By Janusz Bugajski
Center for Strategic and International Studies
I will look at Albania’s development through the prism of international perceptions and stereotypes. Twenty years is a long time in politics; it is also a long time in the politics of perception and national stereotyping. I will briefly trace the evolving images of Albania and Albanians, especially in the U.S. and Western Europe, over the past two decades and how these may relate to Albania’s development. Two initial points: first, national images contribute to public opinion, political position, and policy making; and second, stereotypes are not always fully fraudulent as they often contain grains of truth.
There are at least six phases of Albanian imaging and stereotyping since the collapse of communism and Albania’s emergence from isolation. In order of appearance they are: the mysterious; the obsequious; the rebellious; the victimized; the criminal; and the entrepreneurial. Although these stereotypes are partially chronological, they may also overlap and one or more images are more strongly believed in some policy circles than in others. Let me briefly survey their components and contexts:
The Mysterious: Until twenty years ago, little was known about Albania and Albanians among politicians and public alike. Even conventional Western communists were banned from visiting unless they belonged to an even more exclusive Marxist-Leninist inner sect, were thoroughly vetted, and were willing to have their beards shaved and hair cut upon entry. Little was known about the country: it was neither a threat to anyone, which would inspire curiosity and investigation, or a source of attraction to anyone, which would inspire a craving for information and imitation. Albanians were considered mysterious and reclusive, an unknown breed in Europe, unpredictable in their political and foreign policy behavior but ultimately harmless.
The Obsequious: Very soon after the disintegration of Hoxha communism and the establishment of a rudimentary democracy, it transpired that the Albanians were not only pro-Western but they were turbo-Western. Unfortunately, the obsession with the West after decades of denial, and the passionate pro-Americanism after decades of forced-fed anti-Yankee propaganda sometimes created an image of obsequiousness. The Albanians were bending over backwards to accommodate U.S. and EU requests and demands, whether to desist from actively campaigning for Kosova’s independence or to establish good relations with all neighbors. Interestingly, a similar phenomenon has been evident in Kosova before and since independence because of the overwhelming dependence on Washington and several EU capitals for the country’s creation and survival. Agreement and accommodation are appreciated by policy makers and certainly helped Albania to join NATO and be considered a good ally of the U.S. Nonetheless, sometimes a line is crossed that may bring into question the character of the leadership that always appears to be saying yes in an attempt to satisfy the major Western governments.
The Rebellious: The rebel image of Albanians was created in two places – in Albania and in Kosova. The collapse of the infamous Albanian pyramid schemes in the mid-1990s followed by the disintegration of many government institutions convinced many outside observers that Albanians were ungovernable rioters and gun-totting hoodlums. This image was supplemented with the outbreak of insurgency in Kosova, but this image was partly positive in that Albanians were evidently willing to fight for their rights and freedoms. Of course, Serbian government propaganda sought to portray the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) as terrorists and Islamic militants rather than as an armed struggle for national liberation, which as in all similar conflicts sometimes resorted to assassinations and terror tactics. This had reverberations in the post-9/11 West.
The Victimized: The mass murders and expulsions in Kosova by Serbian government forces in the spring of 1999 and the subsequent NATO intervention created a new image of Albanians as targeted victims of state oppression. The mass media coverage of the war elicited enormous sympathy for Albanian refugees in all Western countries. Additionally, the open reception of refugees in Albania itself partly altered the stereotype of unscrupulous rebels, marauding gangs, and a country in chaos. The pyramids were almost forgotten. The Albanians became more compassionate and altruistic in media imagery.
The Criminal: Since the end of the Kosova war the focus in the Balkans has been on the pervasiveness of organized criminality with frequent scandals over people smuggling and the trafficking of young girls for the sex trade that has outraged Western public opinion. Although the gangs involved operate across ethnic boundaries and are common throughout the region, the evident prominence of Albanian traffickers at the western end of the Balkan route into the EU has strengthened the Albanian criminal stereotype. Belgrade, Moscow, and other capitals have also contributed to spreading the caricature of Albanians as born criminals. Additionally, it does not help that some partially educated commentators and even government officials in the West conflate the kinship concept of clan (as a kindred tracing descent from a common ancestor) with the criminal concept of clan (as a cartel or network of organized smugglers and traffickers). Unfortunately, the two are often used interchangeably.
The Entrepreneurial: This is probably the most positive image that has emerged in recent years. It is largely based on the successes of Albanians who have emigrated and established successful businesses in the U.S. and Western Europe. Although they may only constitute a narrow percentage of emigrants they are the most visible face of the Albanian nation. Although the image is generally positive, it may also contain some negative components where the sources of funds are questioned and ties to organized crime may be assumed. And it does not help that Albanians sometimes accuse each other in front of Westerners of shady connections even if such rumors are groundless and are spread out of spite, envy, or sheer competition.
In conclusion, one can expect the evolution of new stereotypes and images in the next twenty years. Hopefully, some will prove more three-dimensional than several of the simple caricatures in which Albanians have been portrayed. One last point, rather than complaining about stereotypes and prejudices, which certainly will not make them go away, Albanians need to be pro-active in creating their own positive contemporary myths about themselves for external consumption. And maybe once a more wholesome positive stereotype is created it will also become an ideal type or a moral and ethical compass for real human beings to emulate.
