Due to the indecision exhibited by Western powers in confirming Kosova’s final status, the Russian regime now views the issue as a valuable boost for its global ambitions. By threatening to veto Kosova’s supervised independence under the Ahtisaari plan and maintaining an indefinite status quo, Moscow aims to raise its international stature.
First, be denying statehood for Kosova, the Kremlin can claim that Russia is a major defender of international legality by its insistence on working through the UN Security Council. Of course, Russia would not allow the UNSC to interfere in its own neighborhood by approving a UN mission in territories that Moscow covets in Moldova and Georgia.
Moscow exploits the fact that the American administration is hesitant to bypass the UN as it did before launching the Iraqi war. The U.S. is seeking to rebuild alliances in Europe and elsewhere and does not want to be condemned again as a hegemon and unilateralist. Meanwhile, most EU governments do not want to act outside the UN framework as this could discredit their own global influence.
Second, Russia is posing as a promoter of multilateralism, where the UN process can serve its interests and undercut those of the U.S. Multilateralism is a cover for inaction and a tool for expanding Moscow’s influence in the Balkans. Multilateral institutions such as the UN are not only slow in decision-making, but they operate according to the lowest common denominator whereby the resistance of one capital can deny the interests of the majority.
Third, Moscow is posturing as a protector of state sovereignty and integrity by opposing the breakup of a UN member state. It thereby appeals to many UN members who fear separatism, especially authoritarian governments who preserve territories primarily by bullets and not ballots. At the same time, the U.S. is cast by Moscow as a maverick interfering in the internal affairs of allegedly vulnerable victims such as Serbia.
And fourth, Kosova forms part of a wider strategic agenda that enables Russia to elevate its international position, to interpose in Balkan developments, to divide the Atlantic Alliance, to promote splits within the EU, to aggravate weaknesses in Western decision-making, to gain veto powers over Europe’s enlargement, and to construct a Eurasian pole of power as a counterbalance to the U.S.
For the Kremlin the birth of new pro-American states and the expansion of democracies in former communist territories present a long-term threat to Russia’s strategic designs. Democratic governments invariably seek NATO and EU membership in order to consolidate the reform process and to provide permanent security and independence. For Moscow, such steps undercut its influences in neighboring countries, shrink its regional power projection, and retard its ambitions as a revived superpower.
Russia feels more confident in realizing its aspirations where its neighbors are either predictable authoritarian states, isolated and marginalized countries with populist or neutral governments, weak states that are internally divided and cannot qualify for NATO or EU membership, or countries ruled by outright anti-American governments.
In addition, the Kremlin fears that an independent and pro-Western Kosova may become attractive for nations in the north Caucasus that resent centralized rule from Moscow and will seek their own statehood. The fact that Kosova is widely perceived as a “Muslim” entity reinforces Russia’s anxieties that it may act as a model among its own Muslim populations. Hence, Kremlin propaganda depicts Kosovars as fundamentalists and terrorists to undercut international support for the aspiring state.
Given the uncertainty in Western strategy, there is no reason for Russia to compromise over any plan for Kosova, however many amendments are offered by Washington. Opposition to the Ahtisaari plan has become a measure of Russia’s newly found strength from which it is unlikely to back down unless some major concessions are offered or strategic retreats are initiated by the White House in other arenas.
