European Enlargement After Fifty Years

By Janusz Bugajski
Fifty years after the birth of the European Union, the question of further enlargement remains uncertain. The EU is struggling with three fundamental questions: its depth, breadth, and clout.
Regarding depth, the failure to pass the Constitutional Treaty have cast doubts on the strengthening of Union institutions. This also has an impact on both clout and breadth. Regarding clout, a credible foreign and security policy cannot develop in the absence of institutional consensus. Regarding breadth, several older EU members are opposed to further enlargement until integration intensifies. Such postures may further divide the Union between enlargers and restricters.
Restricters argue that the EU cannot handle further expansion, either institutionally or politically. It would be unwise to incorporate states that will become a major burden on the Union. Restrictors also point out that once countries enter the EU there are no longer sufficient controls to ensure that reforms are implemented.
Enlargers contend that the prospect of inclusion has been the Union’s most effective foreign policy tool. Without the target of membership, there is little incentive to consolidate reforms. If blocked from entry, several states may backslide in their democratic development. Moreover, enlargers argue that the EU must be consistent to be credible. It cannot make the rules for entry more stringent because of current political calculations.
The most realistic prospect for inclusion concerns the West Balkans, where Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) imply eventual membership. The combined population of the seven candidates is under 20 million. Their size will not greatly affect absorption capacity although it would require an expansion of existing representative institutions.
Moreover, these states are already surrounded by the EU and they are committed to joining. Even without a valid constitution, changes can be made in the EU’s institutional structure that will accommodate new members from the West Balkans.
There are three pan-European interests in the continuation of enlargement. First, the EU needs security along its borders in order to focus on integration. By bringing in the remaining West Balkan states, security is enhanced for the EU itself much as it was with the inclusion of recent members in the eastern Balkans.
Second, the EU needs workers as the economically active population is aging and economies are slowing down. Further enlargement will help reinvigorate the European economies.
And third, the EU needs to be a global player to succeed in its “soft power” projection. An exclusivist Europe that has defined its limits will weaken its own global role. Scope means clout. The exclusion of the West Balkans would expose the EU’s fragility and international weakness.
A freeze on enlargement will have other negative consequences for the EU. In the worst-case scenario, it would precipitate the rise of populism and isolationism. Internal and cross-border conflicts could unsettle the EU’s outlying states.
Restrictors argue that enlargement will increase risks of political instability, provoke conflicts within EU institutions, and slow down the deepening process. Enlargers argue that inclusion in the EU would enable Union institutions to better handle political and economic backsliding. There are certain controls that the Union can impose on members so they do not veer away from EU norms.
For example, it will be instructive to see how the newest members Bulgaria and Romania are monitored in the areas of justice and corruption. Where appropriate, the European Commission has equipped itself with “safeguard measures” to restrict a country’s access to financial benefits if it backslides on specific reforms. Membership controls over club members may be more effective than sanctions inflicted on non-members.
Furthermore, to effectively pursue its national interests, each EU member needs to engage in flexible multi-national coalitions, whether on economic, security, or foreign policy. This process helps to tie each capital into cross-cutting interest groups within the EU and provides some predictability in their behavior. Clearly, the debate on Europe’s future will continue for the next fifty years.