Belgrade Threatens Conflict

Serbia has only two cards left in the ongoing struggle over Kosova – Russia’s resistance to independence and the threat of conflict. As Moscow’s reaction remains uncertain, the prospect of conflict is becoming Serbia’s primary argument in trying to delay the process of Kosova’s statehood.
Serbia is depending either on Russia’s UN Security Council veto or on a long delay, as Moscow demands more discussions over the Kosova plan. In sharp contrast, Washington is banking on Russia to abstain rather than veto Ahtisaari’s solution.
Behind all its rhetoric, Belgrade knows that it cannot depend on Russian support. It is therefore focusing attention on the specter of instability. In meetings with EU and U.S. representatives, Serbian officials recite three areas of allegedly looming conflict: within Serbia, in Kosova, and in the wider region.
Belgrade claims that Kosova’s independence will lead to major instability in Serbia. Allegedly, the followers of Milosevic in league with ultra-nationalists will attempt to overthrow the government. Indeed, the deputy leader of the Radical Party, Tomislav Nikolic, has threatened a popular uprising similar to the one that unseated Milosevic in October 2000.
Such sensationalist arguments indicate that Serbia cannot be a consolidated democracy if extremists present a constant menace to the country’s progress. This will deflate prospects for Serbia’s EU accession, regardless of the whereabouts of indicted war criminal Ratko Mladic. It will also increase calls for containing Serbian expansionism and strengthen calls for Kosova’s permanent separation from Belgrade.
The second scenario of instability depicted by Serbian officials is Kosova itself. While one leader of Kosova’s Serbian minority, Oliver Ivanovic, has warned of the possibility of another Serbian exodus, more radical voices have called for the secession of the Serb-dominated north once Kosova gains statehood.
Such a scenario is clearly containable if NATO and the EU are serious about maintaining stability and security in Kosova. Preventive measures are necessary by both organizations to ensure proper policing, the disarming of militants, and keeping roads and other lines of communication open.
The border with Serbia must be closely monitored by NATO troops and Belgrade must be warned that any attempts to unsettle northern Kosova will elicit a strong international response. Preparations must also be made for accommodating any Serbs who wish to leave Kosova despite assurances of extensive minority rights in an independent Kosova.
In the third scenario, Belgrade is again focusing on the broader Balkan “powder keg.” While all of its neighbors have tried to change the image and reality of the Balkans as a part of the European mainstream, officials in Belgrade seem to thrive on the specter of ethnic conflict, territorial disputes, and border wars.
By claiming that Kosova’s independence will serve to unravel Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro, Belgrade is in effect threatening its neighbors. Such alarmist warnings should be resolutely condemned by the countries concerned and by international players. Instead of behaving as a positive and stabilizing force in the region, Serbian officials prefer to act as spoilers seeking to reverse the evolution of stable states in the region.
During the final talks in Vienna, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica delivered a bitter statement expressing outrage that Serbia could end up losing 15 percent of its territory, thereby “endangering the foundation on which international order is based.” He only omitted to mention that Kosova’s independence would herald the end of civilization as we know it and the imminent extinction of the human species.
Serbian hyperbole is well known and widely documented. But breast-beating and emotional victimhood have little mileage in international politics and are no substitute for constructive policy. Threats of conflict and violence will further retard Serbia’s stated ambitions to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions or to improve the economic conditions of its citizens. Moreover, overkill by Serbian officials will certainly not obstruct Kosova’s road to independence and sovereignty; it may actually assist the process.