By Veton Surroi
1. One of Kosovo’s counter-expressions, on a none too short list of such statements, is that, whilst Kosovo is one of the fundamental points of European Union foreign policy, precisely when it comes to the deployment of one of the EU’s most ambitious missions to date, EULEX, Kosovo finds itself without its own policy on this issue in relation to the EU.
However, the good news, particularly in comparison with the situation of ten years earlier, when within the Kosovo Movement, especially its armed movement, anti-Western tones existed, is that now all the political and social structures of Kosovo speak of Euro-Atlantic integration. The bad news remains that these declations are superficial and do not contain within truely serious policy-making process.
There are reasons for this state of affairs, particularly in the context of a greater absence, that is of a foreign policy in its entirety, but then again, these reasons do not change the state of affairs. The crux of the matter is that, whilst Kosovo’s neighbours have conducted their own policies in relation to the EU, and each one of them, at its own pace, draws closer and closer to the integrating boundaries, Kosovo is almost totally isolated from this process, judged according to its personal impulses.
2. 2008 could be called a year lost from the viewpoint of the building of European policies in Kosovo. The country lost three fundamental opportunities to lay out the right pickets. The first opportunity was that of European presence in Kosovo, following the proclamation of Independence. In more simplified terms, the European mission in Kosovo has been given the duty of assisting in the establishment of the Rule of Law, and the Kosovans would have to define which Law they refer to. A contract should have been concluded between the two sides; there was no such request forthcoming from the Kosovo side.
The second opportunity was that of dealing with Kosovon development policies within the European context. Over the past five years, one government after the other failed in their efforts to map out a middle-term European, development plan, like Bulgaria, Estonia, or Ireland (and even Turkey) did. In the absence of a development plan. Kosovon governments have presented improvisations (frequently drafted roughly by auxillary international assistant agencies). One such improvisation was tabled at the Donor’s Conference. In the absence of such a development plan, relations with the EU, in the economic context, remain those of charity and not assistance for transformation.
The third opportunity is that of the absence of European conditionning in Kosovo-Serbia relations. During this entire year, Serbian diplomacy has been endeavouring, through concrete acts, from sending the issue of Kosovo’s issue to the International Court of Justice (with the blessing of the UNO General Assembly), and up to Ban ki-Moon’s six point plan, to isolate the issue of Kosovo as a constitutional obstacle in its own European integration. At the same time, with the combination of several factors (refusal of recognition by five states of the EU, the strengthening of parallel structures in Kosovo), European presence in Kosovo has entrenched itself even further in positions of a stabilising mission, which could continue for years on end without any major impact on the country’s transformation.
3. The year 2009, could be crucial in the development of European policies in Kosovo. Primarily because the entire region could advance at at a higher level (Albania’s membership to NATO and candidature to the EU, review of Montenegro’s status of candidate, perhaps of Serbia’s too, liberalization of visas for Macedonia). Secondly, because the lack of capacities in institutions will make very visible the discrepencies between requirements and possibilities.
However, here are two issues for which a great deal of work must be done and through which a more active side could be identified. The first one is that an operational dialogue is opened on the European presence in Kosovo. The more concrete the dialogue the better. And within this concrete character there should be dialogue of the government together with the Opposition and civil society, on one of the issues with which Kosovo has been identified, corruption and organised crime. This is an issue that could be easily utilised for demagogy by EULEX, charged with the duty of helping to establish Rule of Law. EULEX could continue to blame the Kosovars, but without actually undertaking anything themselves, while the Kosovo officials on the other hand, lay the blame at EULEX’s door, precisely because formally it is charged with the Rule of Law. The opposite should be happening-instead of mutual blame there should be cooperation. The second is the medium term European Plan. For whoever comes to office or is in the Opposition, today and tomorrow, this plan is indespensible, because it renders Kosovo’s development a European proces that can be gauged, and equally as important, it can qualify for greater European support. This plan is even more crucial for 2009, because swayed by powerful political pressure, there is a campaign a-foot outside of any development plan, with the objective of selling the country’s basic economic resources in 2009 in the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEC) and Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo (PTK), although the world is being battered by a tsunami of economic crisis.
4. But, the fundamental issue in Kosovo’s foreign policy for 2009 should be Kosovo’s return as a constitutional point for Serbia’s integration policy into the EU. In view of the fact that Serbia should be supported in accalerating its progress towards the EU, with the liberalization of the visa regime and attaining candidate status, none of this can dared be reached to the detriment of Kosovo. Without a policy of conditions, two kinds of damage could be rendered. The first is that relations are not created by which Serbia becomes responsibility for its acts in Kosovo through the so-called parallel structures. The second danger is that Serbia’s progress towards the EU is not qualified with the Kosovo issue (and a process in which Serbia would recognise Kosovo’s independence). In this case the discrepancy would increase between Serbia and Kosovo in relation to Brussels, to the degree where Serbia could become an obstacle to Kosovo’s integration into the EU.
In fact, the sirens of alarm should be heeded now.
