By Janusz Bugajski
The next few years will present important challenges for trans-Atlantic cohesion, European Union unity, and the determination of the West to stand up to an increasingly assertive and expansive Russia that is seeking a dominant role in the wider Europe. I will focus therefore on the current threats to the trans-Atlantic agenda and the escalating confrontation with Russia, as exemplified by Allied decisions over Kosova.
Threats to the Trans-Atlantic Agenda
Each of the CEE countries, much like the rest of Europe, faces novel security threats and intricate foreign policy challenges especially given the difficulties experienced in maintaining the cohesion of both European and trans-Atlantic institutions. These threats range from unresolved status issues, lingering ethnic tensions, and mass migration to energy security, organized crime, international terrorist networks, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some states also view the lack of political stability and international integration among their neighbors as a latent security threat whether to their own national independence, territorial integrity, diaspora rights, social stability, economic development, or investment opportunities.
In many respects, the most important security challenge for the Atlantic Alliance is the ongoing gap between the U.S. and the EU, even though the second George W. Bush administration has endeavored to heal some of the rifts and the new leadership in Germany and France is more amenable to a stronger American connection. The gap that emerged between the U.S. and the EU during the past decade has been a consequence of numerous factors, and not only because of divergent opinions on how to deal with Iraq and international terrorists. With the disappearance of a tangible common threat such as the Soviet Union, almost inevitably the glue of the Alliance weakened, while no single overarching security threat has had the same adhesive power. The divisions that emerged are also a manifestation of asymmetrical military capabilities, differing national interests and regional priorities within the EU evident in divergent threat perceptions and security strategies.
While in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the U.S. has focused intensively on overcoming global threats and grappling with regional insecurities stemming largely from the Middle East, the EU has been preoccupied with its own institutional enlargement and integration. While Washington has viewed international Islamicist terrorism as the most critical national security challenge, many European states consider a spillover of Middle Eastern instability to be potentially more threatening. While the US has been focused on pre-emptive and even preventive military action against real and potential threats, the EU has been more concerned about state sovereignty, “soft security” strategies, and preserving the legitimacy of multinational institutions.
In addition to their policy differences, both the EU and the U.S. are suffering from persistent and diverging weaknesses. The EU has a capability gap with regard to its potential military dispositions and its willingness and ability to deploy combat troops. The projected European army remains in its infancy. Meanwhile, the U.S. is experiencing a credibility gap in terms of its political influence in the face of growing skepticism about Washington’s policy and global manifestations of anti-Americanism manipulated by extremist groupings and by some governments.
However, the differences that emerged between the U.S. and the EU do not signal that the Alliance should be discarded because the most basic American and European interests are reconcilable. In many cases, the U.S. will require EU political support, military assistance, and complementarity in some combat zones and in a host of “softer” security components such as law enforcement, intelligence sharing, peace-keeping, and reconstruction. The EU itself is eager to better coordinate foreign policy with Washington on questions that the Europeans consider central to their interests or in which they have made military and economic investments.
Beyond the tangible threats themselves, one of the major trans-Atlantic security challenges will be to maintain sufficient Alliance as well as European cohesion in tackling emerging threats. Although Americans and Europeans generally have similar perceptions about the most vital security challenges, they differ markedly on how best to deal with them. For example, EU citizens are less willing to support military force without the seal of multilateral institutional approval. The EU countries also tend to be ambivalent concerning what global role they should play and at what cost, while at the same time support for strong American leadership in world affairs has significantly declined during the last decade.
It is in America’s national interest to promote a European Union that is committed to the trans-Atlantic relationship. The most beneficial result for the U.S. of EU enlargement and integration through the Reform Treaty for the U.S. would be the emergence of a revived EU that also rejuvenates the Atlantic connection with a more coherent foreign and security policy. Simultaneously, the new members can become good Europeans by helping to transform the EU into a politically cohesive, economically competitive, and strategically vital region that can complement and work together with Washington to resolve a host of common challenges.
While the U.S. must work hard to restore its international legitimacy in the wake of the Iraqi war, the EU must find its identity, scope, and solidarity. At the same time, NATO is also experiencing a prolonged period of evolution, seeking to find its own identity and mission in a post-Cold War world. NATO’s security agenda, and that of its individual members, has become more diffuse and complex as threats and challenges to alliance security have become more ambiguous and diffuse. Clearly, the anti-terrorist campaign or any other contemporary international crisis does not have the same trans-Atlantic adhesive force as the struggle against communism and Soviet expansion once did. Different NATO members exhibit contrasting national priorities and a variable willingness to contribute to NATO missions.
It is in U.S. national interests to have a united European ally that can cooperate and complement the projection of America’s political authority, economic strength, and military power. And it is the national interest of all EU states to have a strategic alliance with the U.S. and benefit from Washington’s commitment to European security and from a partnership that aims to build a wider Europe. A more Atlanticist EU will encourage a more multilateralist U.S. policy at least on issues of primary concern to both sides of the Atlantic.
The U.S. administration, both outgoing and incoming, needs to reinforce ties with its new allies in Central-Eastern Europe, as well as with more traditional partners. Political support for CEE priority issues, whether towards Russia, the Black Sea region, or the Western Balkans, together with appropriate economic and business benefits may help guarantee more durable commitments to the transatlantic relationship. Simultaneously, the challenge for the new allies is not a question of simply balancing U.S. and EU interests, but of making these interests compatible, complementary, implementable, effective, and durable. And the challenge for Washington is to transform the EU into a partner that complements America’s strategic goals and does not obstruct or divert them.
Russia’s Challenge
In the post-post Cold War world, Russia presents an increase challenge to Allied interests. Although Russia is not as strong as it acts, it is also not as weak as many in the West believe. It can and does act as a spoiler, a conflict provoker, and a direct threat to the national interests of its neighbors.
The list of conflict points between Russia and the West expands almost every week. The Putin leadership has deliberately created a sense of danger through its anti-Western rhetoric. It claims that the U.S. and its closest NATO allies, such as Britain and Poland, are seeking to encircle Russia and prevent the country from regaining its rightful position as a major global player. The expansion of Western alliances and the promotion of liberal democracies are depicted as direct threats to Russia’s interests.
Russia’s presidential elections in March will not change policy. President Putin’s selected successor, Dmitry Medvedev, is not an independent actor with his own power base but will remain beholden to the “cekistocracy” that controls the Kremlin. Moscow’s policy will remain assertive and at times openly confrontational toward the West.
In this strategic context, Kosova has evolved into more than a wedge issue for Moscow vis-a-vis the U.S. The wedge has widened into a valuable strategic weapon. The Kremlin views the issue as a boost for its regional and global ambitions. Although Kosova is not intrinsically vital for Russia’s expansionist interests, by vetoing Kosova’s independence and maintaining an indefinite status quo, Russia aims to raise its international stature in several ways.
First, the Kremlin can claim that Russia is a major defender of international legality by its insistence on working through the UN Security Council. Of course, Russia would not allow the UNSC to interfere in its own neighborhood; for example, by approving a long-term UN mission in territories that it covets in Moldova and Georgia. Moreover, Russia itself regularly violates the UN Charter (in Chechnya) or stations troops in neutral states without government approval (as in Moldova).
Second, Russia is posing as a promoter of multilateralism, where the UN process can serve its interests and undercut those of the U.S. Multilateral institutions such as the UN are not only slow and cumbersome in making decisions but they operate according to the lowest common denominator whereby the resistance of one capital can deny the interests of the majority.
Third, Moscow is posturing as a staunch protector of state sovereignty and national integrity by opposing the imposed breakup of a UN member state, Serbia, irrespective of the genocidal policies pursued by Belgrade, which led to Kosova’s de facto separation in 1999. Russia thereby appeals to several UN members who fear separatism. At the same time, the U.S. is depicted by Moscow as a maverick interfering in the internal affairs and state structures of allegedly vulnerable states.
Fourth, Kosova forms part of a wider strategic agenda that enables Russia to elevate its international position, to interpose in Balkan and European affairs, to divide the Atlantic Alliance, to promote splits within the EU, to aggravate weaknesses in Western decision-making, to gain veto powers over Europe’s enlargement, and to construct a Eurasian pole of power as a counterbalance to the United States.
Although Kosova’s statehood will generate tensions in the region, the stabilization of the western Balkans is manageable if NATO, the EU, and the U.S. work in tandem to prevent Belgrade and Moscow from exploiting divisions in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Belgrade no longer possesses the capabilities to export war to neighboring states, but a display of diplomatic and military force may be necessary by NATO and the EU to convince local actors that the West is serious.
Containing Russian reactions outside of the Balkans may prove more problematic. In the wake of Kosova’s independence, Russia may pursue its imperial interests more vigorously in several neighboring regions and intensify its anti-American alliances. Moscow has already signaled that it will fortify its economic and political ties with Iran; it will seek a closer relationship with China to counter “American expansionism;” it will develop the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) into a competitor with NATO in Central Asia and the Caucasus; and it will increase pressure on all former Soviet colonies who seek inclusion in Western institutions.
NATO enlargement throughout the Balkans and toward the Black Sea region, with invitations for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, would help undercut Russia’s aspirations in the region and provide a greater sense of security to the new Atlanticist states. The Balkans have once again become useful for Moscow in disrupting democratic expansion in the wider European theater. In this strategic context, Serbia is manipulated by Russia as a valuable bridgehead within South East Europe to further Moscow’s economic and political designs, especially through the expansion of its energy interests.
The Kremlin does not seek a permanent solution for Kosova but prefers a “frozen conflict” in the Balkans that it can exploit to its advantage. For Moscow, the emergence of Euro-Atlantic democracies in former communist territories undermines its strategic designs. Democratic governments invariably seek membership in NATO and the EU in order to consolidate the reform process and provide permanent security and the assurance of state independence. Such developments undercut Russia’s regressive influences in neighboring countries and retard its ambitions as a revived superpower. Russia feels more assured in realizing its aspirations where neighbors are either predictable authoritarian states, isolated and marginalized countries with populist governments, weak and internally divided states that cannot qualify for NATO or EU membership, or countries ruled by anti-American governments.
