellow culprits and “responsible for the cruelties carried out during the civil wars in ex-Yugoslavia.” So Tadi硩nvites the Balkan “culprits”, to follow the “unprecedented” shining example of Serbia, and to ask forgiveness from Serbia, since they dared to respond in rational and irrational ways to the fury of Serbia in the 90’s. The way Tadi硨as asked forgiveness for Srebrenica while distancing himself from his own guilt by sharing the guilt with everybody else in the Balkans, is immoral.
The same pettiness and unprincipled political game is obvious in another identical maneuver of Tadi硡fter the Montenegrin memorandum for separating from Serbia. Tadi笠in an essay in the same Washington Post on 7 June 2006, writes: “Immediately after the results of the referendum, I called on Serbian citizens to accept the Montenegrin decision, and to extend to them the hand of friendship. I travelled to Montenegro to express these sentiments personally. Now Serbia and Montenegro are negotiating the details of separation. Often in our regions this has been a sad and messy problem. The Serbs believe that we have a good opportunity to show that it doesn’t have to be this way, and that, in separating, we know how to keep good relations with each other.” As can be seen, this is a rhetoric completely and deeply opposed to what Tadi硡pplied later to the independence of Kosova. His attitude was indirectly supported by the international media and political discourse, regularly referring to Kosova’s independence as “unilateral declaration of independence”, with the meaningless additional stigma and uncertainties coming from the addition of “unilateral”. This is another instance that demonstrates a behavior of double standards by Tadi笠where Kosova is concerned. Tadi稳 undemocratic and unliberal position on Kosova is not the result of Kosova being different from all the other cases Tadi硨as dealt with. To the contrary, it is because Tadi硩s no different from his predecessors, who have traditionally treated Kosova as a zone that does not deserve and should not have much freedom, as a zone with truncated rights to development, not even the right to a proper legal name, unlike other parts of ex-Yugoslavia. Tadi硨as no real basis to justify him in continuing these undemocratic policies towards Kosova, but he strengthens them whenever he can, because nobody stops him. So why not? He works to form his European image, in relation with other ex-republics which it pays to deal with, putting something in his political sack at no cost. He uses Kosova, on the other hand, for other purposes.
Doubtless Tadi稳 public pardons are welcomed, however late, however formal, and however tricky they might be. But it is regrettable that the obvious conflict between his completely opposed positions in principle and in practice, pass without being pointed out. Would Tadi硳upport that murderous hate that Milosevi硯nce instigated towards Kosova? I don’t think so. But that is of little practical importance today. On Kosova, in practice he impedes and discourages those political behaviors that he, in theory, considers to be his democratic and liberal views. The moral that guides mankind, even politicians, cannot have ten different nuances. You are guided, or you are not, by ethical principles. And Tadi笠so it appears, is not a man of ethics. The politics of Tadi硨ave diverse standards; one for foreigners, and one for the Balkans; one for Montenegro, and another for Kosova; one for Srebrenica, and another one for Ra被 and Krusha e Madhe; one for communities with orthodox majority, one for catholic majorities, another certainly for muslims… Tadi硣ares nothing for the still missing 1500 Kosovar Albanians who disappeared to places still unknown! For much fewer vanished Serbs, the internationals put great pressure on Kosovar leaders, but to the president of a “real” independent country they can do nothing! They even ease the way for Serbia’s entrance in Europe. It is not only Tadi硷hio applies double standards!
Tadi硨as only a “western” image… like many other Balkan politicians; as for his vision, it is “eastern”, and concretely, typically Balkan. Milosevi硬ives on multidimensionally, if not completely, in the shifting and pragmatic concepts of Tadi笠and of other “democratic” Serb leaders in general. As in all official Balkan politics today, liberal and democratic rhetorics are inconsistent and unprincipled, and they are activated only in the service of kickbacks and profits, as for example in admission into a powerful organization, the securing of a material investment, or of a favor of interest to the Balkan side. A progressive idea is not defended to affirm its human value, but as conformism and only as the “solution” of a problem; Tadi硰oses as an early supporter of the victory of the opponent, only there where victory is confirmed, and the power, so to speak, of Tadi硡nd his side to oppose it, is equal to zero. So I am not at all surprised when successful Nikoli硴rumpets himself as more progressive than Tadi箠Let us not forget that not long ago Nikoli硷as sworn to the ideals of the extreme Serb nationalist Shshejl.
I was very moved when Roger Cohen on April 12th in the New York Times concluded his analysis (as usual brilliant) of the tragic incident of the Polish president who was travelling to the Katyn forest, where he would commemorate, together with pardon-seeking Putin, the soviet massacre (under orders from Beria and Stalin) by shooting of around 22,000 Poles in 1940. I thought of the parallel event, left unjustly to be forgotten by Albanian media and politicians, of the massacre of Albanians in Tivar during WWII. I published the end of Cohen’s article on my Facebook page: “So don’t tell me that bloody history can’t be overcome. Don’t tell me that the Israelis and the Palestinians can’t make peace… don’t tell me that lies can live forever!” But do I believe this beautiful cry of human triumph? With Tadi砦 Co around, this still cannot be seen as a near possibility. The example of the freeze, a few days ago, of the ratification of Turko-Armenian protocols, reinforces the idea that it is too early to be optimistic in Southeast Europe. Just as with the lack of progress of ȡm demands in Greek-Albanian relations. Doubtless ours is a traditional political culture of the public, with many problems. But this is a vicious circle: political culture with patches produces mediocre politicians, and these give form to political cultures that hold them in power at any cost. The Balkans, especially, need moral beings who can lead, not petty politicians in high posts, caterers to special interests, manipulators, exploiters of rancor, masters of intrigue. But no leaders appear anywhere on the horizon.
* Eda Derhemi is a professor of communication at the University of Illinois.
