Janusz Bugajski
Dangers lurk ahead for the new coalition government in Macedonia. Skopje sees NATO and EU entry as its policy priorities but cannot achieve its targets without resolving the dispute with Greece. If there is no solution over the name question Macedonia will not receive an invitation to NATO at the April 2009 summit or a membership track to the EU. This could rebound negatively on perceptions of Macedonia’s political stability, affect investor confidence, preoccupy government and parliament, halt progress in reforms, and potentially undermine national stability.
The long-term failure to find a solution could also negatively affect the Albanian coalition partner, the DUI, especially as the key foreign policy priority of Albanians is to join NATO because NATO means the U.S. alliance. Macedonia’s stalled NATO entry is a source of concern for Albanian leaders as it could lead to isolationism and nationalism in which the Albanians will be left stranded.
The VMRO government could find itself in a spiral of instability in which Albanian position hardens and the SDSM opposition increasingly attacks the VMRO administration for failing to devise a formula for a solution with Athens or moving Macedonia into NATO and the EU. President Branko Crvenkovski continues to criticize Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski for obstructing the negotiations with Athens and for allegedly using the name question for populist purposes.
If the West is committed to Macedonia speedily entering NATO and the EU, the stalemate with Greece needs to be overcome. As both sides dispute the meaning of Macedonian identity and believe that their rivals are either denying or claiming their identity in order to pursue a hidden agenda of irredentism or destabilization, the only way out seems to be to make a distinction between Greek Macedonian and Slavic Macedonian and tie this distinction to territory and statehood.
Of course, Macedonia as a state cannot be qualified as Slavic Macedonia because it is not mono-ethnic, but a formula such as New Macedonia seems a viable solution as it does not alter Macedonian identity or threaten Macedonia’s statehood but would disarm any reasons for further dispute. It is worth remembering that the previous VMRO government accepted the single formula qualifier of Republic of Macedonia (Skopje) that was rejected by Greece just before the NATO summit. It appears that a name qualifier in itself does not seem to be the issue but finding the right one, or maybe what matters is who does the pressing.
The longer the dispute continues the deeper the intransigence on both sides, the weaker Macedonia will become, and Athens may feel more emboldened and eventually demand no mention of Macedonia in the country’s name which of course would be unacceptable not only to Skopje. At that point the U.S. could be in open conflict with Athens while several key EU countries could support Greece, And Russia would benefit from the ensuing division and conflict.
Time is working against Macedonia for at least five reasons. First, more countries have either lined up behind Greece or will not support Skopje in its dispute with Athens. It is difficult to see the Bush White House or the next U.S. administration pushing Athens to drop its demand, precipitate a government collapse, and escalate anti-Americanism in Greece. Washington continues to receive most of the blame in Greece for allegedly supporting Macedonia’s perceived intransigence in changing the name. There is a pervasive belief that without U.S. support Skopje would have to make a deal.
Second, the EU seems to be uninvolved in the process. The EU considers itself an interested party and cannot mediate: an interested party which is uninterested in the process or maybe even in the result? Such a stance indicates how the EU dithers or neglects a challenge until a real crisis erupts which it may well do in Macedonia.
Third, in recent months, the VMRO government has raised questions about the collective rights of Macedonian Slavs in Greece where Greece like France does not recognize minority rights but ones based on citizenship. Statements by the VMRO government have further estranged Athens and certainly not helped Macedonia’s position internationally. Even presidential contender Barack Obama has been supportive of the Greek position.
Fourth, the Albanian population could become increasingly disillusioned and alienated and its leaders may push for decentralizing and even fracturing the state. A destabilized Macedonia is in nobody’s interest, including Greece as it could mean armed conflict and refugees along its northern border, and negatively affect its business interests.
Fifth, without the prospect of EU entry reforms will stall, investor confidence will decline, and economic conditions could deteriorate in Macedonia.
Basically, there are three choices: stalemate and no solution, pressing Greece to back down and accept the current constitutional name, or press Macedonia to qualify its name. Of the three, the name qualifier is likely to be the least destabilizing for Macedonia and the broader region.
For Russia, Macedonia could become another useful “frozen state” in the Balkans alongside Kosova and Bosnia-Hercegovina. A Macedonia that remains outside NATO and the EU will be a source of dispute and even conflict that can preoccupy Washington and Brussels while Russia pursues its expansive political agenda in Europe to roll-back U.S. influence and neutralize Europe’s opposition to Moscow’s reimperialization.
Russia’s ambitions are another important reason to rapidly resolve the name dispute with Greece. Resolution would help Macedonia to maintain itself as a single state and not isolated from its neighbors, including Greece. It would help to satisfy and incorporate the Albanian population in the renamed state. At the same time, it would prevent Greece’s estrangement from the United States and preclude pushing Athens closer to Russia because its concerns were dismissed by Washington.
