By Bern Fischer
The short period from 1943 through 1945 was a critical one for Europe, witnessing the great final battles of the Second World War, the defeat of Italy and Germany, the initial stages of post-war recovery, and the beginning of a new era. For Albania, too, this short time span was of monumental significance, indeed these decisive years were arguably even more important for Albania. They saw the exit of the Italians, the coming the Germans and the German occupation, the end of the remnant of the old regime, the maturing of the resistance movement, the intervention of the Allies, the victory of the communists and the construction of the Hoxha regime which would rule Albania with an iron fist for the next 45 years. While most of Europe has left the struggles of this period behind, not Albania. We are still witnessing the fallout from this period today. It is present not only in the discourse concerning the creation of the Albanians’ image of themselves as a people and a state, but remains important in terms of contemporary political discourse. In a way the period from 1943 through 1945 is still a vital part of the twenty-first century cultural and political landscape in Albania.
In part because of this continuing contemporary significance, a clear understanding of this period is particularly important. Scholars have recognized its pivotal role and as a result these few years has been studied extensively both within Albania and abroad. These studies have of course taken many forms including oral and traditional histories. As the years pass, along with the contemporary witnesses of those events, further study – always necessary because of the availability of new material and the fact that there is no single interpretation of history – becomes more heavily dependent of documents produced during the period.
There are of course many such documents, both domestic and foreign. The various Albanian archives are certainly a critical source of information, but documents produced by representatives of interested states, both published and unpublished, are also extremely valuable. With these documents there is, however, a sliding scale of significance. Of this foreign material, Italian documents, while still important, are perhaps relatively less useful for a number of reasons. First there is a question of reliability. When Count Galeazzo Ciano assumed control of the Palazzo Chigi, the Italian foreign ministry, in 1936, he introduced a new policy called the “Tona Fascista” which was intended to infuse new energy and a new spirit into the Italian diplomatic corps. The net result, unfortunately, was to encourage traditionally thorough Italian diplomats, who before the fascist period had had a good reputation, to report primarily those pieces of information that Ciano wanted to hear – if indeed he was willing to listen at all. Like Mussolini, Ciano disliked reading dispatches, relying instead on newspapers and spies for information upon which to base policy. The breakdown in communication became so dire that the Italian ambassador in England ultimately relied upon the British Foreign Office for clues as to the direction of Italian foreign policy. The Italians were of course also removed from Albania in 1943 which severely limited their representation and the quality and quantity of their dispatches. So Italian documents do have some limitations.
In this author’s estimation, perhaps the most useful of the foreign documents for the period 1943-1945 in Albania, include the British, German and, to a lesser extent, some American material, in part because it is so extensive. British documents are somewhat lacking for the period 1939-1942, because of a limited British presence but with the introduction of a score of Special Operations Executive agents beginning in 1942, British documents become very useful for both limited statistics and on-the-ground analysis. German and American documentary material has also proven to be very useful for its thoroughness and, at least in the case of Germany, for the sheer volume of the material available. While the German material is somewhat limited for the period prior to 1943, since their efforts at maintaining current information on Albania were hampered by Italian suspicions of German motives, they ultimately produced a large volume of material, usually quite objective and therefore quite useful. The document reproduced in this volume, which we shall refer to as the Final Report of the German Wehrmacht in Albania, is representative of this wealth of material. The German Final Report is unique in many ways, not the least of which in the fact that it was written by an unknown official attached to the Administration Group at Wehrmacht headquarters in Berlin, likely in February or March 1945. The doomed capital was of course under constant air attack as Allied armies closed in for both east and west. Seemingly undeterred by the impending, and by now inevitable, fall of the Reich, the German official produced a remarkable fifty page brief history of the German occupation of Albania mixing raw statistics with analysis.
The document is divided into three major sections, 1) The Organization of the German Administration and its Evolution, 2) Political Developments, and 3) The Duties of the Administration. This last section, the longest, is subdivided into internal administration, transportation, public health, culture, finances, justice, labor service, labor services in the Reich, foreigners, and the economy. While we find a multitude of statistics in this document, there is also some very cogent analysis.
The reader is particularly struck by the level of self criticism in which the Germans engaged. In very general terms, it is reasonable to argue that German policy in Albania was at least partially successful, if we accept the argument that the Germans were principally interested in keeping the area quiet with a limited number of troops. This German official, though, was more than willing to argue that there was considerable room for improvement. As examples, he suggests that the degree of respect which the Germans paid to Albania’s nominal independence during the period of the German occupation might have been overdone, and certainly largely determined the scope and limitations of the German administration’s activities. He alludes to disputes between the various branches of German authority in Albania, in particular the office of the German Commanding General in Albania (DGA) and the representatives of the German foreign office.
The official was also quite critical of some aspects of the basic German approach to the occupation. He complains that the Germans too often saw Albania through the eyes of the Italians, who he blames for the near collapse of the country through their promotion of incompetent collaborationists. In his estimation, the Germans compounded this error by relying almost exclusively on the narrow group of wealthy landowners and beys, thereby never gaining a clear picture of the will of the people or true conditions in the countryside where the vast majority of the people lived. Admittedly, the Albanian elite were the natural allies of the Germans, being anti-communist, and, on a very basic level, far easier to communicate with because they were often multi-lingual and had spent time abroad. The official laments the fact that even at the very end of the occupation there were never more than ten Germans in Albania who could speak Albanian. The Albanian elite, of course, expected the Germans to maintain the old social structure and defend their economic privileges, a point which the communist resistance used effectively to gain support from the disadvantaged masses. But this emphasis on the towns and the well-to-do minority resulted in those who had real influence on the majority of the population – the village headmen – being essentially overlooked. The Germans simply did not seriously consider the influence of the solid institution of the village structure, just as they paid far too much attention to the central government. This significant disadvantage was compounded by a lack of consistency in German policy which reduced practical efficiency and was skillfully exploited by the Albanian collaborators. If one German official refused to agree to a particular course, the Albanian official simply went to another until he found someone who would agree. German influence, as well as state efficiency suffered as a result.
The German official who wrote this piece describes the various power groups in Albania, and their relative significance over the time of the German occupation, including of course the Balli Kombetare, whose leadership, the official noted, were supporters of England from the very start. He discusses the rising resistance, led by a few “Russian-oriented masterminds,” and the few advantages that the Germans had in countering this growing power, including the widespread sympathy for Germany and Austria-Hungary dating back to the First World War, the understanding that it was German policy which created Greater Albania, and that without the Germans, Kosovo would again be lost. He also details, at great length, the various aspects of the Albanian economy, including an assessment of those raw materials, principally chrome and oil, which proved useful to the German war effort. The German withdrawal is describing in detail, down to the last German troops evacuating the country on 4 December, 1944, an event whose actual date continues to hold political significance in Albania to this day. While the Italians are blamed for attempting to reduce Albania from the status of a condominium to that of a colony, the Germans are blamed for throwing the country back several decades in its development by the destruction of the breakwater at Durres, and the blowing up of most of Albania’s bridges during the retreat. The official feared for the future of the country given Albania’s relative lack of development and perhaps developed an overly pessimistic view of Albania’s future, one born of the chaos of war. He argued that the German occupation seemed to offer proof that the Albanian people were not yet mature enough to govern themselves. Only if a strong and just foreign power without ulterior motives came and took it over for at least a generation and gradually educated its inhabitants towards independence, would Albania – beautiful and to a certain extent, promising as it was – be saved from the eternal internal conflicts that would end by destroying the nation entirely.
The American document reproduced in this volume, is the somewhat more lengthy “Documentary Report Supplementing Summary of Findings and Recommendations with Respect to the Recognition of the ‘Democratic Government of Albania,'” prepared by the Department of State Special Mission to Albania, with J.E. Jacobs serving as head of mission. The Jacobs report initially intended to serve a different purpose than the German report – it was meant to be a beginning rather than as end of a relationship. Jacobs recommended that the United States recognize the Hoxha regime. Since the Department of State did not, in the end, support that recommendation, the Jacobs report too was in a way the end of a relationship, with diplomatic relations between Albania and the United States not being reestablished until some 46 years later in 1991.
The report is considerably lengthier and considerably more in depth than the German report, a function of the fact that it was written during peacetime under somewhat less trying circumstance. The Jacobs report is similarly structured to the German report. There are 14 sections including in order 1) Government Structure – Party Relationships, 2) Power and Influence of National Army in National Affairs, 3) Albanian Legal and Judicial Systems, 4) Extra Governmental Agencies and Groups, 5) Opposition to the Present Regime, 6) International Relations, 7) Educational and Cultural Programs, 8) Commercial and Economic Development and Rehabilitation, 9) Mineral and other Natural Resources, 10) Agricultural and Food Conditions, 11) Public Works, 12) Public Health, 13) Public Finance and Fiscal Matters, and finally, 14) Trip through Southern Albania, June 12-16, 1945, with comments. While like the German document, the Jacobs report contains a great many statistics, still there is also a good deal of analysis as well. Each section contains some degree of evaluation intended to assist the Department of State in its decision whether or not to recognize the new regime. The evaluation is of course intended to be objective, and certainly Jacobs is careful to present multiple interpretations of most issues. He has high praise for the abilities of the new leadership in Albania, complementing its considerable energy and sound planning which it exhibited in constructing the new state. The leadership was described as a shrewd determined group of individuals who clearly hoped to improve the lot of the average Albanian. Jacobs listed some immediate improvements, including in the health sector where he saw great strides being made. Prior to the advent of the communists, 88% of Albania’s health professionals resided in the bigger towns, serving the health needs of between 15 and 20% of the population. While the new government was clearly faced with daunting challenges in the field of health, the average Albanian had greater access to healthcare in 1945 than he had ever had. Similarly, more Albanians were participating in the process of government than had ever had before.
But Jacobs was willing to be critical of the developing Hoxha regime as well. He noted the fear that the communists inspired, including warnings to certain individuals that they were visiting the houses of American and British officials too often. He commented on the horrible prison conditions and the use of torture. Trials were used for both dispensing real justice against collaborators but also as a weapon against political opposition. There were secret executions. While there was perhaps no blood bath, the moderate opposition was being terrorized by the secret police. He noted that the size of the army, making up some 12% of the male population and accounting for over half of the annual budget, clearly had a more significant purpose than to deal with external threats. The army, which had taken to conducting frequent fascist-like parades, was clearly there as a major instrument of social and economic change and to enhance the regime’s control. Jacobs also believed that the regime’s strong vocal commitment to democratic principles was little more that a sham. He complained that the government instituted a system of voting by show of hands, which of course allowed for intimidation and manipulation until the desired result could be insured. Jacobs believed that the regime’s aims were often at odds with the will and basic instincts of the people. Perhaps the best example here was the regime’s attempt to replace the naturally pro-western leanings of most of the Albanian population with a pro-Soviet view. With what might be considered as an ominous prediction, Jacobs concluded that the only way the communist leadership would ever be successful in producing a pro-Soviet atmosphere in Albania would be to inaugurate a stern and drastic regime, or to eliminate by execution and murder a large proportion of the intelligencia of Albania.
Even though Jacobs was often quite critical of the Hoxha regime, he saved much of his criticism for the opposition, for whom he had very few kind words. He defined the opposition to the regime rather narrowly to include merchants, former government officials, army officers, some clergy (principally among the Catholics and Sunni Moslems), large landowners and other propertied classes who benefited the most from the Italian and German occupation. He argued that this group made up perhaps between 10 and 15% of the population and believed that its opposition to the regime was based not on some form of political principle but rather was dictated entirely by personal advantage and privilege. Free elections did not come into their thinking, indeed they were even less interested in the establishment of a truly democratic system then were the communists. The opposition simply feared the loss of their traditional dominance and wealth, some of which was built up during the occupation by, among other things, exerting pressure on Albania’s few Jews under the pretense of protecting them from the Germans. And now, in 1945, they turned in desperation to the western allies to preserve their wealth and position as the Germans and Italians had done. Jacobs believed that these people, some of whom he contemptuously referred to as “intellectuals,” had little respect and little support among the common people. Indeed, he argued that their incoherence and weakness was in part responsible for the communists going to extremes.
One important difference between the German and American reports is their assessment of Albania’s economic future. The German document, as noted above, was quite pessimistic, suggesting that Albania needed the protection of a benevolent foreign power simply to survive as a state. The Jacobs report, although clearly wary of the introduction of the Soviet model of nationalization and central economic control in Albania, was much more optimistic arguing that, if handled properly, the Albanian government and people could be made economically stable. The report suggests that Albania was endowed with extensive mineral resources which needed to be exploited before foreigners took this wealth for themselves. The report was particularly positive about Albania’s agricultural resources which would allow Albania to become economically self-sufficient. This had not yet happened, the report argued, not because of any deficit in resources but because the prevailing social system and land tenure had kept peasants in a state of ignorance and degradation. One can only speculate as to why the German and American visions of Albania’s future were so different. One possible explanation is that the Germans relied on the traditional elite for a good deal of their information and for their image of the common people. Naturally the traditional elite would argue that without their guiding hand, or some other guiding hand, to manage the course of events, the Albanians were lost. Jacobs, by his clear rejection of these elites and their views, was much more willing to put his faith in what he believed to be the natural desire of the average Albanian to live in a just and equitable society. The Jacobs report did, however, foresee potential future ethnic problems in the region and argued for a quite radical solution which included extensive territorial readjustment and population exchanges. Jacobs suggested that Albania be awarded extensive parts of Kosovo, but not to include the most sensitive Serbian churches and monasteries. He foresaw that this would likely increase Albania’s population by as much as one third, a number to be further enhanced by forced population exchanges with both Yugoslavia and Greece. The latter was necessary in order to undercut what he believed to be ridiculous Greek territorial claims. These are certainly interesting comments, considering that fact that the problems they raised continue to be sensitive issues in the twenty-first century.
What can we learn from these two documents? While the ultimate answer to that question will be left to the reader, a number of broad conclusions can be drawn. In a way, the documents help to demonstrate both the strengthens and weaknesses of primary source documentation in historical research. As with most documents of this type, there are of course limitations. After all, documents, as well as the works of history for which they are often used, are produced by fallible people who have biases whether they admit them or not, they are produced by people who are influenced by their particular cultural and political environment. In this case, for example, the German official clearly accepted some of the ugly prejudices of the Nazi period. He repeats a racist joke at the expense of Jews, and seems to see average Albanians as little more than children. While perhaps less effected by racist ideology, Jacobs, too, writes from a distinct cultural and political point of view. In his denunciation of the opposition to the Hoxha regime he celebrates the democratic inclinations of the Albanian people, along with their strong individual love of freedom and innate sense of justice. This may indeed have been the case, but we are offered little in the way of evidence to support these conclusions. Jacobs was an American, who seemed to think that all oppressed peoples could develop functioning democracies and healthy economies if left to do so without interference. Documents, such as the two presented here, often also suffer from a problem of methodology. We are not told how the information presented in them was obtained. The German official laments the fact that there were so few Germans in Albania who actually spoke Albanian, so we must assume that the statistics offered were collected by Albanians – but which Albanians? Were they associated with the collaborationist regimes, or were they in some way independent? The same question much be asked with regard to the Jacobs report. The American mission in Albania consisted of four Americans, supplemented by a local staff. What role did this staff play in gathering the statistics? The answers to these questions clearly have bearing on an evaluation of the veracity of the material. But researchers, of course, face the same issues when attempting to evaluate any document. The problem constitutes one of the hazards of historical research.
In the final analysis, though, these questions should not seriously devalue what can be gleaned from these documents. They are remarkable pieces of the historical puzzle. Apart from the analytical aspects discussed above, they contain a rich trove of contemporary statistics collected under very difficult circumstances. They were produced by trained and most likely objective professional foreign service officers or military analysts whose principal role was to effectively serve the state which they represented. They likely suffer less of an ideological handicap which impacts at least some of the material produced during the communist period. They constitute an invaluable contemporary resource which, combined with other evidence, will provide a clearer picture of this critical period in 20th century Albanian historical development.
