By BERND J. FISCHER
It is perhaps appropriate to begin a discussion on myth and Albanian history with a brief general definition. The British scholar George Schopflin, who has worked extensively on the topic, has argued that in the simplest sense myths are narratives, fictitious, highly metaphysical and symbolic, reproduced as a set of shared references by members of a group in order to define that group’s characteristics and to mark that group’s boundaries. It seems clear that the content, truth or facts, are secondary to the actual employment of myth as a means of identity construction. These are sacred narratives which embody idealized representations of a collective past, present, and future.
It is of course a given that all countries have them; we in the U.S. are certainly not immune. If you permit me a personal aside, I recently became a U.S. citizen (although I have lived in the U.S. for fifty years) and was required to take a citizenship test from a book provided . The book was a 100 page history of the U.S. which included most of the myths associated with the birth of the U.S. and its role in the world since then. The pages I read were filled with the tales of American heroes and the United States as a global savior and force for stability. Nowhere did I find such subversive ideas as the notion that states act in their own self interest. It was also filled with some remarkable glaring errors. But I understood that what was being presented here was not an attempt to provide a brief objective view of American history. Rather, the book was clearly part of a socialization process. The intention was the creation of good citizens. Not necessarily well-educated citizens, but good citizens.
So we are all subject to myths and they remain quite prevalent for many reasons, some obvious but some less so. They clearly serve a significant purpose. Myths provide social cohesion, they are a tool of choice for those who want to simplify complex realities in order to control the actions of a group. They are instruments of power, invented, selected, promoted and established by elites who hope to use them to unite the individual with the group through emotional attachment. The goal is to create the pride of belonging and the rejection of the outsider, “the other” who is quite clearly defined. There is rarely space for deviant thought in this rarified world. Through the use of myth elites legitimize the inequalities of privilege and status. So myths construct a collective identity but also serve as a justification and sanctification of existing rules and leadership.
Are Albania’s myths different from those elsewhere, or at least elsewhere in the Balkans? In a general sense, not really – they are at least similar to fairly standard myths particularly in central and eastern Europe. Schopflin has identified eight fairly common, closely related, general myths including:
1. Myths of territory, which attempt to answer the question of who belongs where. This is of course a critical issue for the Balkans in general because of the Ottoman religious administration which complicated and continues to complicate the creation of equitable ethnic frontiers.
2. Myths of suffering and redemption.
3. Myths of unjust treatment, which of course refers to the culture of victimhood, again a prevalent feature of the Balkan historical landscape.
4. Myths of, formerly divine but now profane, election in terms of moral superiority.
5. Myths of military valor, particularly guerrilla movements, a topic which will be further explored below.
6. Myths of foundation, which determine who was where first.
7. Myths of ethno-genesis and antiquity.
8. Myths of kinship and shared descent.
There are certainly others but these are perhaps the most prevalent.
The world of myth is the world of heroes and anti-heroes or villains which in Albania, Fatos Labonja tells us, are principally associated with four major moments; the Illyrian wars, Skanderbeg, the Albanian renaissance, and the partisan war. Each had heroes who became principal characters of literary and artistic work with the most prominent being Skanderbeg and Hoxha. The villains changed from the Romans, to the Turks, to the Serbs and the Greeks, and then the Nazis and their collaborators. The dark world of villains also included religion and it practitioners, particularly the Catholics. The nationalists saw religions as dividers, hence the notion that the religion of Albanians is Albanianism, and the communists saw religions as representative of the old conservative world. In this last feature, Albania is of course somewhat unique in the Balkans because of its multi-religious makeup.
While others certainly made their contributions, I would argue that the communists were the supreme mythmakers in Albania. Myth construction was a central part of the totalitarian project – if you questioned it you are an enemy of the people. In Hoxha’s world both external isolation and internal totalitarianism was a political strategy to force together internally divergent groups in order to create national unity. Traditional nineteenth century myths were standardized and transformed but a new creation myth was added, the myth of the partisan war.
The principal method for promulgation of these myths was through texts, a process that was significantly aided by the new literacy of the 1950s and 1960s. In this fashion myths were quickly standardized and widely distributed. In a normal world these myths would have fallen prey to modern historians who look to find scientific, rational or a linear understanding, or the truth if such a thing exists. But in Hoxha’s world this potential problem was eventually taken care of by fear of the security services and the sanctions they could inflict. The mythmakers often encountered inconvenient moments when central figures, like Shehu, were purged. But the totalitarian regime allowed for the swift destruction of old texts and the rapid production of new ones.
So the war, the war in Albania, became not only the foundation but also the foundation myth for Enver Hoxha’s state and continues to have a strong hold on many aspects of the contemporary Albanian world. Rarely has an event so dominated a national psyche for such an extended period of time, particularly since Albania’s neighbors experienced many of the same patterns of collaboration, and resistance, and suffering
The wartime experience forcibly brought Albania into contact with various groups of foreigners, their ideas and their guns. But while Albanians were exposed to the outside world as perhaps never before, the experience of the war also helped to reinforce suspicions of foreign entanglements, a notion which was strengthened and exploited by Hoxha’s communist regime in the postwar world. Enver Hoxha found that Albania’s experience with the war was one of his most useful tools in achieving his occasionally laudable goals. The war was also used by Hoxha for legitimizing and maintaining power based upon an ideology rather alien to the average Albanian. Hoxha concluded that his goals could only be achieved through the extension of the wartime struggle by the establishment of a state-of-siege or garrison-state mentality, which emphasized the continuing and growing dangers that foreigners represented.
The war, then, essentially created Hoxha and his movement and it would do much to help sustain both as the principal foundation myth. The war would become one of the central focal points for much of post-war Albanian culture, and ultimately constituted a profoundly stultifying influence. Writers used the war as the major theme of many of their works: Albania art, drama, film and music and of course education – textbooks, traditional histories, even literature for children were never completely allowed to separate themselves for the anti-fascist struggle.
The role of communist historians in this process was quite clear. Myths exist uneasily with ambiguities, and it was the task of the historian to increase the effectiveness of the myth by removing the inconvenient ambiguities, to make it all simple and clear. Communist academics, who were often very good historians but did not always produce very good history, incorporated the war into the developing ideology which might be called Marxist-nationalism but one of a non-traditional variety, if one is of the opinion that traditional Balkan nationalism includes irredentism.
There were many wartime themes that required some degree of cleansing and most are of course related. Let us briefly look at some that have occurred to me. First and foremost is the central theme of the role of Hoxha and the partisans in resisting and then expelling the invaders. Resistance itself was predated – to even before the formation of the party. This is a traditional theme for Communists throughout Europe, who still chafe under the accusation that no resistance was mounted until after the invasion of Russia. More importantly, there were to be no questions about the Germans just having withdrawn from Albania as a result of events elsewhere, although this is of course the case. The partisans were rarely able to hold fixed positions if these positions threatened German lines of communications or German security in general.
But this, of course, was not an acceptable interpretation so a simpler and clearer one was created containing what can only be described as stunning exaggerations. The partisans, who, we are told, were all talented warriors, defeated the Germans and drove them out of Albania. We are further told that “every partisan was a brilliant sharp shooter” and that “Our national liberation army was able, relying only on its forces, to liberate the whole of the country from the Italian and German invaders and the rule of the exploiting classes which had placed themselves in the service of the foreign invader.” This was simple and clear, and above all useful.
Another central theme, very much related to the one above, involved the nature of the Albanian on Albanian struggle. During the war, in the communiqu고of both the Allies and the Axis, the struggle was referred to as civil war – a struggle between the partisans on the one hand, and the Balli Komb쵡r (BK), the Zoggist and the independent chieftains on the other. Once the war was over, communist historians needed to produce another formula, since the concept of a civil war at least suggests an element of proportional equality, and does, in a way, legitimize both sides. This, of course, was unacceptable so all of those who resisted the partisans became traitors, whether they had cooperated with the Axis or not.
It was also of some importance that all of the achievements of the partisans were accomplished by the partisans alone – “Our national liberation army, relying only on its own forcesŮ” etc. This naturally did much to legitimize the regime and became even more imperative once relations with one-time allies began to sour. This souring happened first with the British, so their role in supplying the partisans with war materials needed to be minimized. The partisans had won themselves. This had to be true with regard to the Yugoslavs as well, particularly after the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948. While there were a number of issues of importance with regard to the Yugoslavs, one of the most significant was the role of the Yugoslavs in the foundation of the Albanian Communist Party. That the Yugoslavs played a very active role is clear, but inconvenient. In most cases, Albanian communist historiography generally fails to mention the Yugoslavs, or when they are mentioned they are described as gangsters and meddlers giving all credit to Hoxha and the Albanian leadership, who were spurred into action by the need to resist the Italians, and by the German invasion of the Soviet Union. As purges of old partisans became more common, Hoxha assumed the achievements of those purged.
The role of the Germans has naturally also led to a series of questions which needed to be resolved. One of the more subtle questions has to do with the role the Germans played in facilitating the partisan rise to power. It seems clear that the Germans, while certainly not intending to, did much to insure Communist success by, to a greater or lesser degree, co-opting all the other principal contenders for power, a process which was not unique to Albania. Since the BK, the Zoggists and the independent chieftains represented the pre-war social structure, there was some expectation that, with the onset of the war, they would provide security for their population. When resistance resulted in reprisals, in most cases resistance was suspended and the communists became the principal enemy. This, perhaps inevitably, forced some of the non-communist resistance into tacit or direct cooperation with the invaders, thereby eventually removing them as serious contenders for power in post-war Albania. The Germans, then, unwittingly did the partisans a tremendous service. Since this, too, contradicted the post-war certainty that the “national liberation army, relying only on its own forces, liberated” etc. etc. this could not, and did not, become an issue to be discussed in the historical community.
The role of the Germans has also engendered one the most longstanding disputes related to the war, something rather superficial but of critical importance because it deals with symbols – and that is the date of the liberation and the withdrawal of the Germans from Albania. While it is likely impossible to tell when the last German actually left Albania, 29 November 1944 was chosen during the communist period, in part because the date corresponded to its Yugoslav counterpart. Twenty-nine November henceforth became the Albanian liberation day and the country’s principal holiday, superseding 28 November, the day on which Albanians have traditionally celebrated their independence. This has remained a delicate topic and has become something of a flashpoint for the debate between communist and post-communist historiography.
In all of this historical cleansing by the Hoxha regime, the agenda of course was to establish the perception of the communist struggle against overwhelming foreign invaders and domestic traitors securing the victory by themselves under the leadership of the party, with Hoxha at the helm. These themes were continually reemphasized by constant reminders that the enemies were still at the gates necessitating a state of siege mentality and eventually a partisan strategy of a people’s war – the mobilization of the masses for a struggle against the invader. These themes remained relatively intact at least until the death of Hoxha in 1985.
With the collapse of Communism in 1991-1992, however, a reexamination of the some of these foundation myths began, the process of which is still on-going and can be quite positive. After all, there is no gospel in terms of history, there is no definitive work or last word, all we as historians can hope to do it make a contribution. While reexamination is important work, equally important is motive. Do we do this in order to develop a clearer picture of the past, or do we do it for political purposes like Hoxha?
The historical reexamination under the Democrats resulted in the establishment of new historical agendas and new dilemmas in terms of the war. In its simplest sense, Hoxhaism was quickly supplemented by nationalism and anti-Communism. While Hoxhaism included an element of strong nationalism, the post-communist period saw the rise of a new (or at least new for Albania in the post-war period) nationalism which contained elements of what we might call traditional or irredentist nationalism, which focused on historical heroes and often militated for an ethnic Albania.
As with most institutions in Albania, when the Democrats came to power in 1992, a new politically appointed leadership in the academic community emerged which initiated something of a purge of the rank and file. These changes engendered, among other things, a new discourse which disparaged the past and promised a new era in scholarship with communist-era historiography now being considered “non-scientific.” To reject Hoxha required rejecting the historical pillars upon which he built his power. This process included the rehabilitation of historical figures and events, in particular those from the Second World War since this era was considered one of the most politicized. In general this meant an attack on a historiography based largely on dialectical materialism, to be replaced by one aimed against Marxism-Leninism and Communism in Albania. This included a revision of the periodization of history, away from economic developments as the key. The new, or rather, traditional nationalism was emphasized and Kosova became an important theme with historians being critical of the Party of Labor for paying insufficient attention to Kosova- and for its passive acceptance of Kosova’s reintegration into Yugoslavia following the war. Some historians rehabilitated the Balli Komb쵡r by attributing to it an important role in the country’s anti-fascist struggle.
The date of Albania’s liberation was of course revisited once again and politics intervened decisively. President Sali Berisha appointed a twelve member commission to determine the “true date” of the withdrawal of the Germans. The commission predictably concluded that the communists had been pressured by the Yugoslavs to accept 29 November as the date of liberation. Twenty-eight November was determined to be the true date of the liberation, principally, in seems, because of the significance of that date in Albanian history – Sk쯤erbeg raising the flag in Kruja, and of course Ismail Qemal raising the national flag in Vlora. The commission concluded the “November 28, 1944 stands rooted together with the above events and testifies to the deep patriotism felt by Albanians and their massive readiness to fight with self-affirmation against foreign occupiers however strong they may beƌet us hope that we will have even more November 28ths in the future.” Just as a aside, my own research into German documents indicates that the Germans actually left on 4 December which casts some doubt on the official version. To the credit of Albanian historians, some certainly questioned the motives behind this revisionism and others were quite critical of the textbooks produced based upon this new historical agenda.
When the Socialists came back to power in 1997, there was again a certain shift, although perhaps not quite as substantial as that of 1993. Although not nearly as strident as in the past, some traditional Socialist themes were reemphasized, in particular the 29 November date for the celebration of the liberation. The Socialist dominated parliament declared that the official ceremonies commemorating Liberation Day would again be held on the 29 November. As soon as he returned to power in 2005, Sali Berisha declared 28 November as the day that both independence and liberation would be celebrated. The opposition and the Association of War Veterans denounced the violation of the symbols of the Anti-fascist National Liberation war and the feelings of those who sacrificed their blood for the liberation, and suggested that the government’s decision ran contrary to history and the sentiments of the Albanian people. The Socialists went on to celebrate on 29 November.
We have seen myths adjusted and changed, compromises between old ones and new ones, the process is ever evolving. One of the new ones in the post-communist period is what Fatos Labonja has called the Myth of the West. He has argued that the collapse of Communism resulted in something of an identity crisis. The old heroes were still there but a gap developed. The gap was filled in part by the Myth of the West, the idea that Albania was now finally back on the road to the west (Communism had just been an aberration). The Myth of the West was integrated well with the old nationalist myth of prosperity and civilization before Turkish period and the Christianity of Albanians before the Turkish invasion was treated as an indication of western identity. The communist period was seen as a betrayal of Albania’s true path. The communists forced Albania to become a part of a world in which it did not belong, the eastern world
But this Myth of the West, too, has begun to wane – in part, as Lubonja point out, because this myth was based upon a distant promised land, not the coming of a savior. So Albania went from a period when not a negative word was heard about the U.S. or the West in general, to today, when we see a much more realistic attitude, and very healthy criticism. I know it may sound curious coming from me, but I was delighted when I began hearing criticism of the U.S., because it indicated a maturity of political thought in Albania
So where are we today? I leave that determination to others, but from my perspective, these and other myths all linger – Skanderbeg, romantic nationalism, the partisan war, the West, – and the religion of Albanians being Albanianism. But there is also a new skepticism, a new critical spirit, where we see not only examples of the political maturity but also the process of myth deconstruction, both of which I would argue are hallmarks of a sophisticated society.
