By: Edward J. Sheehy, FSC, Ph.D
“We confess to not knowing much about Albania except the essentials: private cars are forbidden, men do not wear beards, adulterers can be sent to labor camps, state-owned stores sell one style of women’s shoes, all religion is unconstitutional, and in a recent election all 1,830,653 eligible voters cast their ballots for the ruling party. (one voting paper was found invalid).”
TIRANA, Nov. 17 – Thus did a popular U.S. magazine begin a story on former King Zog of Albania under the heading “Muttontown’s King.” This little appreciated and even less understood country, bordering the Adriatic, endured as a rigidly communist dictatorship for over forty years. As such, western diplomats and historians alike were unable to penetrate its wall of silence. Peter R. Prifti began his 1978 book with an appropriate reminder: Albania remained “one of the least known countries of Europe in the West.” To European and American societies, Nicholas Bethell colorfully remarked, Albania seemed as “unreal as Ruritania or Transylvania.”
Anglo American intelligence sources personalized this ignorance of Albania. “Even in our more serious moments,” Kim Philby remembered, “we Anglo-Saxons never forgot that our agents (in Albania) were just down from the trees.” Yet these observations are all the more surprising since in Nicholas Pano’s view, this society “has at various times since 1945 enjoyed a prominence far out of proportion to its size and power.”
Besides western unawareness, Albanian history, especially regarding local rivalries and suspicions about foreign presence, has contributed to the unique nature of this secretive state. Outside powers, such as Russia, Yugoslavia, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and even China, at times this century, have related to an independent Albania, in J.F. Brown’s words, as “a client state.” Moreover, regional and international events have influenced the nation’s past. A short-lived free Albania, for example, disappeared in the cauldron of World War I, keeping alive persistent concerns about Rome, Athens, and Belgrade’s territorial aims.
In terms of U.S. policy specifically, Washington withdrew its diplomatic mission in mid-November, 1946 and each society antagonistically ignored the other for over four decades. The last weeks of the American presence with its myriad of furious charges and counter-charges, actions and reactions, culminated with an evacuation to navy vessels waiting on the stormy Adriatic. This period then is vital for understanding not only the background to a sometimes ferocious hostility between Washington and Tirana, but also the larger issues of the Cold War, State-Navy operations, and U.S. decisions affecting diplomats in the field. As we shall see, the curious mixture of history, policy, and politics led to a unique, complete break in diplomatic relations in this part of the world. Moreover, the current chaotic conditions in post-Hoxha Albania have left many westerners curious about this country and its future, given “ethnic cleansing” in surrounding areas.
Our story begins on April 7, 1939 as Italian troops rolled into Albania and permanently drove the king from the country. Washington made known its decision to withdraw State Department personnel in June. Within a short time, Mussolini’s fascist state had absorbed Albania.
Two key ideas permeated America’s pre-1945 Albanian strategy. On the one hand, as elsewhere in the Mediterranean, British forces were the cornerstone of Allied involvement. The O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), under William Donovan, served as “a junior partner” in the area. Washington believed this approach could be beneficial. “Albanians generally have high regard for the United States,” as a summer, 1944 dispatch observed, as well as “particular confidence in us because of our disinterested position.” Secondly, the Americans focused on winning the war, thus “military considerations are paramount.”
Yet, Albanian, especially the Partisans, identified American with Britain’s efforts. London began covert operations as early as spring, 1943. Although a major increase in British presence took place in the following months, London’s policies wavered between the need to support anti-German troops and a two-fold fear: Hoxha’s communists, and the country’s future, especially given possible use of Allied military aid in a civil conflict. Hoxha’s concern about Britain’s ultimate aims in the region, possible western backing for Greece, and the fact that his Partisans clearly led the fighting against the Axis complicated the internal political situation. Hoxha perceived Allied delays in delivering assistance, his being left “out of the loop” regarding certain operations, and London’s eagerness to land its own units in Albania as examples of Anglo-American efforts to stop him.
Perhaps befitting a small player in a global conflict, Albania’s postwar situation did not merit specific mention at wartime conferences through Yalta. Moreover, the October, 1944 Anglo-Soviet discussion regarding possible partitioning of Eastern Europe did not, at that time, focus on Tirana. Again, lack of knowledge contributed to this neglect. “Indeed Albania is less touched by western civilization,” an Intelligence survey observed in August, 1945, “and more remote from the general life of the Continent, than any other country.” Yet, as the Cold War took shape, this nation received more and more attention. For, while its relatively small size and population precluded global impact, a State Department release explained, its “significanceŠderives from its strategic situation and from its part in the complex of Balkan and Adriatic relations.”
Washington dispatched Joseph E. Jacobs to represent U.S. interests and observe the postwar restructuring of Albanian society before deciding on official recognition. James took up his post in Tirana on V-E day. He went to see Hoxha the following day, and his initial impressions are worth noting in light of subsequent events. The Albanian leader “strikes me as a forceful character with ambitions,” Jacobs told State, “but suffering from effects of an inferiority complex because of his failure to win recognition.” Several weeks later, Jacobs analyzed the country’s leadership. Jacobs was “laboring under no illusions.” The Albanians were “a sincere, patriotic group of individuals who are going to be difficult to deal with” because “they are ignorant of the science of government, know little of international relations, and are highly sensitive” about their general lack of official recognition by the world community.
Thus, even before V-J Day, the Allies had established a diplomatic presence in Albania. The Communists, now known as the ‘democratic’ front, began to consolidate control, deal with opponents, and prepare for an end-of-year election. Accordingly, in early December, Party candidates received over ninety-three percent of the votes. Within six weeks, the now elected Constituent Assembly officially ended the monarchy and established the People’s Republic, followed in mid-March by a constitution. While some non-communists had been elected, they were systematically removed from power. Hoxha gradually assumed almost all important posts ranging from foreign affairs to defense.
On the same day as Moscow’s recognition of Albania, the United States and Great Britain set special conditions for their establishment of full relations. The Allied diplomatic missions, already on the scene, would continue to monitor the situation. The requirements were precise. Tirana must have not only “free elections leading to the formation of a truly representative government,” and “the enjoyment of freedom of speech and of assembly by non-fascist groups and individuals;” but also “an unfettered press and provision for foreign correspondents to work in the country.” Although all points were arguable, the final stipulation was Washington’s insistence that Albania honor various treaties effective on the last day of Albanian independence. (April 7, 1939)
Understandably, Hoxha unfavorably contrasted these requirements with Moscow’s willing recognition. “The fact that conditions are placedŬ” he complained, “astonishes us.” Moreover, the requests seemed “completely unreasonable,” especially in the light of Tirana’s contributions to the war effort, and “when the character of the regime is democratic, when the decisions and laws are made and put into practice in the most democratic way.” In addition, Hoxha was angry that his country had not been accepted into the U.N.
As the conflict turned to the U.N. and the International Court of Justice at the Hague, Anglo-Albanian and by extension, American-Albanian relations continued to worsen. Hoxha adamantly defended his country’s position on Corfu when speaking with Stalin in the summer of 1947. “We do not know the British suffered the damage they claimed,” he explained, “and do not believe that they did, however, even if they did, we are in no way to blame.” Almost twenty years after the incident, a London-published book on the affair referred to Albania in May, 1946 as “a brooding, secretive enigma” with “barred frontiers and armed guards.”
Albanian harassment of Allied personnel did not spare Jacobs. The on-going battle over pre-war treaties led to his early March view “that our stay here is drawing to close.” Even at this time, he was “awaiting the final note from” Washington which he thought “will be the beginning of the end here but one can never tell.” As the British minister-designate, Thomas Cecil Rapp, waited in Italy for final instructions, Jacob’s March 11 dispatch reaffirmed his belief that “my days in Albania are drawing to a close.” “After one year’s dealing with them,” he continued, “I have had enough.” Jacobs thought his fellow-countrymen in Tirana shared these views with perhaps one exception, his aide, Harry Fultz, “who seems to be a glutton for punishment.” Four days later, he was even more pessimistic. If the mission didn’t leave soon for Italy, “we shall probably wind up our lives in a Siberian salt mine.”
Moreover, American sources in 1946 concluded that Hoxha was supporting the rebellion in Greece. While naval intelligence minimized Tirana’s value to Soviet machinations in the summer of 1946, “indications are that Albania, like Yugoslavia, has fallen under Soviet domination.” Ominously, Albania “can under certain conditions constitute an important supporting element in Soviet Mediterranean planning.” Camille M. Cianfarra in a late July New York Times article summed up contemporary American thought. News from Albania described the country as “a puppet state of Russia” and “a 100 percent Communist” nation in which “ƴhe clergy are being annihilated, individual freedom does not exist and militarism is rampant.”
On October 10, 1946, George D. Henderson took over as head of the U.S. mission in Tirana. Hugh De Santis in The Diplomacy of Silence, poignantly summarized Jacobs’s state. He was “weary of the mounting anti-American tone of the Albanian press,” as well as “the systematic campaign” directed against religious and political organizations. Thus, “Jacobs too, in his case quite literally, fled from his Balkan purgatory.” In mid-November, as the mission left Tirana, he would refer to the Government as “barbarous”, “ruthless” and “unscrupulous.”
Based on these on-going difficulties, by early November, Washington saw no need to maintain a diplomatic presence. The November 2 dispatch was succinct. “After careful consideration [of] all aspects [of the] situation,” State “has decided on immediate withdrawal US mission from Albania.” Henderson had mixed reactions. In a letter the same day to a fellow diplomat, he was “curious” as to their method of departure, and wondered if Washington “heeds my suggestion that a U.S. Navy shipŠtake us out in style.” He cited his “numerous telegrams” leading to “this drastic decision.” His feelings were undisguised. “It is a tremendous source of satisfaction to tell the boys here where to get off,” he explained, “even though during only such a brief period of time.” According to November 3 message, Henderson began “secret preparations” for the withdrawal and noted religious holidays for November 4-5 which could help these efforts since local employees would not be present.
An internal American diplomatic cable discussed the nature of the message to Tirana about the move. The “mission has been unable to achieve [the] purposes for which it was originally sent,” specifically “to bring about mutual understanding and establishment of diplomatic relations between US and Albania.” Washington then told Henderson to notify “Hoxha at onceŠif necessary” at his home.
November 4-5 brought increased preparations. State informed British officials in Washington of the move on the fourth. The next day Washington cabled the U.S. Embassy in Paris explaining that Tirana was being told of the departure. Also, on the fifth, Navy and State officials prepared for evacuation by sea. According to State, the Navy Department ordered the area command (Naval Forces, Mediterranean) to “make available [an] LST or similar vessel to effect withdrawal” of American personnel.
But, as these efforts went forward, Henderson ran into a snag: an inability to reach Hoxha. The U.S. diplomat tried to see him as soon as possible. “After exhausting every diplomatic means [to] make appointment,” Henderson explained, he “was obliged to go [to] his residence whose entrance was guarded by at least six armed soldiers. [The] highest ranking officer went in five times to request Hoxha to receive letter in person [or] even on residence steps,” Henderson continued. Yet every time, despite the “clearest explanation [of the] importance and urgency of communication,” the American was told that Hoxha was “too busy,” but would be able to see him the next day at government offices. During the third attempt, Henderson managed to convince the Albanian officer to deliver a “French translation of [the] letter after reading which Hoxha [was] still too busy but would see me [the] same afternoon at [the] Ministry.” Finally, through the military representative, Henderson “told HoxhaŠthat if he still refuses accord US representative [the] courtesy of receiving letter personally,” Washington would be told. Unimpressed, Hoxha’s response was “substantially unchanged.” Then Henderson, probably more than a bit exasperated at this point, “gave original of [the] letter to officer who promised [to] give it immediately to him.” According to a November 5 internal message, State delayed its press release, needing “definite confirmation Henderson has succeeded [in] delivering message to Hoxha which he has been endeavoring to do both yesterday and today.” (November 5). Perhaps overly optimistic, the dispatch did note the Moslem holiday which “has been complicating delivery.”
Hoxha must have gotten the message for State told the media on November 8 of the impending move. Washington’s discussion of the withdrawal focused primarily on the treaty issue. Henderson’s one page letter was diplomatically correct (and general) and concluded:
In the circumstances, although my Government retains its sentiment of warm friendship for the Albanian people, it does not feel that there is any further reason for the Mission to remain in Albania. The United States Mission is accordingly being withdrawn.
Notification of Hoxha led to acceleration of U.S. efforts on November 7. Washington ordered the mission to “destroy all codes and confidential records by burning.” In addition, Henderson should coordinate plans for the withdrawal with the area naval command and ask Hoxha’s government to allow the U.S. Navy to enter the port of Durazzo for the operation.
On-going discussions concerning the evacuation centered on the type of ship available as well as Albanian permission. Henderson repeated the need for naval transport since only warships were close by. While the mission wanted a larger vessel such as a cruiser to be involved, the Navy could dispatch only two destroyers. In the Navy’s view, the Noa and Perry would be adequate for both personnel and equipment. But Tirana still would not allow the U.S. Navy into their waters. Henderson’s exasperation was clear in a November 12 telegram. “Odds are all against me here,” he cabled State, “so (I) will understand if Navy gets fed up with delay ad uncertainty and calls off whole matter.” In that case, Henderson wanted State to provide air transportation as an alternative.
To further complicate the issue, the Navy could not guarantee their involvement past November 14. Finally on November 13, Henderson reported that the Albanians would permit the mission to be ferried to the destroyers waiting in international waters.
As the mission prepared to leave, Henderson was able to send final communications despite Albanian radio interference. He reported that his staff “spent six hours last night (November 12) trying (sic) (to) escape jamming to send message re ships.” Efforts to help local employees were illusory “since legal documents, justice and civilized code are perverted mockery here.” Not surprisingly then, a Navy memorandum on November 14 observed the “extremely touchy” relations with Tirana.
The supposed final chapter in this saga involved the evacuation in stormy (appropriately enough) seas, successfully accomplished on November 12, 1946. On the following day, leaving some materials still ashore, the destroyers left Albanian waters.
This text was presented by Edward J. Sheehy, FSC, Ph.D Vice President of the Corporation Associate Professors, Department of History La Salle University
It has been published exclusively in Tirana Times with his consent.
The full copy of his work can be found at www.tiranatimes.com
