By: Veton Surroi
Tirana, April 19 – At the time of celebrating the 100th anniversary of independence, Albania will not be a candidate for EU membership.
The impact of this prospect is profound. It tells the story of a country, having spent more time in this century of independence with an Eastern rather than Western mentality. It also speaks to the lack of a clear historical compass, which would put the country clearly on the Western path.
Albania today is a hybrid state in terms of its Western identity. It is a state that meets the basic criteria of NATO, yet it does not meet the basic criteria of the European Union.
Viewed from the institutional perspective, it has managed to get a passing grade of formal multiparty democracy. But the institutions created by this multi-party democracy are still not able to be considered as part of a functioning democracy. Institutions locate, or more accurately-said, occupy the space between the pluralist model and the true meaning of the Copenhagen democracy.
Viewed from the historical dimension, Albania is where Turkey was during the latter half of the last centuryנa member of NATO, but one for which a place within the EU has not been found.
In fact, in this respect the difference when compared with Turkey, puts Albania, which has the advantage of free travel for its citizens, in the upper hand. While in institutional terms, compared with Albania, Turkey has the advantage of being a candidate for membership since 1999.
The country thus is still in a state of uncertainty for the determination of its historical development. And in the coming decade it will have three options for its European future.
Three scenarios for the next ten years:
1: The first option is that of tolerating the current hybrid situation so that Albania continues to live in the space between NATO and the identity characterized by its own lack of EU identity. The country has already begun to accommodate such an option by losing its request for candidate status, on the one hand, and by not committing to meet the explicit requirements of the EU, on the other. In turn, we are dealing with the rational decision-making of the elites. Their decision could come from the perception that the country is unlikely to join the EU anytime soon; so this long waiting periodנwhich could be spent on reformsנshould be given to rapid economic growth, leaving aside other aspects of growth of the country (and fundamental freedoms, rule of law, etc.).
This option can endure for a while, but not very long. Countries that have successfully developed this model, as the Turkey of-old (or earlier South Korea) are states with very large markets, and immense domestic and exporting capacity. Albania has neither one nor the other. The country is dependent, more than one may think, on its connection to the EU. Lately, even the basic geographical factors, point to the idea that Albania can not be an “eastern island” in the western extension of Europe.
2: The second option is the “Ottoman process” toward a European future.
After the integration of Croatia, the EU will be faced with a level of problems reflective of, in some way, the influence of Turkey on the remaining countries. Albania, with its long length of processes is removed from the group of candidate countries (now Montenegro and Serbia, Macedoniaإven though it suffers from current ethnic divisions). If it continues to stall, Albania will enter the group of dysfunctional states such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
These two dysfunctional states, in addition to other issues, face the unresolved issues pertaining to their territory, and consequently their sovereignty. One such factor is very significant for Albania: The eventual undoing of Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually Kosovo (or vice versa) will be inherently connected to the capacity of Albania for integration. To these complications, we should also add Macedonia’s potential for implosion.
In the event of border changes, a united Albania with Kosovo would need to harmonize the two former institutions of independent states, which would further delay integration. On the other hand, a unification with Albania would automatically overcome the stage of stabilization and association and membership in NATO for Kosovo.
All the complications associated with such “unfinished states” should be added to the larger “Ottoman” framework. Turkey, with its current political dialogue with Europe, is not seen as a future member of the European Union.
In this capacity, the unofficially rejected state, Turkey, has fostered relations with the states, which coincidentally have large Muslim populations and are behind in their integration.
Indeed, the entire next decade, could be spent in such a state; which would consequently bring to importance for Albania another historic date: When celebrating the 100th anniversary of the 1923 Turkish Republic founding by Ataturk, it could very likely be that along with Turkey, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo will not be part of the EU.
3: The third option is “post-Meciar.” If personalization is excluded, in other words the attempt to identify one leader with another, it will then in effect remove the topic of debate, and leave the valuable lesson of Slovakia’s European transformation.
Slovakia in the first part of its life as an independent state was dominated by a policy, which was the product of a pluralistic multiparty system, but that actually veiled the issue of a true functional democracy. The Prime Minister Meciar era was characterized by corruption and authoritarian tendencies, followed by the inevitable clientelism.
Only when a critical point was reached did the entire political spectrum of the right, center and left (with great support from civil society) reach consensus to change this form of government. Rapidly Slovakia undertook mass transformation.
Albania now faces a dilemma similar to what Slovaks had, though, of course, with completely unique domestic conditions.
All three options are possible for Albania:
Option one and two can be developed with inertia. If nothing changes in the life of the country, media, politics and state institutions, one can easily predict how Albania could fall deeper in the East, while the former symbol of the East, Turkey, falls deeper into the West.
The third option is affected very much on the EU. The European Unionנwhich has entered a period where it will take an “enlargement pause” to address domestic issues and its role in the worldנhas lost the proactive sentiments it had toward countries with a European perspective. Thus, the third option depends very much on the Albanians themselves.
This article was based on the author’s lecture given at the conference “Albania in the next ten years” in Tirana two weeks ago.
