The consequences of Berisha’s newfound nationalism

When such radical changes suddenly take place in the regional politics of a Balkan country, they are bound to raise questions and even give cause for concern.
By Pirro Misha
Quite e few guesses have already been offered concerning the reasons that made Prime Minister Berisha suddenly unfurl the flag of nationalism. There has been talk of him feeling compelled to neutralize the damage he can suffer in the coming elections because of the Red and Black Alliance, the new, populist party that is playing hard in an arena that until recently Berisha considered to be his. There have been rumors that the support the Red and Black Alliance has managed to secure within a relatively short span of time, combined with the atmosphere that reigned during the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of independence, have convinced him that nationalism is the correct bait for fishing for votes among certain sections of Albanian society. But, without going into any detail concerning the reasons he may have had, I think it would be worthwhile to discuss first and foremost the consequences that this sudden move by the Prime Minister may bring about. Because when such radical changes suddenly take place in the regional politics of a Balkan country, they are bound to raise questions and even give cause for concern. When a leader like Berisha, who until yesterday was an example of moderation when it came to regional issues, and who used the card of Albania’s constructive role in the region to secure international support, suddenly swings to the other extreme and raises the flag of nationalism using a provocative language that had not been heard – at least not in such high levels – for a long time, of course, one has to expect a reaction and consequences. Naturally, there are still too many questionmarks concerning Berisha’s latest actions that are hard to interpret. For instance, it is really difficult to understand why the Prime Minister, who knows perfectly well how sensitive the international community is with regards to the political stability of Macedonia, chose Skopje to present his thesis on the national unification of all Albanians living in the Balkans in front of an exalted crowd cheering slogans about ethnic Albania! The only explanation that comes to mind concerns what has been dubbed the mirror effect: in other words, by demonstrating the indisputable popularity that he still enjoys among the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia he aims to convince the electorate in Albania that he is the one and only individual who is capable of defending the national cause. That this was indeed the objective becomes clear if one skips through the pages of that part of the Tirana press that is controlled by him, on the morrow of the events in Skopje. “Berisha, the Prime Minister of all Albanians” read the title of the main editorial in one such paper, which among other things wrote: “The slogan “Ethnic Albania” was heard all over the city (Skopje) when Sali Berisha began to speak; he whom the moderator called the ‘prime minister of the Albanians'”.
That it was not an isolated case, that much became clear in the following days when this politician, who until yesterday was known for the excessive care he showed in his dealings with the international community, instead of chosing to soften the effect of the speech he held in Skopje, went even further, thus making it clear this was not a spur-of-the-moment outburst, but rather the beginning of a new political line. As Balkanweb informed us “Yesterday (during the inauguraton of a street bearing the name of an Austro-Hungarian foreign minister) the Prime Minister added to the declaration he made three days ago in Vlora (that ethnic Albania extends from Preveza to Preshevo) the fact that “there are 67 thousand square kilometers of ethnic Albanian land”.
Naturally, this sudden outburst of nationalist rhetoric reminds us of that popular expression of the empty sack that cannot stand upright. Because we know from history that projects similar to that of an ethnic Albania, in other words, the idea of uniting all ethnic Albanians in a single state, require at the very least the existence of a number of preconditions that are totally lacking today. It is not a coincidence that the term “ethnic Albania” enjoyed popularity precisely in those two moments in history when all the equilibria in the Balkans had been upset and, consequently, the borders were once again being disputed: at the outset of the twentieth century and during the Second World War when it was first the Italians and then the Germans who through their propaganda nurtured such ideas for their gain. But the resurrection of such a deceitful dream is at present not just irresponsible, but outright dangerous. And it is also undoubtedly comical or pathetic, if we refer to Ardian Vehbiu who in an article analysed the general phenomenon of the nationalistic delirium that has gripped part of our compatriots, focusing on the two huge maps of “ethnic Albania” that have been placed since two weeks ago along one of Tirana’s main bridges, very close to the center. Alongside the maps there is a slogan calling for an end to 1913’ Treaty of London. In other words, what is being called for is not more and not less than the revision of the entire length of the land borders of the Albanian state. And this coming from a party that is part of the ruling coalition; a party that feeling that its monopoly on anti-helenism has come under threat as a result of the growing pressure from the Red and Black Alliance, has suddenly undergone a transformation from a force created with the mission of lobbying for the rights of a certain community, (i.e. the ȡm community) into a properly irredentist party. “Were our neighbours to take these maps seriously,” writes Vehbiu, “we would have heard of some protest taking place somewhere, of diplomatic notes of protest or the withdrawal of ambassadors. But the fact that this is not happening, makes the idea of the revision of the borders seem all the more pathetic and miserable, a belated complaint that impresses nobody, resembling instead the honking of a bus full of football fans whose team has been relegated for who knows how many seasons to the amateur league.”
Berisha knows better than anyone else that today ideas such as that of an ethnic Albania are nothing but empty slogans. Any normal person understands that despite the fact that a century ago the Albanian people were undoubtedly subjected to an act of injustice, at present claiming or even alluding that it would be possible for all Albanians, that live in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (Preshevo), Greece and who knows where else, to unite in a single ethnic state, thus practically putting into question half the borders of the Balkans, if not an act of demagogy is at the very least an adventure. Furthermore, Berisha certainly knows that the term “nationalism” that he reintroduced into his vocabulary after so many years, has a negative connotation in all European languages (only in English the word “nationalist” has a somewhat more neutral, descriptive meaning) because from the conclusion of World War Two there has existed a clear and essential distinction between the terms patriotism and nationalism. And that is why at present it would be very hard to imagine even an ordinary Frenchman, Italian or Dutchman declaring: I am a nationalist! Which course, does not mean that he does not love his country! And that is yet another reason why it makes such an impression when the Prime Minister of a country, and a country located in the Balkans at that, where it is well known what tragedies have been caused by the use of such language, goes public and boasts about Albanian nationalism!
There is little doubt that the use of such a language makes the Prime Minister gain in popularity before the crowds or even among certain sections of the Albanian populations in Macedonia, Kosovo and even Albania proper. But the consequences of this type of populism that is borne of calculations and the mood of the crowds at a given moment in time, this type of populism that is ready for everything as long as this guarantees a few more votes, regardless of the consequences and the costs that one will in all probability have to pay afterwards, should give us cause for concern.
The first consequence is already obvious: the rise in tensions between Albania and at least two of its neighbors, as well as the resuscitation of a perception that until recently was promoted by extremist circles in our neighboring countries, that there exists an Albanian threat. And it is very likely, that if this nationalist fever in the Albanian political scene grows more intense as the elections draw nearer, the crisis in relations with our neighbors will escalate too. A number of questions come to mind: has anyone given any thought to the consequences this might have on the Albanian emigrant community in Greece? What about the Albanian community in Macedonia? What impact could this have on Kosovo and the unresolved issue of Mitrovica? Should we worry about the destabilizing effect of this newfound nationalist mood may bring? Should we be concerned about the attempts that are being made to once again use the Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia for the purposes of domestic Albanian politics? In any case, if we judge from the careful language and positions adopted by the Kosovar Albanian leadership or Ali Ahmeti during the celebrations of the centenary of independence, it would seem that they are aware of the potential dangers that could stem from playing such a game.
But what is even more important: what consequences could this climate have for Albania’s relations with its strategic partners? And first and foremost, what implications could it have for what we have considered for two decades to be the strategic objective of the Albanians, their European integration, since it is known that one of the criteria an aspiring country must fulfil in order to join the EU is that it should have no conflicts or unsettled issues with its neighbors? So it is obvious that the continuation of such a nationalist rhetoric is bound to have a direct impact on our relations with the EU. The intentional ambiguity that one finds in Berisha’s latest speeches, where alongside references to Europe one finds the expressions “ethnic Albania”, “ethnic territories” or boasting about “civic Albanian nationalism,” constitutes at the very least a conceptual paradox.
Let me add at this point that the idea that has circulated lately in the press, which tries to portray the latest nationalist moves by Berisha as an instrument to exert pressure on Brussels, illustrating this through the example of Serbia, does not seem convincing. The situations are completely different and that is why every illusion of this nature would at the very least be na෥.
One of the main dangers that is inherent to populist politics in general, is their potential boomerang effect. Let us not forget that many of the most recent dramas and tragedies that have taken place in our peninsula could trace their origins to unscrupulous politicians who for the sake of their short term calculations and interests in their fight for power have let the genie out of the bottle and consequently lost control over it. We should be concerned by this race which if one judges from the signs could transform the electoral campaign from a confrontation of visions and policies into a race where parties compete who can offer more rhetoric and deceitful dreams that incite the crowds by playing upon the na෥ hopes of certain disillusioned sections of society.