By Bernd J. Fischer
When Enver Hoxha, Albania’s long-time Stalinist dictator, was buried with honors under the socialist realist statue of Mother Albania in the Martyrs’ Cemetery in Tirana, the date of his death was omitted from his tombstone. Ramiz Alia, who followed Hoxha as party secretary, was responsible for the omission, arguing that such a man could never die. Unfortunately for Albania, still mired in its transition and heavily influenced by its Stalinist past, Alia may have been right. Certainly the most brutal aspects of the Hoxha regime, including its state-of-siege isolation, its political murders, its prisons, its forced labor camps, and the hardships of long internal exile are gone. But aspects of its intolerant authoritarianism, the general disregard for the well-being of its people and the best interests of the state on the part of the elite, brutal uncompromising politics, and lack of a rule of law, have obstructed the path to Albania’s broadly articulated goals of establishing a functioning democracy and market economy, and Euro-Atlantic integration.
The Hoxha Regime
That the Hoxha period left a profoundly negative impression on post-communist Albania is clear. Still, some historians have credited him with achievements in specific areas such as health, education, and women’s rights. Despite grinding poverty, he did diversify the economy and society through a program of Soviet-style industrialization, he raised the standard of living, and he reduced the impact of divisive factors on Albanian society, such as regional and clan loyalties, the traditional north-south division, and the occasional tension associated with four distinct religious groups. And he did defiantly and doggedly defend Albania’s territorial integrity and independence.
But while some Eastern European dictators mellowed with age, Hoxha became more extreme building his regime on terror administered by his extensive security apparatus – positioned around the dreaded Sigurimi, the secret police – which allowed Hoxha and his state into not only the homes but also the minds of Albanians. They were cowed into a fearful state of conformism and apathy, with their thoughts kept secret, and like their leader, paranoid and suspicious of all around them, losing their sense of personal dignity and responsibility. The Albanian Party of Labor (APL) and its members fared little better, for Hoxha ruthlessly eliminated his colleagues – no communist regime experienced such repeated purges and decimations. Ultimately power was restricted to a small group bound together by traditional ties of family or clan loyalty, and their common complicity in the continuing murderous purges. But even these people were not safe, and as a result little in the way of active dissent could be found anywhere in Albania.
The Collapse of Communism in Albania
When Hoxha died in 1985 he was succeeded by his protꨩ Ramiz Alia who, among other challenges, was immediately faced with increasingly serious economic and social problems. These resulted in part from the usual plague of over-centralization, persistent often inept interference from the center, further complicated by high birth rates, overcrowding in the countryside and increasing unemployment. Albania’s economic woes were further exacerbated by inefficient enterprises, widespread corruption and constant shortages of basic goods. In the midst of this looming disaster, Albania entered the television age with over 200,000 sets by 1985, affording Albanians the opportunity of a glimpse of the outside world via Yugoslav, Greek, and Italian stations and adding to the growing disaffection. By the late 1980s, as the repressive aspects of the regime were gradually reduced, alienated segments of society became slightly bolder. Alia, who recognized the growing political, social and economic crisis, did not handle this increasingly complex situation very well. His response was always reactive, tinkering with the structure when it was already too late. To his credit, he lessened his reliance on the Sigurimi, but he was pushed into reforms in fits and starts, which prevented him from developing anything like a cohesive program. Perhaps his biggest problem was his goal, which was to preserve the system while instituting minor technical adjustments. Events, including the expanding revolutions elsewhere in Eastern Europe – in particular the rapid fall and execution of Nicolea Ceaucescu of Romania – stimulated the Albanian leadership to push this grudging minimalist reform further. But the communists slowly lost control as disenchantment amongst the population found more active expressions including spontaneous strikes and demonstrations, while the government became increasingly reluctant to use its still extensive security apparatus. At the emergency 9th plenum of the party in January 1990 the leadership voiced criticism of Mikhail Gorbachev and refused to consider political pluralism, hoping to contain the situation with baby steps in terms of minor economic decentralization.
That this was not working and that a degree of panic was setting in is indicated by the rapid convocation of the 10th plenum in April that took more dramatic steps. At this important meeting, the party essentially reversed the 1967 degree which had abolished religion in Albania, reinstituted the ministry of justice which Hoxha had dissolved in 1966, after declaring that the ideal of “socialist justice” had been achieved, and removed the 1976 restriction on foreign investment. Alia continued to hope that communism could be saved through gradual change but as with others like him in Eastern Europe, he underestimated the seriousness of the crisis and was overwhelmed by the momentum of the growing revolt.
By the spring of 1990 with little hope of an economic turnaround, Albania was faced with a slow decline in public discipline. More and more workers, those who were still employed, failed to show up for work. Peasants, who still made up the vast majority of the population, refused to deliver food to the cities and stole state-owned animals. Rage was exhibited as well as people took revenge on the state through the destruction of state property – including government offices, and schools. By July the regime’s very legitimacy was called into question when it was faced with the spectacle of thousands storming western embassies in Tirana seeking asylum, while thousands more commandeered rusty boats in Durr쳠harbor and fled to Italy.
The next months saw the development of an increasingly radical, violent, and confrontational street culture of a random and anarchic character that took hold in almost all of Albania’s cities and towns. The final push towards political pluralism, and with it the eventual end of the regime, came from students, particularly those from Albania’s only university in Tirana who unlike the majority of the intellectuals were willingly to risk open defiance of the government. Alia was concerned enough to send Dr. Sali Berisha (see box), who had been one of the first to openly advocate political pluralism and was assumed, therefore, to have some standing with the students, to act as a mediator. Berisha very skillfully used his role to commandeer and then direct the protests, which by December had finally pushed Alia to give up Europe’s last political monopoly and schedule new elections. On 12 December, once such a thing had become legal, the Democratic Party (DP), with a rather ill-defined ideology but based generally on democracy, market economy and national reconciliation, was born – with Berisha in a leading role.
But it required two difficult elections, during which the country nearly fell apart, before Alia was finally ousted and the transition could begin. Albania had no experience with pluralist elections and no tradition of political parties on which to draw. The new DP had little organizational experience, minimal external political contacts and severely limited financial resources. On the eve of Albania’s first multi-party election in March 1991 the party was not only without a clearly articulated program – no clear policy on land reform, and vague notions about visas to Europe and admission to the EC – it was also without the means to spread these ideas. The party had only eight automobiles. The APL, conversely, despite rapidly deteriorating conditions, had well entrenched national organizations, control of all radio and television and the support of Albania’s conservative peasants who had little in common with the DP leadership and its urban supporters.
In an atmosphere of tense anticipation, the APL won two thirds of the seats in parliament. Fatos Nano, a young economist and protꨩ of Hoxha’s wife but who seemed to favor the party’s new moderate forces, was appointed prime minister. In increasingly difficult circumstances, Nano was responsible for some important achievements, including continuing to open Albania to the world, a policy begun by Alia, and the adoption of a provisional constitution which endorsed political pluralism and freedom of religion, guaranteed human and civil rights and, in a symbolic move, reduced the name of the country to simply the Republic of Albania. The energetic Nano also saw the need for significant changes within the APL itself and he took the opportunity to do so at the 10th party congress in June. Under Nano’s guidance the party renamed itself the Socialist Party (SP). Fatos Nano was elected party president and proclaimed a new program based on the principles advocated by West European social democratic parties. He declared himself dedicated to a gradual transition to a market economy while strengthening international ties. As a concrete and symbolic gesture of change, Nano dissolved the dreaded Sigurimi in July.
Despite these significant political changes taking place in Tirana, the country in general simply continued to degenerate into chaos. The security apparatus, particularly the underpaid demoralized army, continued to disintegrate, basic services collapsed, food production and distribution lagged, both internal and external immigration continued, while violent demonstrations and destruction of property increased. Cities became unsafe, particularly at night. Alia had ordered the removal of the last statue of Stalin in December 1990. In February 1991 demonstrators destroyed the larger than life size golden statue of Hoxha in the main square in Tirana, while others repeated the process in smaller towns. The old guard resisted by organizing and arming the so-called Enver Hoxha Voluntary Activists Union, which along with some elements of the security apparatus organized pro-Hoxha rallies throughout the country and did manage to detain and occasionally torture hundreds of the most outspoken critics of the regime. There appeared to be a threat of civil war.
These conditions were exacerbated by a virtual economic collapse – by mid 1991 only some twenty-five percent of the state’s productive capacity was operational. In May the already paralyzed government was faced with a nationwide strike, organized by newly independent labor organizations. The government appealed for foreign help and received some in the form of Operation Pelican, a coalition of the willing spear-headed by Italy which was having trouble coping with the massive influx of refugees. The operation, led by 750 Italian troops, provided up to 90% of Albania’s basic food needs until the end of December 1993 when the mission was declared complete. While starvation, which had become a tangible threat, was averted, the general decline continued, making it impossible for the Alia/Nano regime to stabilize. In June, soon after the party congress, Nano was replaced by Ylli Bufi and a “Government of National Stability” which included seven DP ministers. The new government had a very limited mandate which included attempting to deal with the economic crisis and preparing for new elections, which the DP had been demanding for some time. The first goal proved beyond the government’s capacity and the internal situation only deteriorated further. A particularly severe winter gripped the country in 1991. There was no fuel – and no real functioning economy. Serious disturbances continued. In December 1991 Bufi was replaced by the more able Vilson Ahmeti who called together some independent technocrats who did at least adopt a new electoral code and managed to finally schedule new elections for March 1992.
This time the DP, which had withdrawn from the coalition government in December, had time to prepare, having received both advice and funding from the increasingly active, anti-communist, diaspora. During the campaign, Berisha as always was perhaps too lavish with his promises. Among other things, he suggested that a DP victory would result in a massive influx of foreign aid as well as increased quotas for visas to the West – ironically very much in line with what he continues to promise today. His platform also called for radical political and economic reform and the restoration of law and order. All of this was delivered with Berisha’s dynamic campaigning and personal tenacity. In the end, in a generally fair and honest election, the DP won a substantial victory. The party gained over sixty percent of the popular vote, doing well in both urban and rural constituencies. Ramiz Alia resigned in April and the new parliament elected Sali Berisha as Albania’s first post-communist president.
President Berisha in Power, 1992-1997
Sali Berisha’s task was more than daunting and he attacked it with energy and uncompromising determination. At least in the initial period, he was able to achieve some far reaching political, economic, and social reforms. Berisha began by rapidly dismantling some aspects of the previous one-party state. He removed communist symbols from the coat of arms and the flag, and banned the APL. Wide-ranging purges were carried out in all of the ministries and remaining security organs.
Early economic and social change was much more profound. The process of privatization began prior to the Berisha presidency but significantly accelerated under the new government which enthusiastically adopted the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) macroeconomic stability package, or the shock therapy approach. This program, which had done well elsewhere, included rapid privatization, removing restrictions on imports, abandoning price controls, and phasing out subsidies to unprofitable or even marginal businesses. These policies, supplemented by nearly one billion dollars in foreign assistance (1992-1995) and 350 million dollars in immigrant remittances, did reverse the trend pushing the GDP into positive numbers again by 1993. But the costs of these programs were heavier than they were elsewhere. First, the economic turnaround was based principally on consumption rather that on manufacturing and agriculture, resulting in a massive foreign trade deficit. The cost to the average Albanian included extensive unemployment and for the tens of thousands who had become dependent on government subsidies and government services, which were cut significantly in line with IMF instructions, even deeper poverty. While some of course thrived, for most the concepts of democracy and a free market economy became synonymous with insecurity and hardship.
The social changes accompanying this upheaval were also profound. Seemingly overnight, Albanians were released from one of the most restrictive and isolated social structures in Europe. New found personal freedoms were perhaps best exhibited through automobiles, televisions, and simple mobility. During the Hoxha years, private automobiles had been outlawed so that by 1989 there were no more that 200 cars in the entire country. Once the restrictions were lifted, used cars, many of them stolen, were imported by the tens of thousands so that, by 1992, Albanians were driving 120,000 private vehicles. The lifting of Albania’s draconian travel restrictions not only allowed hundreds of thousands to flee abroad, but also resulted in extensive internal migration with entire poverty-stricken northern villages resettling in hastily constructed squalid shanty towns near Tirana and other cities. Even the past was changed, with history cleansed by the new leadership at the Albanian Academy of Sciences which oversaw the production of new textbooks focused on the contribution of the nationalist forces during the Second World War. Religious freedom was confirmed and while there was periodic tension, and Berisha’s adherence to the Islamic Conference in 1994 raised some concern abroad, religious issues did not become major political issues.
While some of these social changes can be considered at least partially positive, others were decidedly not. New found freedom led to a rapid rise in both organized and random crime, in a country that had been relatively free of petty crime. Albania proved ideal for the rise of international criminal organizations. It was a poor area in a chaotic state surrounded by wealthy countries, with a legacy of clans which provided organization and codes of conduct, and many unemployed former secret policemen with special talents and networks for sale. These new criminal organizations were able to take advantage of the breakdown of the law enforcement system, porous borders, a growing diaspora and migrant labor population which often served as a vehicle. The insecurity in the Balkan region in general – in particular the collapse of Yugoslavia and the sanctions imposed on what remained offered unique smuggling opportunities, similar perhaps to the period of prohibition in the United States. Individuals in these brutal organizations maintained their old contacts with the political class to the extent that the state became further ensnared. Violence was further increased by the revival of blood feuds, which continue to be a scourge in the north of Albania.
The end of communism also brought in its wake a significantly deteriorated status for Albania’s women. While Hoxha, at least in theory, held to the Marxist concept of gender equity, with the beginning of the transition even the fiction of equality disappeared. During the Hoxha years rural women especially did see some benefit. For the first time they had access to medical care and education for their children. They could leave the house to meet with other women, participate in politics and own property. With the collapse of communism traditional attitudes and actions resurfaced, often returning women to the role of chattel. With the coming of significant unemployment, women were always the first to lose their jobs. They found themselves once again confined to the house, producing many of the family’s basic needs. To be sure, the new Albania provided women some benefits, including freedom of contraception, and eased abortion and divorce restrictions, and enhanced mobility. But much of this was offset by the return of patriarchal predominance, the virtual disappearance of women from politics, and new dangers including pornography and crime, and abduction for purposes of sex trafficking and rape – the latter being ills generally new to Albania which continue to be concerns today.
Still, social and economic trends could be said to be moving in a generally positive direction. The same can not be said of politics which remains a major problem. The authoritarian and intolerant nature of Albania’s elite precluded the negotiation and compromise which was desperately needed for Albania’s new political forces to move steadily in the direction of democracy. Despite his singular courage during the last stages of the old regime, Berisha seemed unable to distance himself from an unhealthy political culture. He ultimately proved to be the poster child of old school politics with the DP becoming his personal vehicle to increased power. He refused to allow any internal dissent within the party, and when his policies were questioned and the continuation of his presidency challenged, he struck out with everything at his disposal – willing to use violence and willing to undermine Albania’s fledgling democracy in the process.
President Berisha’s political honeymoon was rather short-lived. Although the DP won the local elections of July 1992, it polled only 43% of the vote down from 65% in April. This outcome resulted generally from continuing, even growing, insecurity, popular disappointment with the pace of economic recovery and reform, discord within the ranks of the DP and overconfidence on the part of Berisha. Progressive elements within the party accused him of ignoring socio-economic problems, of cronyism in order to augment his power base and attempting to mask his failure and growing authoritarianism through settling of old scores and vengeance against former communists.
Much of the criticism was justified. Berisha was increasingly influenced by former political prisoners who were uninterested in the original DP platform of national reconciliation. Although a former low-ranking communist functionary himself, Berisha found revenge against former communists useful in distracting the population. One certainly expected that many former communists would be replaced but Berisha launched a wholesale purge of the security organs, the ministries, and state administrative structures. Since there were not nearly enough qualified DP militants to fill the vacancies, Berisha required the University of Tirana to construct a six month “how to be a judge or prosecutor” training course which enrolled many who had no legal background whatsoever. Those within the party who objected to this procedure were simply removed. With his new judges in place Berisha targeted, among others, former politburo members like Alia and Hoxha’s widow. Their trials had many of the attributes of traditional communist show trials, including television coverage and young unqualified judges humiliating older defendants. Fatos Nano, too, was arrested on corruption charges and in what many observers saw as primarily a political trial, was sentenced to twelve years in prison.
As Berisha’s authoritarianism intensified, Albania’s fledgling new media became a target as well. Given the lack of an underground or dissident press during the Hoxha period upon which to build, the construction of a free press was complex in Albania. With radio and television remaining under state control, Albania’s first independent print reporters were challenged by the concept of press responsibility. Press outlets themselves tended to be the mouthpieces of political parties and therefore highly partisan. Employing invective reminiscent of the Hoxha era, much of the press became increasingly critical of Berisha. The president struck back with violence and through his courts. Policemen and thugs, often interchangeable, attacked the offices of the opposition press as well as individual reporters. A restrictive press law was passed in 1993 which instituted high taxes, allowed for heavy fines and imprisonment, and did much to cow the press into silence or self-censorship, which in turn encouraged the people to question the value of print media, reducing readership. Even today Albania has many newspapers but remarkably low circulation rates.
With every election, the president came under greater pressure and in response became more authoritarian. By 1994 the Berisha regime had finally readied a new draft constitution which would have further augmented the power of the president. Lacking sufficient support in parliament, Berisha referred the constitution to a popular referendum, but despite extensive manipulation lost by a wide margin. Stunned and angered, the president became even more determined and began planning early for the upcoming parliamentary elections of May 1996, with which he intended to cement his power.
Albania had degenerated into an illusion of democracy with an isolated authoritarian president, facing no effective parliamentary opposition supported by an overly large highly politicized security apparatus. While some in the West continued to support him as the road to stability – Italian politicians referred to him as “the good doctor” – the important support of the United States was effectively undermined by the heavily manipulated elections of 1996. With the electoral defeat of 1994 fresh in his mind, in 1996 Berisha was leaving nothing to chance. Preparations began in 1995 with the introduction of the so-called “Genocide Law,” which barred former top ranking APL and state officials, as well as communist era secret police informants from holding political office until 2002. After selectively releasing files, Berisha was able to disqualify 142 parliamentary nominees, only three of whom were Democrats. A series of other changes in the electoral law also clearly favored the DP.
The campaign itself was reminiscent of communist era propaganda with Berisha branding the opposition, whom he accused of terrorism, as the “Red Front” subsidized by Albania’s traditional enemies the Serbs and the Greeks. Security forces and thugs were used to disrupt opposition political meetings, harass and physically attack opposition supporters and candidates, and the press. On the day of the election, the situation deteriorated further to the extent that the Socialists withdrew from the election two hours prior to the closing of the polls claiming, with some justification, that the DP was perpetrating a massive fraud.
President Berisha was elated with his victory – the DP now controlled 87% of the seats in parliament, was in firm control of the police and the courts and had cowed the media. The principle of the one-party state had been reconstructed. The cost of this victory, however, was enormous. The election was roundly condemned by the US, the EU, various human rights organizations like Helsinki Watch, and monitoring groups like the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The US, which until this point had been Berisha’s strongest supporter, suggested that the entire election be rerun, while members of the opposition compared the election to a coup. The 1996 election was viewed as a litmus test of Albania’s commitment to democracy and speedy reform and Berisha had failed the test. Despite the progress for which he was responsible, Berisha’s domestic and international credibility was badly tarnished by this episode and has yet to fully recover.
The Popular Revolt of 1997
Before the president could even attempt to deal with the outcome of the 1996 election, he did much to create an even more serious crisis which not only eventually swept him away, but caused what could be considered Europe’s first successful popular armed uprising since the nineteenth century.
In the existing atmosphere of political tension and stalled social and economic reform, it likely would not have taken much to push Albania over the edge. The crisis began with the collapse of a series of pyramid investment schemes. In many ways, Albania was ripe for such activity given its cash economy, the large amounts of currency controlled by criminal elements, and the considerable immigrant remittances which continue to make up some 15% of the GDP to this day. The schemes began rather slowly in the 1990s but by the summer and fall of 1996, as those who had invested early began realizing massive profits of up to 50% a month, they expanded dramatically ultimately involving 65-75% of all Albanian families. The funds likely collected at least a billion dollars. Many impoverished Albanians sold everything they had including homes, farms, livestock and personal belongings fully expecting to live off of their investments for the rest of their lives.
The schemes expanded because there were so few areas of legitimate investment in Albania and because scheme managers effectively argued that they had diversified and had essentially become successful investment bankers. They also expanded because of the astonishing failure of the leadership on all sides with both the DP and the SP benefiting directly from specific schemes. Senior government officials ignoring, albeit belated, IMF warnings called the schemes good business and attacked those few in the media who were critical.
Inevitably, as pyramids do, the schemes began to falter. As they did so, by January 1997 popular panic set in and protests, which quickly became violent, broke out in Tirana and some southern cities. In Vlor묠Lushnj롡nd Berat, angry investors attacked and set fire to government buildings, including city halls, courts, police stations, land registry offices, and DP offices. The police attempted to curtail this escalating violence but to no avail, as it became increasingly clear that hundreds of thousands faced financial ruin. The situation took a major turn for the worse when the large Gjallica fund collapsed in Vlor롩n early February. The predominately Socialist seaport town erupted in violence and for days Berisha’s security forces battled the citizens before having to abandon the town.
The growing unrest spread rapidly to other southern towns where the Socialists were strong, often with the direct involvement of high ranking SP officials. With this crisis many Socialists and other party members saw an opportunity to finally be rid of Berisha. Many who had fled abroad, fearing Berisha’s vengeance, returned to help organize the resistance around disaffected former military and secret police officers, people whose experience with the concept of Hoxha’s long-practiced militia strategy would confound the government’s attempt to restore order by force.
By the beginning of March, spreading unrest had degenerated into full scale rebellion. On 2 March, Berisha finally proclaimed a state of emergency and issued a shoot to kill order, to be administered by the feared SHIK, the new secret police, which had already arrested hundreds in the capital. On the very next day, in a move condemned by the internationals and both domestic opponents and supporters, Berisha had his now puppet parliament reelect him to an additional five year term as president, after which parliament ceased to meet.
Berisha’s situation took a decided turn for the worse when the army began to disintegrate. Technically a force of 55,000 with hundreds of armored vehicles, the army proved to be less than useless to Berisha. The president had purged the officer corps, replacing trained personnel with the usual party militants. This served to further demoralize the troops who already suffered from miserable pay and very poor living conditions. Rather than fire on civilians, soldiers simply went home, abandoning well stocked armories. The population, particularly in the south where Hoxha had stockpiled most of his weapons in anticipation of an invasion from Greece, quickly raided the weapons depots, eventually making off with close to one million Kalashnikov assault rifles with hundreds of millions of rounds of ammunition, tanks and artillery pieces and sophisticated Chinese surface to air missiles. While much of the latter was thankfully unusable, almost anyone can fire a Kalashnikov, allowing insurgents to take and hold large southern towns in which banks and government offices were sacked, shops looted and prisons thrown open. Ultimately every prison in the country was opened, releasing all of Albania’s convicted criminals, as well as those who were considered to be political prisoners including Fatos Nano, whom Berisha quickly pardoned.
The criminals rapidly armed themselves and added to the chaos and terror. By mid-March at least 15,000 Albanians had fled to Italy and an estimated two thousand had been killed. The country was being ransacked. Nearly every industrial and manufacturing plant was looted and destroyed – even schools and hospitals were not spared. Spartak Ngjela, the minister of justice, announced with considerable candor that “All structures of the state have failed. In this moment we are in a natural state, if you know your Hobbes.”
Still, Berisha had been able to hold on to Tirana – in part through SHIK terror whose headquarters was guarded by six tanks. He was also able to maintain control of much of the north, where ardent supporters had also broken into armories and swore to defend the president. As the insurgents began moving on Tirana, a full scale bloody civil war drawn along traditional north-south lines became increasingly likely. Although Berisha had pledged never to negotiate with “red terrorists,” once it became clear to him that he could not rely upon foreign military intervention, he was forced into a humiliating compromise with those opposition leaders still at large in Tirana. On 9 March 1997, an agreement was reached which included the construction of a so-called national reconciliation government, the proclamation of a general amnesty for rebels, and new parliamentary elections, accompanied by a referendum on the restoration of the defunct monarchy of King Zog, both of which were scheduled for June. The latter was likely intended by Berisha to deflect at least some attention away from his own failure.
Although significant disorder continued, this political agreement and the arrival of foreign troops helped to avert the threatened civil war and an uneasy standoff ensued. Albania’s neighbors, fearful of yet another massive wave of unwelcome refugees, put together Operation Alba which commenced in April 1997. Finally responding to desperate pleas from Berisha, 6,300 European troops, with the Italians in the lead, dispersed throughout the south and central lowlands on what was billed a humanitarian mission. Although Alba troops did not intervene in the fighting or attempt to disarm the now heavily armed population, they did create at least a modicum of calm during which another seriously flawed election took place.
Following some procedural agreements, including revision of the “Genocide Law,” the vicious and violent campaign led to possibly the least democratic election in post-communist Eastern Europe. The campaign process was marred by bomb attacks and several assassination attempts against Berisha who at one point was caught in a gun battle which wounded at least eight people. Actual campaigning was impossible for one party or the other in much of the country. There was little debate, with Nano, despite occasional vaguely progressive rhetoric, simply running against Berisha and rather disingenuously promising to compensate pyramid scheme victims. Berisha just ran against the communists. An added feature was the sight of the nearly seven foot tall pretender to the throne, Leka, campaigning with his small private army. Immediately after learning that the monarchy had been rejected, Leka declared the election to be stolen and attempted an armed uprising. Dressed in fatigues, accessorized with pearl handled revolvers and grenades, Leka led a group of several hundred armed supporters along the principal boulevard in Tirana. To the surprise of no one, shooting eventually erupted and after one of his militants was killed, the pretender fled back into exile.
Berisha and the DP paid a heavy price for their adherence to the old ways, for their arrogance and incompetence, their intolerance and corruption. Albanians overwhelmingly voted against Berisha as opposed to for the SP, which was rewarded with 101 out of 155 seats in parliament. On 23 July, President Berisha resigned in disgrace. Despite the appalling example of democracy which produced this result, the international community had no choice but to sign off on the outcome.
Berisha had started with such hope – declaring to a large crowd in 1992 “Hello Europe, we hope we find you well.” And Europe had responded. But he had squandered the good will of the international community and the nation with his inability to move past Albania’s political culture of authoritarianism and rigidity. Perhaps it was too much to ask of him, or of any Albanian politician so soon after the collapse of Stalinism. But the damage brought on by this failure of leadership was enormous not only to the state and the well-being of the people, but also to the very concept of democracy and a market economy. Albanians who had yet to really experience either, found themselves wondering whether these goals were indeed worth achieving.
The Nano Years, 1997-2005
Fatos Nano had walked out of an unguarded cell in the middle of March 1997 and by the end of June he was again prime minister with a powerful mandate – it had been a remarkable political come-back and could have been used to accomplish much needed reform, reconstruction, and national reconciliation. But like Berisha, Nano was a creature of his age and was immured in Albania’s political culture of revenge and authoritarianism. Rather than attempt to diverge from that culture, Fatos Nano in many ways was its embodiment. Nano, who had gained prominence as an economist at the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, was considered a dedicated communist. While he was perhaps more open to reform than some of the dinosaurs on the politburo, he had opposed real pluralism and a market economy until the every end of one-party rule. But his native intelligence allowed him to rise quickly in the rapidly disintegrating APL and, as we have seen, he served briefly as prime minister in 1991 while still in his thirties. He surrounded himself with some of the old hard liners, side-lined many dedicated reformers and left little room for internal party discussion. His rhetoric in the run up to his second stint as prime minister, like that of Berisha, envisioned meeting the needs of the population, establishing a free market economy based on fiscal discipline, reducing corruption, and enhanced respect for human rights. The reality which Nano created was something quite different.
Nano set his tone early, and, like Berisha’s, it tended to be dogmatic, confrontational and initially at least, focused on the settling of scores. Like Berisha, Nano did much to undermine the notion of a civil service by initiating a broad-ranging purge of the security apparatus, the judiciary and the state administration, almost all ambassadors and generals. Albania’s recent historical past was once again rewritten under the close supervision of all new university rectors and new leadership at the Academy of Sciences. SP militants replaced DP militants. Once the judiciary was secure, Nano ended the ongoing trial of some thirty former communists, dropped the remnants of the “Genocide Law” and arrested prominent DP members from among those who had not fled the country. The prime minister, ignoring many of the reformers and foreshadowing later party splits, quickly constructed a government comprised of many from the former communist regime and almost all from the south, not bothering to obtain party approval beforehand.
Nano quickly turned his attention to restoring some semblance of order, and was able to calm the south with the help of pro-Socialist criminal bands, who continued to play an important role in the SP government for years to come. The north was more problematic but by the end of November, stability was returning allowing Nano to focus on other critical issues, often simply continuing the policies of the previous regime. Certainly, slow progress on some issues was registered. Albania continued haltingly toward democratic consolidation, establishing the framework for a market economy, and international integration. Nano proved less oppressive when it came to press freedom and slowly growing civil society organizations.
Privatization continued, with the industrial base and banking system privatized by 2005. This has helped to at least set up the basic conditions for market-driven competition. Annual economic growth remained at about five percent during the SP years due mainly to construction, small businesses and the service sectors, but Albania had of course started from a rather low level in 1991. The Bank of Albania reporting that per capita income reached $2883 in 2006 but because distribution was extremely uneven, rural poverty remained a major problem with fully a quarter of Albanians living below the poverty line. It is likely that close to 50% of GDP came from criminal activities but the large influx of cash tended to keep the lek, Albania’s currency, quite stable. Unemployment officially hovered around 15% but with the near subsistence farming in reality was likely higher than 30%, exacerbated by underemployment. Foreign direct investment remained very low and the business climate, restricted by a permanent energy crisis marked by daily disruptions in the supply of electricity and drinking water, serious environmental problems, extensive corruption, and a still developing concept of a rule of law, remained unattractive. With a high internal state debt and negative trade balance, economically Albania did little more than continue to creep forward.
Part of both the cause and effect of this painfully slow level of economic advance was the continuing problem of the brain drain. Although the various crises of course accelerated the process, even during periods of relative stability, Albanians continued to flee their country in astonishing numbers. A total of 720,000 Albanians are estimated to have emigrated between 1989 and 2001 representing well over 30% of the total population. Naturally, this number included many of the best and the brightest whose talents were very much needed. The professions, particularly health care and education, suffered. While under the Hoxha regime Albanians had been afforded some basic universal health care, with the collapse, village clinics were often destroyed and the medical personal assigned there often left for Tirana or abroad. Even in the cities, however, there was a significant degeneration of the system. Apart from the shortage of trained personnel and limited resources, the chairman of the parliamentary health committee estimated in 2006 that the level of medical technology was at least forty years behind Albania’s Balkan neighbors. He suggested that health care in general was in a state of crisis hobbled by a communist centralized bureaucracy pressured by a rudimentary market economy. This clash of systems resulted in extensive corruption, endangering the health of many.
Education, which had been touted as another success story under Hoxha, suffered from related problems. Apart from the lack of adequately trained personnel and resource problems, education – in particular the field of history – became a political battleground. Central to the struggle was the issue of resistance and collaboration during the Second World War, an event which continues to dominate the national psyche. The war remained something of a leit motiv during the communist period, conferring legitimacy on Hoxha and the party who labeled as traitors all those who failed to participate in partisan resistance. When the DP came to power, personnel and textbooks were replaced, with the new leadership of the Albanian Academy producing a new version of the war intended to “make science free of indoctrinated, political party tactics.” Instead, science was captured by different indoctrinated political party tactics and new textbooks were produced reflecting DP reinterpretations of the war. Once the SP came to power, predictably, those books were withdrawn and replaced, moving Albania back to a view of the war somewhat closer to the original APL version. And so it goes – the topic remains a major issue to this day, while standards deteriorate and illiteracy, which had been effectively eradicated during the Hoxha years, is again on the rise. The education system in general remains in crisis.
Most of the socio-economic problems of the Nano period were at least exacerbated by the continuation of poisonous, often murderous politics, precipitated by the continuing inability of Albania’s elite to distance itself from its Hoxhaist past. The tone was set immediately in 1997 when the DP boycotted what Berisha called the new “parliament of Kalashnikovs.” Berisha escalated the usual invective by frequently referring to Nano as a criminal and a drug addict, while DP militants often degenerated into terrorist gangs. Following a DP rally, one such gang, consisting of dozens of heavily armed thugs, attacked Shkod철in February 1998 looting and burning the state bank and the university.
Later in 1998 Berisha took one step beyond his noisy obstructionism and attempted a coup. Political tension in Tirana increased during the summer of 1998 and then exploded in September with the assassination of the DP leader Azem Hajdari on 12 September, 1998. While there remains considerable confusion concerning who was responsible, the immediate aftermath constituted another serious political crisis. Berisha saw the opportunity and seized it leading some 2000 militants, many of them armed, into the streets with Hajdari’s coffin which was used to pound against the doors of Nano’s office. One group of demonstrators attacked and occupied the state-run television studios broadcasting the message that “we have taken over” while others looted central Tirana, shouting “death to Nano.” The prime minister panicked and fled to Macedonia leaving President Rexhep Meidani to call in the troops and disperse Berisha’s ragtag militia. Following three days of chaos, along with eight dead and nearly 100 injured, basic order was restored.
Nano’s behavior during the crisis, as well as the animosity of President Meidani who disliked the prime minister’s excessive drinking and high-living, undermined him to the benefit of a young group of reformers within the party. Nano was forced to resign on 28 September 1998 and was replaced by the relatively untainted SP secretary general, Pandeli Majko. The thirty-one year old new prime minister was faced not only with the continuing challenge of crime, violence, and public disorder, but was also forced to deal with the deteriorating situation in Kosovo and Macedonia.
In the midst of these challenges, Majko did manage to oversee the adoption of a new constitution. With no functioning opposition and despite a DP boycott and general obstructionism, and with considerable assistance from internationals and popular input, the new prime minister approved a relatively progressive constitution which vested power in the prime minister and the cabinet, securing its implementation through a national referendum in November 1998. Majko was also in part responsible for Albania’s receiving much needed international approval for its moderate stance and cooperative attitude on the Kosovo war of 1998-1999 and the Macedonian violence of 2001, despite the DP playing the nationalist card and portraying the SP as un-Albanian and pro-Slav. Although these conflicts were not crucial factors in Albanian internal politics, internal instability was further challenged as Albania was inundated with refugees, principally fleeing Kosovars, who swelled Albania’s population by nearly seventeen percent in a two month period in 1999. Demonstrating remarkable selflessness, Albanians shared what little they had with the refugees and along with extensive foreign assistance, the Majko government was able to avoid what could have become a major humanitarian crisis – and both Nano and Majko were able to avoid war with Serbia. In general, Albania has avoided any serious long-term tensions with its neighbors since 1989.
Despite these successes, the hostile relationship between the two major parties and growing instability at the top of the SP power structure continued to complicate Albania’s road forward. In October 1999 Nano, who had maintained the loyalty of a large group of SP deputies, was reelected leader of the SP, defeating Majko who had hoped to solidify his position. Majko subsequently resigned as prime minister and was replaced by Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta, like Majko a former student leader, and a leading figure in the “reformist” group. Nano continued to intrigue behind the scenes forcing the resignation of a number of Meta supporters in the cabinet and blocking the appointment of their successors. Unable to resolve the crisis, an embittered Meta resigned in early 2002 to be replaced by his predecessor Majko. Within days, however, Nano had convinced the SP steering committee to combine the positions of party leader and prime minister, which effectively forced the resignation of Majko. Nano’s return as prime minister began with some promise, as the DP and SP had given in to European pressure and in July 2002 elected a consensus president in Alfred Moisiu, who proved to be quite effective in his limited role. But the period of reconciliation was short lived and Nano soon returned to monopolizing power in the party and government.
The SP of course also continued to battle the DP in parliament, on those occasions when the DP was not boycotting the body, in the streets, and in a series of bitterly contested elections in 2000, 2001 and 2003. These elections, although not as flawed as that of 1996, were accompanied by intimidation, violence, and manipulation. Party militants confronted each other in the streets, threatened voters at the polls, while party officials occasionally altered civil registries, and stuffed or stole ballot boxes. These and other problems resulted in frequent re-voting, protracted battles in Albania’s politicized courts, delaying the announcement of the results. None of these elections fully measured up to international standards, giving the opposition reason to question not only the legitimacy of the ballots but also that of the governments they produced. Once again, as a result of the enormous energy which these parallel struggles consumed, real progress was slow during the Nano years. While many lived in poverty, criminal organizations acted with impunity, having infiltrated government at every level. Albania gained an unenviable reputation as a haven for traffickers who turned the state into both a major transit country and a major source country. The police and the courts remained politicized, inefficient, and corrupted. Albania was labeled one of the most corrupt states in the world.
Nano, who seemed comfortable with the status quo, likely would have remained the prime minister had it not been for a major split in his party in 2004. Ilir Meta, who had considered defecting as early as 1996, finally decided that he could no longer work with Nano and organized one of many new parties, the Socialist Movement for Integration, just before the parliamentary elections of July 2005. Nano certainly had other disadvantages going into the election. Corruption was growing, his lifestyle increasingly became an issue, and he seemed unconcerned as the nation struggled with several tragedies resulting in significant loss of life. And the DP ran an effective, generally professional campaign emphasizing an anti-corruption, or “clean hands” platform. But many Albanians were still wary of Berisha. It was the defection of Meta which resulted in the narrow SP defeat and a peaceful transfer of power, in what was one of the fairest elections Albania had ever experienced. Following the construction of a coalition, Berisha returned to power, this time as prime minister, taking office on 3 September 2005.
Conclusion
It is clear that Albania continues to move in a positive direction; in particular the economy and the business climate continue to improve. While there is perhaps no “new” Sali Berisha, he has abjured much of the violence and extremism that characterized his presidency. In addition new younger politicians, like celebrated Tirana mayor Edi Rama who became the new leader of the SP, are offering Albanians real policy choices for the first time. There has even been some agreement between the two main parties, including a hastily passed constitutional amendment which will disenfranchise most of the smaller parties. This progress has been noted by internationals, as evidenced by the signing of the Stability and Association Agreement with the EU in 2006 and by Albania’s invitation to join NATO in April 2008.
But is it also clear that the old ways linger. Too much of Berisha’s energy in 2005-06 was dedicated to enhancing his own power through increased control of ostensibly independent administrative institutions and local government units, and preparing to dominate the local and presidential elections of 2007. In February 2007 Albania conducted local elections which both international and domestic observers labeled as a step backward, followed soon after by the July 2007 election of the fifty-year old Bamir Topi as president. While he has shown promise, Topi is seen by many as a non-consensus DP president. Both elections were preceded by invective, and lengthy political crises which postponed work on needed reforms. The Berisha regime has been further buffeted by a series of unseemly scenes in parliament and high profile scandals which have undercut its corruption-fighting credentials. The most serious of the latter involved a deadly explosion at a munitions de-commissioning plant in the suburbs of Tirana which exposed not only the hiring of women and children for dangerous work, but arms trafficking that implicated individuals near and in the government.
These disappointments, too, were noted by domestic and international observers who continue to call for urgent action on electoral and judicial reform, increased attention to government corruption and government connections with organized crime, and the strengthening of the rule of law. That the legacy of the Hoxha regime, with its history of failed political leadership, has demonstrated resilience seems evident given that nearly two decades after the fall of communism, Albania is still struggling to realize its democratic transition.
