By BLEDAR FETA*
As American and European officials scramble to make sense of the Ukrainian crisis and the Israel-Gaza conflict sweeping the Middle East, there is another unstable inter-ethnic crisis in Europe’s backyard: inter-ethnic violence in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).
A series of recent violent incidents have jeopardized peaceful coexistence between the country’s two major ethnic communities, raising fears of renewed instability in the country and in the region by bringing ultra nationalist elements to the fore. Only by adding FYROM as a NATO member can stability return to the area. If the perspective of NATO membership becomes realistic, FYROM’s government can quickly abandon its nationalist policy which has contributed negatively to inter-ethnic coexistence and to neighborly relations, enhancing regional cooperation and dialogue. Then, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will join the Alliance without being considered a “problem-importer” for the NATO and a destabilizing factor for the Western Balkans.
FYROM has a history of ethnic tensions. After the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, ethnic tensions diminished for some time. But thirteen years after the agreement that put an end to the Albanian insurgency, misunderstandings persist. The two groups have limited contacts at the societal level and in recent years the contacts have been diminishing further. Trust between Slav-Macedonians and Albanians has hit rock bottom.
At the core of ethnic Albanians grievances lay perceptions of being looked down upon and treated as second-class citizens. Albanians accept that much of the Ohrid Agreement has been implemented, but complain that the process has been too slow and has not translated into a real commitment to create a multi-ethnic state in which they will have equal decision-making power. Additionally, the grandiose government program “Skopje 2014” – government’s initiative to transform the capital into a European metropolis with monuments of Macedonian heroes in an effort to boost the Slav Macedonian self confidence and national pride — has undermined inter-ethnic reconciliation. The anti-Albanian animus of rising “ancient” Macedonian nationalism is a cause of serious concern for the Albanians who view ‘Skopje 2014″ as a project which symbolically excludes them from their country’s capital. Generally, for Albanians and other Muslims, “Skopje 2014” is just another chapter in a century-long process of marginalization and destruction of their architectural heritage. However, the Slav-Macedonians within the country do not share the Albanians’ views. The Ohrid Agreement is perceived as being unbalanced between the Albanian community and the Slav Macedonians because it gives Albanians too much leverage with respect to domestic affairs. Slav-Macedonians are fearful that every demand of the Albanian side is just a step forward the formation of a “Greater Albania” that will include parts of their own country. Due to this strong rivalry between the country’s two main communities, only the prospect of NATO membership can prevent the deterioration of relations and the deepening of divisions between them.
FYROM’s two major national communities agree overwhelmingly that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia should join NATO, with stability topping the list of positive outcomes expected from membership. However, the inability to solve the name dispute with Greece, and the consequent failure to make progress toward NATO – at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, the Alliance declined to offer an invitation due to its ongoing bilateral dispute with Greece, while at the NATO summit in Chicago, Skopje did not shift the Alliance position on the country’s membership – exacerbates tensions between Albanians and Slav-Macedonians. Since both groups agree on their country’s goal of Euro-Atlantic integration, this could potentially act as a factor contributing to the unity of the country, but there is a danger that NATO accession could shift from a unifying to a divisive feature as the two major ethnicities disagree on its implications for the name issue.
The majority of Slav-Macedonians would take the name over NATO membership, while the majority of Albanians feel exactly the opposite. Albanians are especially frustrated at successive governments’ inability to resolve the name issue and see themselves as the victims of Nikola Gruevski’s nationalistic rhetoric. Thus, they support a quick compromise to the name issue for faster NATO membership.
Any option other than Euro-Atlantic integration can be dangerous to the stability of FYROM’s multi-ethnic society. U.S. and European diplomacy should become more active on the name issue in order to avoid any further destabilization that can open the Pandora boxes in the Western Balkans. But all is not well in the Balkans. A series of problems from incomplete reforms and unconsolidated democratic institutions still plague the region. Political gridlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ongoing name dispute between FYROM and Greece, Kosovo’s ambiguous status, and the implications for Serbia are manifestations of the region’s divides. NATO attention and support through a renewed engagement strategy will be critical for overcoming all of these issues and avoiding a new ethnic conflict in the Balkans. A dialogue, for example, focused on resolving the dispute between FYROM and Greece under the auspices of NATO could prove helpful, as was the case of the Belgrade-Kosovo talks under the auspices of the European Union. Despite its imperfections, dialogue has proven to be an effective instrument in the context of dispute resolution, and has led to significant progress in integrating the Balkans. A NATO presence and Euro- Atlantic integration is necessary for the Western Balkans, as it will to initiate and sustain reforms, represent a framework for conflict settlement, and incentivize an improvement in regional cooperation.
As American and European officials continue to monitor the situation in Ukraine and in the Middle East, another confrontation between ethnicities in the Balkans seems to be developing. If NATO shifts attention from the area, the situation could deteriorate further. Leaving the Western Balkans to the path of uncertainty is risky business and NATO should consider incorporating FYROM in an effort to avoid the Accession process to be a dividing factor between the country’s two major ethnic communities. The anti- Albanian animus of rising “ancient” Macedonian nationalism and the country’s NATO membership is a serious concern for the Albanian community. In the absence of any progress in FYROM’s membership some Albanian voices will likely explore more radical options which could further destabilize the country and the Western Balkans where the increasing clout of radical Islam is raising fears of security threat to Europe.
*Bledar Feta is a delegate to the Atlantic Council’s NATO Future Leaders Summit and research associate for the South East Europe Program at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.
FYROM’s NATO membership: Dividing rather than uniting?

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