by Albert Rakipi, PhD
Tirana Times, September 11, 2026 – The increasingly visible re-emergence of international terrorism against the backdrop of the major conflict unfolding in the Middle East is a new development, but hardly an unexpected one. The experience of the past three decades has shown that terrorism finds its most fertile ground where the state weakens, institutions lose control over territory and borders, and informal economies, smuggling networks and armed groups begin to substitute for public authority. Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia and, in a different way, the Sahel are all examples of this phenomenon. Weak states, and especially failed states, are not merely victims of terrorism. They often become the environment in which terrorist organizations regroup, secure financing, build networks, recruit and forge new alliances. In this respect, what is happening today between Yemen and Somalia deserves particular attention. This time, terrorism is not simply re-emerging on the periphery of the international system. It is moving closer to some of the most important arteries of the global economy.
An Unusual Alliance, but Not an Inexplicable One
The growing cooperation between the Houthis in Yemen and al-Shabaab in Somalia is one of the most troubling signs of this development. Ideologically, these are two organizations rooted in different traditions. The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, while al-Shabaab is a Sunni organization affiliated with al-Qaeda. But prolonged conflicts develop their own logic: operational interests, access to weapons, financing and common enemies can become more important than doctrinal divisions. An investigation published by The Wall Street Journal on August 31, 2026, described cooperation that already includes arms transfers, training in Yemen, the use of drones and interest in radar capabilities that could make it possible to monitor shipping in the Gulf of Aden. According to the information presented in the article, al-Shabaab militants have travelled to Yemen for training, while Houthi instructors have also operated in Somalia. The interests of both sides are relatively clear. Al-Shabaab has financial resources, territory and smuggling networks, but seeks more advanced weapons and technology. The Houthis possess missiles, drones and combat experience, while seeking to extend their strategic presence towards the African coast. This relationship is also a product of two weak state environments. Yemen and Somalia, in different ways, do not exercise full control over their territory. It is precisely this deficit of state authority that creates the space in which non-state actors can build parallel structures and cooperate across borders. The problem, therefore, is not simply the return of al-Qaeda in a different form. It is the growing intersection of terrorist organizations, regional militias, smuggling networks and new military technologies.
When Terrorism Reaches the Arteries of the Global Economy
The importance of this development is above all geographical. The Houthi advance along Yemen’s coast in September, including around Mocha and areas close to Bab el-Mandeb, has brought the group even closer to one of the world’s most important maritime passages. On September 11, UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg warned the Security Council that the conflict was entering “a new and more dangerous phase.” This is happening at a particularly sensitive moment. The conflict with Iran has severely restricted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the principal routes for global energy supplies. As a consequence, the Red Sea and Saudi infrastructure on the Kingdom’s western coast have become increasingly important as alternative routes.
If Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb become insecure at the same time, the problem ceases to be merely regional. It directly affects the functioning of global energy and transport markets.This is also where a classic feature of asymmetric warfare becomes apparent. A terrorist organization does not need to physically control a strait or sink large numbers of ships. It only needs to create a level of insecurity sufficient to alter the behaviour of insurers, shipowners and transport operators. Insurance premiums rise. Freight rates increase. Ships are diverted around the Cape of Good Hope and journeys between Asia and Europe become considerably longer. UNCTAD has documented how the diversion of traffic away from the Red Sea since late 2023 has increased shipping distances, fuel costs and pressure on the global fleet. In 2024, longer routes contributed to a significant increase in maritime ton-miles.A comparatively inexpensive drone or missile can therefore alter the route of a ship and cargo worth hundreds of millions of dollars. This is perhaps the most important dimension of the threat: terrorism can affect the global economy without acquiring territorial control in the traditional sense.
Saudi Arabia and the Regional Balance
Saudi Arabia stands at the centre of this crisis. Attacks and threats against Saudi cities, economic infrastructure and vessels associated with the Kingdom show that pressure on Riyadh has become a direct element of the current escalation. But Saudi Arabia’s importance cannot be reduced to oil.The Kingdom is a key state in the Arab system, a member of the G20 and, because of Mecca and Medina, occupies a unique position in the Islamic world. Jeddah is also home to the headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which brings together 57 countries. At the same time, Saudi Arabia remains clearly anchored in the Western security architecture. Its long-standing partnership with the United States includes defence, intelligence cooperation, counterterrorism and energy security. Saudi security therefore matters far beyond the security of one individual state. Attacks against Riyadh would affect the balance in the Gulf, global energy markets and the most important political centres of the Arab and Islamic worlds. It would also create additional space for armed non-state actors in a region where the weakening of states has already been one of the principal sources of instability. Support for Saudi security, therefore, is not simply a matter of political solidarity. It is connected to the broader interest in preserving a regional balance in which functioning states do not lose ground to militias and terrorist organizations. In this sense, Saudi Arabia remains a pivotal state not only in the Middle East, but also across much of the Arab and Islamic worlds and in the relationship between this region and the West.
Albania and the Balkans: A Conflict Closer Than It Appears
The reactions of Albania, North Macedonia and Kosovo indicate that the threat to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea is increasingly being viewed in the Balkans as an issue that extends well beyond the conflict in Yemen. On September 8, 2026, Albania’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs condemned the attacks by the Iran-backed Houthis against civilian and economic targets in Saudi Arabia. Tirana also condemned attacks against commercial vessels and any attempt to undermine freedom of navigation and the security of international maritime transport. This was Albania’s second reaction within a matter of weeks. On July 22, Albania had condemned Houthi threats to impose a maritime blockade and had taken a clear position in support of Saudi Arabia’s security and freedom of navigation. Foreign Minister Ferit Hoxha is a career diplomat with extensive experience, including a long record in multilateral diplomacy and direct experience at the UN Security Council, where Albania served as a non-permanent member in 2022 and 2023. This background is relevant to the institutional language in which Tirana has framed its position: not only in terms of solidarity with Saudi Arabia, but also with reference to international law, the protection of civilians and freedom of navigation. On July 23, North Macedonia also condemned Houthi attacks and threats, directly linking them to international trade and regional security. Kosovo adopted a similar position on July 23 and again on September 8, when acting Foreign Minister Glauk Konjufca condemned attacks against civilians and critical infrastructure and expressed solidarity with Saudi Arabia. For Albania and North Macedonia, as well as Montenegro, there is also a NATO dimension. Alliance security is no longer understood solely in terms of territorial defence. Critical infrastructure, energy, ports and supply chains are becoming increasingly important components of security. The economic dimension is equally direct. For the small economies of the Balkans, higher transport and energy costs quickly translate into higher prices and inflationary pressures. In this sense, Bab el-Mandeb is much closer to Tirana, Skopje, Pristina or Podgorica than geographical distance might suggest.
A Warning Beyond the Red Sea
Houthi-al-Shabaab cooperation should not be viewed simply as another episode in the war in Yemen. It points to a broader problem: the escalation of conflict in the Middle East is creating conditions in which weak states, armed militias, terrorist organizations and smuggling networks increasingly intersect. This is precisely the environment in which terrorism has historically re-emerged and flourished. This time, however, there is an important difference. The space in which this process is unfolding lies alongside some of the most important corridors of global energy and trade. The threat, therefore, is not only to Yemen, Somalia or Saudi Arabia. It concerns the broader principle that the main routes of international trade must remain open and secure. And if weak states create the space in which terrorism can return, then supporting states capable of maintaining stability and order is not simply a diplomatic choice. In an increasingly fragmented region, it becomes part of international security itself.
Albert Rakipi is the author of the book “Weak States and Security”
