Kosova has three categories of neighbors: opposers, waverers, and supporters. These categories also apply further afield within the European Union. In the absence of a unified European position, differentiated country approaches add to the confusion over Kosova’s final status.
The key opposer to Kosova’s independence is Serbia. There is no likelihood that any officials will willingly accept a new neighbor although they will have to reconcile themselves to reality once the internationals implement their decision.
No other state in the region is adamantly opposed to Kosova’s independence although Serbia has made strenuous efforts to appeal to various mythical solidarities – Slavic, Christian, Orthodox, and linguistic. Both Belgrade and Prishtina are now engaged in a struggle for influence in neighboring capitals particularly among those countries perceived to be wavering.
Macedonia and Montenegro have been targeted by Serbian officials to resist recognizing Kosova. But Belgrade does not have much to offer in return for opposition to Kosova’s independence, whether lucrative energy deals or financial payoffs to corruptible officials. But the political scene in both countries remains divided and susceptible to outside influences.
Macedonia’s authorities have stated that they are prepared to recognize Kosova once the U.S. and EU make a firm decision. This is unlikely to change as Skopje is seeking the green light to a NATO invitation at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008.
Although Serbian parties in Podgorica are campaigning on behalf of Belgrade, above all Montenegro seeks good relations with Washington and Brussels and will not oppose their decisions on Kosova.
In both Macedonia and Montenegro the Albanian population plays an important role in ensuring political stability. Both governments need to remember that without Albanian support their progress could become rocky. Hence, political practicalities will help trump its ties with Serbia.
Bosnia-Hercegovina falls within the wavering camp as the two entities have adopted opposite positions on Kosova. While the Bosniaks and Croats favor independence, the “Serb Republic” supports Serbian sovereignty over Kosova and some leaders have even threatened to organize their own referendum on independence.
In the broader neighborhood, Greece has sought a delay on status but will agree with a consensual EU line. For Turkey, support for Kosova’s independence is balanced between positive and negative precedents – positive in the case of Northern Cyprus and negative with regard to Kurdistan. Ankara will agree with a common U.S.-EU position but does not want to take a leadership role.
Firm supporters of Kosova’s independence will not be swayed by diplomatic pressures or by international indecision. Albania remains fully supportive although it is careful not to push the issue too hard and stand accused of annexationism. Croatia will not back down because of Serbian threats that bilateral relations could be broken.
Slovenia has also adopted a supportive position toward Kosova’s statehood although it remains hamstrung by EU responsibilities. Slovenia is praying that when it assumes the EU Presidency in January 2008, Kosova will be settled. Ljubljana does not want to be accused of breaking up Serbia as it was once attacked for destroying Yugoslavia.
Among EU states there is little outright opposition to independence but an ongoing debate over the best means to achieve it. Many members advise caution on bypassing the UN Security Council, but this does not mean that they will oppose such as step once it becomes necessary.
While Britain and France have supported the U.S. position on Kosova, Germany has proved to be more resistant. One likely explanation is that Berlin does not want to sour its relations with Moscow. Germany’s coalition government is lobbied by business groups with profitable interests in Russia.
Given the complexity of positions over Kosova, one must also beware of rumor and disinformation. Some of it may be wishful thinking and some is planted by parties and capitals interested in sowing even more confusion in the EU and delaying any firm decisions.
