Tirana Times, May 20. The May 11 parliamentary elections delivered a further consolidation of the Socialist government under Edi Rama’s leadership, while simultaneously revealing a deterioration in democratic standards across the country: unequal representation, abuse of state resources, media capture, and pressure on the opposition. The near-absolute majority that the Socialist Party has effectively secured in these elections grants it unprecedented political power. Yet the question remains whether this power will deepen existing inequalities and undermine citizens’ trust in Albania’s democratic system.
The Democratic Party, which won only 50 seats in Parliament, appears poised to reject the results, calling the process an electoral farce unworthy even of authoritarian regimes such as Vladimir Putin’s.
The Socialist Party, in power for twelve years, has won a fourth consecutive term by capturing 83 of 140 seats in Parliament. This outcome brings it very close to an absolute majority—a threshold that, under current circumstances, could be reached with the support of one or two independent deputies, including those from Tom Doshi’s Social Democratic Party, which seems ready to back the government.
Rama’s Fourth Term, Shrouded in Controversy
Edi Rama—mayor of Tirana ( 2000- 2011) and prime minister since 2013—has secured yet another term in the May 11 vote. A fourth term is a unique occurrence in Albanian politics and demands deep analysis to understand how such a victory was achieved.
Explanations focusing on the opposition’s weakness, its fragmentation, or its leadership by a figure like Sali Berisha—a former president and two-time prime minister—are insufficient. Though younger in age, Rama has almost thirty years of political experience, including twelve as prime minister. His victory in securing a fourth term should (not) surprise in light of Albania’s harsh reality: some 800,000 citizens have emigrated over the last decade, and the country is experiencing a dramatic wave of depopulation that both international and local experts attribute to misrule, rampant corruption, lack of political competition, and state capture by organized crime.
During these years, the construction sector has flourished as an industry widely viewed as a criminal enterprise for laundering drug money, corruption, and organized-crime proceeds. Corruption under Rama’s administration has reached unprecedented levels, with dozens of senior officials under investigation, on trial, or convicted—including a former interior minister, a former deputy prime minister, ministers of finance, health, and environment, and even the mayor of Tirana, considered Rama’s political heir.
Key sectors of Albania’s economy—infrastructure, energy, and construction—have been seized by clientelism and corruption. Misappropriation of European Union funds intended for agriculture reached such an extreme that Brussels suspended financing and demanded the return of the abused sums.
Opposition Alleges “Electoral Farce”
The Democratic Party and a number of smaller parties, united in coalition, managed to win only 50 seats in Parliament. International observers from OSCE/ODIHR emphasized the massive use of state resources by the governing party, near-total control of the media, and the absence of a clear line separating party from state. In fact, this was not the first time these concerns were raised: in the 2021 elections, OSCE/ODIHR concluded that no genuine separation existed between the ruling party and state institutions.
A poll published immediately after the 2021 vote found that a majority of citizens believed the government could not be changed through elections. Local experts now say that, following the May 11, 2025 vote, the idea of peaceful rotation of power by ballot has become practically impossible.
The opposition has leveled a series of serious accusations of manipulation in the May 11 electoral process, raising deep doubts about the legitimacy and fairness of the political contest. They argue that the election was not a free and fair contest between alternatives, but rather an unequal confrontation between a politicized state apparatus and an opposition weakened by the tools of power.
First, the opposition accuses the government of extreme use of state resources in favor of the Socialist Party. Public administration, state institutions, and logistical assets were mobilized in service of the governing coalition’s campaign in ways that political opponents say violated every democratic norm. From official vehicles and public buildings to misuse of personal data and institutional influence, the state was turned—according to the opposition—into an electoral instrument in the hands of the governing party.
Another grave charge involves alleged collaboration between state bodies, the ruling party, and organized-crime groups. The opposition asserts that significant portions of the campaign were funded and logistically supported by criminal elements granted impunity in return for political favors, particularly in sensitive electoral districts. This cooperation, they contend, undermines not only the elections but also the functioning of constitutional order and the rule of law.
The opposition also points to oligarchic influence as a further threat to electoral equality. Businessmen with close ties to the government allegedly financed the Socialist Party’s campaign and promoted its candidates, in exchange for public contracts, tenders, and fiscal advantages. According to critics, the elections have effectively become a transaction between money and power.
Another widely denounced tactic targeted the private sector: employees were reportedly coerced to vote for government candidates under threat of losing their jobs or state contracts. Many entrepreneurs say they were openly instructed to direct their workforce’s votes toward the Socialist Party or risk losing access to public projects and other institutional benefits.
Particular attention has been paid to Tirana, where dozens of expedited building permits were allegedly granted to companies linked to organized-crime networks that had covertly or overtly supported the Socialist Party’s campaign. The opposition says this mechanism has become a new form of mass vote-buying through financial favors.
Pre-election mass hirings in the public administration were also heavily criticized. According to the opposition, the government artificially boosted public-sector employment by up to 18% over the level on the day the Socialist Party took office—hirings tied not to genuine civil-service needs but to electoral calculations and securing votes through reliance on state employment.
Some of the most serious accusations concern municipalities run by the Socialist Party. More than 90% of these local governments, the opposition alleges, were converted into centralized campaign centers to aid the government’s effort. Instead of serving residents, these municipalities became electoral tools for the ruling party.
The opposition has also raised concerns about the diaspora vote, cast by mail for the first time. They say it strains credibility that over 90% of diaspora ballots went to the Socialist Party, with only 10% for the opposition. According to critics, such an imbalance can only be explained by institutional vote-rigging or illicit interventions in the counting process. Former Parliament Speaker Jozefina Topalli, an opposition candidate, declared, “Even Putin would be ashamed of these one-sided results.”
Finally, one of the most serious accusations relates to the near-total control of the media, both public and private. The Socialist Party’s campaign, according to the opposition and international observers, was covered in a biased manner, while opposition candidates were excluded from debates or were treated marginally. This media domination strongly influenced the shaping of public opinion and limited the citizens’ real opportunity to make an informed choice.The opposition has warned that it will not recognize the result, and it remains to be seen how it will react moving forward.
New parties: a challenge to the political duopoly
The 2025 parliamentary elections in Albania have produced a development that may be considered historic for the country’s political landscape. For the first time since the beginning of the democratic transition, several new parties, unconnected to power, are managing to enter Parliament, challenging an electoral system designed to keep them out. Around 155,000 voters—approximately 10% of the electorate—have supported these new political forces, which are expected to secure between 3 and 5 mandates, a small window for representation outside the traditional elite.
This development represents a jolt to a political system built upon the tacit agreement between the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party—a consolidated order since 2008 through an electoral reform that strengthened their control via regional seat distribution, high thresholds, and numerous bureaucratic obstacles for new parties.
One such obstacle is the requirement of 20,000 notarized signatures for the registration of a new political party, a cost that in practice renders participation nearly impossible without substantial financial support.
Nevertheless, in these elections, several new parties managed to overcome these barriers. “Nisma Shqipëria Bëhet” has already secured one mandate in Tirana and is in contention for additional mandates in Fier and Vlorë, especially thanks to diaspora votes where its performance is notably higher than within the national territory. The “Opportunity” party, founded by Agron Shehaj, has won one mandate in Tirana and remains in the running for a second. Likewise, “Lëvizja Bashkë,” with a more civic profile and social program, has passed the threshold to secure a mandate in the capital. All these political forces have entered the scene not only with new energy but also with more open and democratic structures than the traditional parties.
If their votes were fairly represented in a national proportional system, these forces would win over 10 mandates. But reality is different: a large portion of citizens’ votes for new alternatives will remain unrepresented and will be redistributed to the major parties due to the regional division and the way mandates are calculated. Thus, the Socialist Party, which received 52% of the vote, is expected to control about 56% of Parliament, while the Democratic Party, with 35% of the vote, will obtain around 36% of the mandates. Meanwhile, nearly 10% of the electorate who voted outside this axis will be represented by far fewer seats in Parliament than their vote deserves.
In a country where for more than 30 years politics has been dominated by clientelism, patronage, the use of the state for campaigning, and media control, the attempt to build a new culture of representation is more than just an experiment—it is a necessity. The rooting of this new model, though still fragile, may be the first step toward a functional and inclusive democracy.
The 2025 elections may not have brought an immediate upheaval of the political order, but they have signaled the beginning of a new era. If the new parties manage to preserve their integrity, demonstrate competence, and maintain a connection with citizens, they could play a key role in building a real alternative for the future. In this small window that has opened, there is more than just mandates—there is a chance for change.
