Kosova’s Final Steps to Independence

By Janusz Bugajski
The Ahtisaari plan for Kosova launches the aspiring state on the road to independence and sovereignty. However, statehood will not be obtained overnight. The process will take several months to complete and the Kosovar leadership must remain patient, consistent, and determined on the road to the final destination.
The Ahtisaari plan effectively removes all Serbian jurisdiction over Kosova, terminates the UNMIK mandate, establishes a provisional European Union and NATO supervisory mission, and legitimizes Kosova’s steps toward statehood. The latter will be strengthened through the passage of a Kosovar constitution, the creation of state symbols, and Prishtina availing itself of the right to join international organizations including the UN.
Ahtisaari and all members of the Contact Group, except Russia, are determined to maintain a tight timetable with regard to the status decisions. They will therefore not tolerate obstruction and boycotts by Serbian officials with whom much of Europe and America are fast losing patience.
The next steps for Kosova envisage a series of discussions on the Ahtisaari plan between political leaders from Prishtina and Belgrade. These are to take place in Vienna by the end of February. There will be no acceptance of major changes but some adjustments and compromises will be pursued especially regarding the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosova.
Sometime in March, the finalized document will be presented to the UN Security Council for approval and for the passage of a new resolution. Washington and the EU capitals are calculating that despite its tough rhetoric in support of Belgrade, the Russian regime is likely to abstain rather than veto a UN resolution.
The UN statement is likely to be neutral, neither recognizing nor forbidding Kosova’s independence and sovereignty. It would thereby allow Prishtina to declare independence and petition for recognition from individual governments.
Thus far, the reactions of the Kosova leadership has been measured and sensible. Above all, the population of Kosova must avoid any instability and violence as this would play directly into the hands of Belgrade. One major reason why the Serbian government has tried to delay the status process is to provoke an Albanian overreaction that would allegedly prove that Kosova is not prepared for independence.
Serbian government reactions to the Ahtisaari plan have been confused and fearful. While President Boris Tadic at least displayed the courage to meet with Ahtisaari and reject the proposal, outgoing Prim Minister Vojislav Kostunica remains in a state of psychological denial.
Kostunica’s party has even made it a condition for forming a new government that the coalition break off relations with any state recognizing Kosova. Kostunica’s infantile and isolationist reaction indicates that Serbia’s real national interests take second place to Serbia’s mythic interests.
In reality, the Serbian population in Kosova has probably gained more than any other small minority in Europe from the status process. 5% of the citizenry will benefit from extensive decentralization and self-government, disproportionate representation in the national parliament, close ties with Serbia, and far-reaching cultural and religious protection supervised by the international community.
Regional reactions to Kosova’s coming independence will place Serbia in an even more difficult position, especially if Belgrade is serious in severing official ties. Albania will undoubtedly recognize the new state, Macedonia has expressed its acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan and Bulgaria is likely to follow suit. Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina are unlikely to object as each is seeking progress toward EU entry. Serbia may be left far behind the integration and growth process if it isolates itself from the region.
If officials in Belgrade simply cannot accept having any role in Kosova’s independence, maybe the best solution is not to have a functioning government while statehood is gained. In this way, it can be claimed that noone will be held responsible in Serbian historiography. Again, this may be another myth. In reality, all high officials will be held responsible for delaying the inevitable and thereby obstructing Serbia’s integration in the European mainstream.