Thursday, 20 November 2008
How can you know what issues are the most important for Kosova? It is very easy. Read the newspapers and write down what they present as the most important topics. Then, watch the broadcast of the Assembly’s session when they announce the agenda. Cross out, from the most important headlines of the newspapers, the issues that were also included in the Assembly’s agenda for discussion. Whatever issues remain are the most important issues for Kosova.
Kosova is not a Democratic Republic because it does not have democracy. Kosova is neither a Parliamentary Republic because it does not have parliamentarianism. Maybe Giorgio Agamben would have said that Kosova is a Governmental Republic, a Republic where the decrees of the government turn into laws by the routine ratification of the Assembly? Not really. It is even worse: Kosova is a Republic in the hands of two persons – the president and the prime minister. These two together make up a teenager king who all the other kings in the world make fun of. This is how Kosova comes across regarding the vital issues of a state, the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In order not to lose their positions, Fatmir Sejdiu and Hashim Tha詠initially opposed the six-point proposal of Ban Ki-Moon. This proposal was earlier Slobodan Samardzic’s plan for the “functional partition” of Kosova, and recently became an agreement between the UN and Serbia. Sejdiu and Tha詬 concerned that they would not be able to survive politically in Kosova if accepting this proposal, opposed it. In the meetings with the internationals, it seemed that Sejdiu was louder than Tha詠in his opposition. This is very understandable for those who know these two a little bit. While Tha詠has a more powerful position in PDK, the position of Sejdiu in LDK is more fragile. Therefore, Sejdiu had to pretend to be a patriot and a principled man. Not only the resistance but also the intensity of the resistance resulted from their personal motives for authority. In this situation, where local politics has subordinated to international politics, the more fragile a politician (in his party), the stronger politician (for Kosova).
However, how did Sejdiu and Tha詠come to the conclusion that if they now say Yes, they would irrevocably be jeopardized? I do not believe that this had to do with the situation that could be created on the ground after their acceptance. Before the declaration of independence, Kosova’s political leaders were invited to negotiations and at the end, they readily agreed to compromises that were unimaginable in the beginning. After the declaration of independence, Kosova’s leaders were not invited to negotiations, but were offered an agreement as if it was a done deal. They considered that being offered an agreement in this manner could be fatal for them. They considered that accepting an agreement offered this way – as a done deal rather than as a result of a negotiating process – would politically bury them. Marti Ahtisaari knew that his plan, which would come out of negotiations, would be no more than the report of Kai Eide, made more concrete and detailed according to the requests of Serbia. However, Ahtisaari led a process that lasted a year and a half to accomplish what in principle was known since the beginning. The long duration of the process enabled a step by step deceit of the public.
Ban Ki-Moon did not act like Marti Ahtisaari. After he received Sejdiu and Tha詧s approval (“in principle”) of his 12 June letter, he did not involve them in further negotiations.Why did Ban offer something already prepared? Why did he not instead arrange for a process that would make Sejdiu and Tha詠look more dignified? Maybe Ban acted like this because Sejdiu and Tha詠were not really factors on the ground – they do not have an army, do not have control over the police, and they do not have any economic power. However, this is not a sufficient response. The reason why Ban Ki-Moon left Sejdiu and Tha詠outside the process for five months is that he did not expect them to accept new negotiations with Serbia at the time when the Constitution of the Republic of Kosova was being approved. Only now, when they have refused the proposed six-point agreement, are ready to accept negotiations. Their present request for dialogue and ‘positive modifications’ is a demand for negotiations. In only five months, Belgrade, which continuously threatened with negotiations, has made Pristina demand negotiations!
If before the declaration of independence, negotiations preceded an agreement for compromise, now after the declaration of independence, it is the newest compromise agreement that is preceding negotiations. A careful reading of Ban Ki-moon’s points shows that further talks are foreseen for at least three of the points (customs, transportation and infrastructure and the cultural heritage). Therefore, the UN-Serbia six-point agreement, besides being an agreement, is also an agreement for new negotiations that will lead to new agreements and maybe to new negotiationsƓomething like Spinoza’s idea-ideae doctrine of infinite regress. The four-point plan of Sejdiu and Tha詠is not a plan (for Kosova) but a standpoint (for the international authorities). It is the initial position for upcoming negotiations. Sejdiu and Tha詠do not make plans because they do not want to implement them. Implementing plans means taking the state mechanisms to implement the plans. They express standpoints and with these they become part of the bargain for Kosova where they remain elevated while Kosova sinks.
What is maintaining this continuous degradation of our political position? Ban Ki-Moon’s six points do not present new topics compared to the Ahtisaari Plan. Serbia wants more quantitatively, not qualitatively. Serbia has already gained the quality it wants with the Ahtisaari Plan. So the essential difference is not between the Ahtisaari Plan and the six points but between a normal state and a state with the Ahtisaari Plan. The division of Kosova was cemented in the Ahtisaari Plan. The Ahtisaari Plan ethnically divided the police and judicial system, and Serbianized the cultural heritage of medieval era. Based on that plan, Serbs has gained the opportunity to block Kosova’s institutions with the right of the veto, the ISR/EUSR has become king of Kosova, the territory is divided and the united character of the institutions is demolished. Only a bought or ignorant political leadership could cripple the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Kosova before it was actually granted. Every EU state that would have implemented the Ahtisaari Plan would have disintegrated completely. Kosova, due to this plan, will not even manage to become a real state. Kosova’s official political elite gave up the substance of the state in Vienna. They made concessions previously unheard of. And now of course, this elite is expected to make new concessions. The West cannot understand how Sejdiu and Tha詠can resist today, when yesterday they made greater concessions and Kosova has not gained strength as a state in the meantime, with an army, or economic development. Those who have made essential concessions and still have not gained strength, can always be relied on to make some more, right?
