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By Genc Pollo
The European Union’s stance on democracy in the Balkans is increasingly difficult to defend. The recent visit of EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to Albania is a glaring example of Brussels’ selective engagement, where stability appears to take precedence over genuine democratic governance. Despite mounting evidence of democratic erosion under Prime Minister Edi Rama’s 12-year rule, Kos sidestepped concerns over media freedom, opposition rights, and corruption. Instead, she praised Albania’s alignment with EU foreign policy and reiterated the goal of concluding accession negotiations by 2027.
This is troubling. If the EU is serious about its democratic principles, it cannot afford to turn a blind eye to a government that delays meaningful reforms until the very moment negotiations are supposed to conclude. Reform schedules that push key democratic measures beyond 2027 raise legitimate concerns about whether the Albanian government is truly committed to democracy—or merely playing a waiting game.
Kos highlighted three key aspects of Albania’s so-called progress: stability, foreign policy alignment, and regional cooperation. Stability, of course, is a favorite term in Brussels, but in the Balkans, it often translates into “stabilocracy”—a system where autocratic tendencies are tolerated as long as they ensure geopolitical predictability. Albania’s foreign policy alignment is nothing new; it has been a rare point of political consensus for years. And while regional cooperation sounds promising, Rama’s approach, particularly in dealings with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, has at times alienated Kosovo, raising tensions rather than fostering unity.
The EU’s annual reports on Albania have gradually become more critical, but these critiques often feel like a formality rather than a meaningful call to action. When the EU intervenes—
such as blocking Albania’s dubious “golden passports” scheme or the proposed fiscal amnesty that could have encouraged financial crime—it does so sporadically and without consistent enforcement. Meanwhile, high-profile cases of government overreach, such as the dismissal of the Venice Commission’s opinion on the parliamentary mandate of former Foreign Minister Olta Xhaçka, show that EU objections are easily brushed aside in Tirana.
The EU’s handling of democratic backsliding in Serbia is equally discouraging. As thousands of Serbians protest against Vučić’s government over election fraud, media suppression, and
corruption, Brussels remains largely silent. This is not an isolated case. The EU has a troubling track record of prioritizing stability over democracy in the Western Balkans, a strategy that has produced disappointing results. Montenegro, for example, has spent 12 years in accession negotiations and has only closed three of 35 chapters, yet it too has been given the 2027 accession target, raising doubts about the seriousness of the EU’s enlargement process.
The question Brussels must answer is simple: does it stand for democratic values, or does it merely want to keep the Balkans in check? If the EU continues to tolerate “stabilocracies” where democratic institutions exist on paper but not in practice, it risks not only undermining genuine democratic movements but also damaging its own credibility. Enlargement policy
should not be about setting artificial timelines; it should be about enforcing the standards that the EU claims to uphold.
For too long, the EU has taken a passive approach, hoping that democracy will somehow emerge on its own while rewarding leaders who master the art of controlled governance. But democracy is not a passive process—it requires constant vigilance, real consequences for democratic failures, and a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths. If the EU wants to
remain a beacon of democracy, it must start acting like one.
