There is much to celebrate about United States-Albanian relations which have generally been strong, particularly in the period since 1991, but historically these relations have of course experienced many important changes and are likely to do so again with the inauguration of President Barach Obama. It is the purpose of this short paper to explore the connection between the two states and then briefly examine three principal periods of bilateral relations; 1) the period from Albanian independence through the Hoxha years 2) the post communist period since1991 3) concluding with some thoughts on the future of Albanian American relations during the Obama presidency.
The relationship between the United States and Albania has been quite solid for a number of reasons, not the least of which is American stability concerns in the Balkans and Europe as a whole. Most American administrations, at least in recent years, have appreciated the strategic position which Albania occupies on the peninsula as well as the general significance of what has been described as the “Albanian question” for the stability of the Balkans and the region. America’s stated policy goals of the promotion of democracy, some form of a market economy, and regional cooperation and integration, all of which are intended to promote regional stability, has dictated a certain focus on Albania.
Albania and Albanians have, in general, welcomed and striven to facilitate that focus, partly as a result of the clear physical and emotional attachment that many Albanians have to the United States (by 1945, for example, twenty-five percent of Albanians had either been to the US or had friends and relatives who had been there) and in part in recognition of the perceived power and resources that the United States is in a position to employ. Certainly one of the key actors here has been the Albanian-American community in the United States. While the community was relatively small at the beginning of the 20th century, counting somewhere between thirty and forty thousand by 19181, it was led by a group of dynamic individuals who founded organizations which became more influential than the size of the community would dictate. The Albanian-American community grew substantially after the Second World War into one of the largest and possibly the best educated in the Albanian diaspora. It became highly concentrated in specific areas of the United States and generally prosperous2 which allowed it to wield considerable influence on issues relating to Albanian security and development, particularly in the post-communist period.
The Albanian-American community played a particularly important role during the first period delineated here, the independence-Zog period to 1939. The first two decades of the 20th century saw the creation of three of the more important US-based institutions of the Albanian Renaissance, the Albanian Orthodox Church in America (1908); Dielli (1909), the oldest continuously published Albanian-language newspaper in the world; and the Pan-Albanian Federation “Vatra” (1912). The driving forces behind these organizations were the well-known Albania-Americans Fan Noli and Faik Konitza, both graduates of Harvard University. Among other achievements, they wrote and spoke prolifically, raised funds, and were able to attract the assistance of influential Americans, all in support of Albanian causes.3 The most important cause during this period, of course, was the recognition of Albanian independence and the maintenance of its territorial integrity. While more than half of all Albanians remained outside of the Albanian state confirmed in the post First World War period, it is certainly possible that without the persistent lobbying efforts of the Albanian-American community and its leaders, Albania would not have regained its independence or at the very least, would have emerged as an even smaller state. The refusal of American President Woodrow Wilson to support all of the provisions of an Anglo-French proposal that would have ceded more Albanian territory to Serbia and Greece, and granted Italy control over Vlore and the surrounding area as well as a mandate over the truncated Albanian state, removed the issue from the conference.4 The Albanian state was ultimately restored in November 1921 and recognized by the United States in July 1922. As a reward for their many contributions to this outcome, the Albanian-American community was allotted one seat in the new Albanian parliament and elected Fan Noli as their representative. Noli eventually rose to become prime minister in 1924 but ultimately proved to be more successful as an advocate and churchman than as a politician, and quickly lost the support of the United States and much of the Albanian-American community by failing to carry out promised reform, failing to hold elections to legitimize his regime, and by moving to extend recognition to the Soviet Union.
The return of Ahmet Zogu to power in late 1924 marked an end of a period of acute interest and participation in Albanian affairs on the part of the Albanian-American community and the United States in general. The community reduced its activity for a number of reasons, including internal rifts eventually exacerbated by the onset of the depression. The American government became less actively involved in part because of an increasing isolationist foreign policy, but also as a result of a number of other factors. The Albanian-American community became less effective as an advocate, and the first economic reports produced by American representatives in Albania were not encouraging. That the US was not overly interested is indicated by the level of diplomatic personal assigned to Albania – some of whom were uninspired political appointees. In contrast, the British, with their vast imperial/colonial experience, had many diplomats, like Sir Robert Ryan their last minister during the Zog period, who were well prepared, well informed and as a result much more active. It is interesting to read American and British dispatches from the period, where the American messages are occasionally trivial and when reporting on issues of some significance seem to mirror British dispatches sent a few days earlier.
But the US government did recognize the regime, as well as the creation of the monarchy in 1929, and concluded the usual treaties between states including a Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation in 1928, a Naturalization Treaty in 1932, an Extradition Treaty in 1933, and a Nationality Convention in 1937. The presence of US nongovernmental organization and religious organizations provided various forms of aid including schools which further solidified the connection. With Zog’s marriage to Geraldine in 1938, the connection between the court and the American mission became even stronger. Geraldine was born to an American mother whose influence seems to have been substantial and in consequence, aspects of American culture, at least in Tirana, became more pronounced in the period after 1938. The royal sisters also staged a rather flamboyant and somewhat extravagant exploratory visit to the US in that year which may have been responsible in part for Zog, in exile, purchasing an estate on Long Island New York with the prospect of settling there. That Geraldine influenced Zog in a pro-American direction is perhaps evidenced by the fact that it was to the American minister Hugh Grant that Zog turned when if came time to break his silence with regard to Italian demands during the crisis period just prior to the Italian invasion in 1939. Zog was also willing to put his family’s personal security in the hands of the Americans when during the invasion he sought the protection of the American mission for Geraldine and her newborn son Prince Leka.5 Although Grant readily agreed, Geraldine recovered sufficiently from childbirth to flee the country with her husband. Zog’s flight deprived him of much of his political legitimacy and despite constant efforts he was unable to convince the Americans to extend him recognition as the official Albanian government in exile.
The Second World War and Hoxha period, saw an even more restricted level of American involvement in Albanian issues. During the war, the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) agreed in 1942 that Albania was to fall within the British zone of operations. The British, therefore, took the lead in supplying Albanian resistance groups and carrying out independent acts of sabotage against Axis and collaborationist targets. The American did launch a series of small intelligence-gathering operations but not until November 1943, following the German invasion. There are a great many detailed reports filed by Albanian speaking OSS agents who sent back situation reports giving good descriptions of conditions in various part of the country.6 In one way this British-US arrangement and the lack of direct involvement during the war was to the advantage of future Albanian-American relations. The British, by frequent mistakes in political warfare during the course of the war, squandered some of the goodwill that they had developed in Albania during the interwar period. The United States, on the other hand, Hoxha’s shrill anti-Western siege nationalism not withstanding, remained for many Albanians a hazy ray of distant hope – and we see the development of something of a myth of America.
Following the war the Americans established an unofficial observer mission under the experienced foreign service officer Joseph E. Jacobs whose mission was to study country conditions with a view towards the eventual reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the US and Albania. In a comprehensive 300-page report submitted to Washington in July 1945, Jacobs recommended that the United States recognize Hoxha at the easiest possible moment, but only in consideration of Hoxha meeting certain democratic criteria, including a free secret-ballot general election.7 While Hoxha announced a willingness to comply with these requirements, he would not agree to a further demand that his government confirm the treaties and agreements in force between the United States and Albania prior to 7 April, 1939. The US did not expect to maintain a large role in the Balkans in the postwar period so these negotiations dragged on as official anti-Americanism grew, resulting in severe restrictions on American representatives. The final result of these circumstances was the withdrawal of the American mission in November of 1946, and the freezing of relations until 1991.
Hoxha attempted on numerous occasions – in 1947 and 1949 – to restart talks but the US was uninterested. By this point it had of course already become involved in the abortive British plot to overthrow Hoxha. British MI6 and the CIA decided to focus on Albania as their first covert operation to roll back communism with the hope that trouble for Hoxha would encourage some remaining anti-communist guerrilla groups still active in other Eastern European countries. The CIA reasoned that the Soviets would not be provoked over Albania and with MI6 set up guerrilla training centers to train anti-communist Albanians in West Germany, Malta, and Cyprus with the active participation of David Smiley, who had served with the SOE in Albania during the war. The operation was doomed for various reasons, including the fact that the MI6 representative in Washington responsible for coordinating with the CIA was the Soviet mole Kim Philby. But it is reasonable to assume that even if Philby had not relayed detailed plans to the Soviets, the operation would have failed in any case due in part to increasing Hoxhaist security and a climate of fear, which MI6 and the CIA had seriously underestimated.8
Very little changed in terms of US-Albanian relations until the collapse of communism in Albania in the early 1990s, which constitutes the second period upon which I would like to concentrate. Desperate to save what could be saved, the Alia regime rapidly expanded foreign contacts including conversations with the US in May 1990. These initial contacts were limited however, as the George H.W. Bush administration gauged the Albanian government’s willingness to support democratic reform. As the Alia regime was pushed ever further down the road to reform, the US and Albania formally reestablished relations in March 1991, followed by the remarkable visit by Secretary of State James Baker in June. While US material assistance at this early stage was limited to a relatively modest six million dollars, American willingness to sponsor Albania for membership in various international organizations was of much greater importance.
The US role expanded rapidly to include actual participation in the March 1992 elections which saw the American ambassador William Ryerson appearing at Democratic Party rallies. With the election of the Democrats under Sali Berisha, US interest and involvement expanded exponentially as the collapse of Yugoslavia presented new challenges and dangers. The great fear for Albania was the so-called “spillover” effect which foresaw the possibility of Albania being dragging into the Yugoslav wars.9 The Albanian government rightly concluded that since the Council of Europe and the European Union were essentially without a military component and could be of only limited help in terms of national security and border stability, NATO and the United States by necessity would be the focus of security policy.10 Albania requested the establishment of US military bases on Albanian soil and applied, in June 1992, for membership in NATO.
While not yet ready to grant all Albanian requests, the US nevertheless responded vigorously and expanded the relationship. Not only was there a growing understanding in Washington of the significance of Albania for the region, but the US also believed that military reform was a critical step on the road to democratization and stability.11 The US therefore initiated a policy of Albanian integration into Western security structures including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the Partnership for Peace program which aimed at creating greater understanding between NATO and Eastern Europe, and a bilateral partnership program with US state national guards. Bilateral defense consultations were begun facilitated by an increasing schedule of reciprocal visits. And despite the fact that the George H.W. Bush administration contained high-level foreign policy advisors who could be considered partial to Yugoslavia, in December 1992 it issued the so-called “Christmas warning” making it clear that unilateral military action in support of Albanian interests was not out of the question. This warning, while not seen as an official commitment, was welcomed by the Albanian side and reiterated by the Clinton administration in 1993.
The mid to late 1990s, however, saw a lull in the expansion of the US-Albanian relationship. This was due in part to the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 which for the US temporarily removed the Balkans in general from its list of policy priorities. The US saw Albania decline in terms of strategic significance. Part of the problem may actually have been that President Clinton preferred a foreign policy which avoided the overt use of American power particularly where others were better situated. As a result, the Clinton administration determined to allow the Europeans to deal with the crisis of 1997 in Albania, offering encouragement but little else.
But the growing Kosovo crisis reversed the lull and essentially forced renewed American interest in the region. Following a vigorous internal debate, the United States and NATO confirmed in December 1997 that NATO interest extended beyond Bosnia and expressed concern about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Albania emerged as a possible staging area for operations in Kosovo and once again offered all of its military facilities. Not only did it host a series of NATO exercises but also welcomed some 7,000 US troops, most of whom were assigned to a contingent of Apache attack helicopters.12 The Albanian-American community was mobilized in support of the KLA, contributing some thirty million dollars to the cause.13 In conjunction with the March 1999 air war against Serbian targets, the US, along with NATO and the EU, launched a series of extensive humanitarian operations in Albania to cope with the massive refugee crisis created by the war. As a result of these efforts, Serbian forces quit Kosovo and the US rose significantly in the esteem of Albanians everywhere.
In general, the post Kosovo war period saw the US continue to encourage regional and European integration as well as continue to encourage Albania along the lines of military and other reforms in preparation for NATO membership. But the George W. Bush administration was somewhat slower to develop the same enthusiasm for Albanian issues demonstrated by Mr. Clinton and the elder Mr. Bush. Ultimately, however, the Bush administration, too, became more aware and involved without giving up its long-term goal of disengagement. This renewed interest stemmed from the realization that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable, the need to further stabilize the region, the continuing pressure from the Albanian-American community in the United States, and Albania’s consistent support of US foreign policy objectives in the region and beyond. The US, although encouraging deeper reform internally, was very appreciative of what it considered Albania’s moderating influence on the situations in Macedonia and Kosovo. Albania also proved to be very supportive in America’s foreign policy priorities, including its struggle against international terrorism, as well as providing logistical support for KFOR in Kosovo, dispatching troops to support efforts in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and the granting of airspace, ports and land bases at the disposition of the limited coalition which America collected to support its efforts in Iraq. In a move that put Albania at odds with much of the EU, it also was willing, in 2003, to sign a bilateral agreement with the US to guarantee the non-surrender of US nationals to the International Criminal Court, which is generally referred to as “article 98.”
The Bush administration responded with further US involvement including encouragement in the creation of the Adriatic Charter to advance Albania’s candidacy for NATO membership, a 2004 supplemental agreement to the Partnership for Peace program, as well as funds from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which allowed Albania to become perhaps the first state in the world to complete destruction of declared chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2007. Washington also remained a stalwart advocate of Albania’s NATO prospects and played a significant role in the invitation to join which Albania received in April 2008 and which seems still to be fully on track. The Bush administration, despite some internal opposition from influential foreign policy advisers, like former UN ambassador John Bolton, also of course was an enthusiastic advocate of Kosovar independence. The relationship between the US and Albania was capped by top level exchanges which saw Secretary of State Colin Powell, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and others visit Albania and then reached a symbolic high point with President Bush’s historic visit to Albania in June of 2007.
This leaves us with the third period which I would like to briefly address; the Obama presidency and the future of American Albanian relations.14 It seems clear that the relationship will continue to be positive. The American side will continue to provide assistance of various types; this includes government grants for various rule of law enhancing projects, military advisors, including those attached to the ten year reform program launched in 2002 to trim down and modernize Albanian armed forces, technical advisors in some government departments, and active diplomatic support for further Euro-Atlantic integration. Private sector contacts will likely increase. These would include business contacts, American based NGO assistance, and of course, the still important immigrant remittances. But the dollar amount of at least the latter will likely decrease because of the current economic problems impacting the US and now the rest of the world, which likely will not fully abate until 2010. Immigrant remittances are also of course impacted by the changing nature of Albanian-American society where we see the slow disintegration of the tightly connected extended family. As Albanian-American families continue to integrate into the prevailing nuclear family structure, contacts and remittances will likely continue to decrease.
The Albanian government will continue to stress the close relationship and strengthen it when possible, as with the recent offer to accept more released prisoners from Guantanamo Bay facility which, through a recent executive order, the president has announced he will close by the end of the year.
In general terms there will be a major shift in the conduct of American foreign policy. There will be a renewed emphasis on so-called “soft-power” and multilateralism. This translates basically into less militarism, more traditional diplomacy, a policy of constructive engagement with adversaries and certainly more subtlety. This policy will likely be more effective. We can, I think see this trend in President Obama’s frequent public statements, in his commitment to increase the budget of the State Department but also in the people who surround Obama and have emerged in top level positions. The recent appointees tend to be experts rather than aggressive neoconservative ideologues who often dominated the foreign policy establishment under President Bush. These new people include, among others, Vice President Joe Biden who is seen as a liberal-minded internationalist committed to seeking the support of friends and allies. Biden is also seen as a friend of the Albanians and a strong supporter of human rights for Albanians throughout the Balkans. Next we have Secretary of State Hillary Clinton with whom the Albanian lobby in the United States has good ties. Bill Clinton has of course been viewed as a close friend of Albania. Others in the new administration have considerable Balkan experience like Richard Holbrook while others, like Dennis Ross, a former Middle East negotiator, and former Clinton aides Kurt Campbell and Philip Gordon have a clear focus on the Islamic world. All of those listed above, like President Obama himself see the world less from a power-projecting perspective and more from looking at problems and seeing how to solve them.
But a certain disengagement from the Balkans will continue. The Balkans will likely be relegated to the back burner, a policy followed by the Bush administration and one which I expect will be followed by the Obama administration as well. The new president is aware that the United States likely lacks economic and military resources to deal with any new crises in region and clearly hopes to avoid a new conflict with Russia. President Obama’s general domestic and global priorities will be the economy clearly impact by such considerations as climate change and oil dependency. There will also of course be considerable attention paid to the traditional concerns of Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, and the Middle East, along with other issues relating to restoration of US world prestige. These priorities will encourage Obama to avoid extensive engagement in the Balkan region, where he will hope that Europe can take the lead in terms of developing solutions to remaining political problems as well as assisting with desperately needed economic development.
But having said that, for the Obama administration there will likely be no basic changes in specific policies towards the region. The priorities will remain 1) to maintain stability in the region 2) to promote the integration of Albania and South Eastern Europe into Euro-Atlantic structures. Quite specifically he has said that he will not change policy with regard to Kosovo or Albania. During the election campaign in September 2008 Mr. Obama announced in the press that he strongly supports Kosovo and its democratic process towards full sovereignty and promised to help Kosovo develop a strong economy. He pledged to defend Kosovo’s sovereignty against possible Serbian aggression, and pledged to assist Kosovo in developing strong and healthy trade relations. He understands that stability depends on, among other factors, economic development and job creation, and promised to help by assisting Kosovo to build a powerful infrastructure and energy system. Mr. Obama also praised important achievements in Albania and congratulated Prime Minister Berisha and his government on their role in receiving an invitation to join NATO. He expressed the hope that Albania become a member of the EU in the near future. But President Obama will likely facilitate this further integration by encouraging the Europeans to take a larger role as economic concerns become more prominent.
Attention directed towards Albania is shifting somewhat from security considerations to economic development. Whether this shift continues depends on a number of things not the least of which includes developments in Macedonia and Kosovo. But assuming the situation in Kosovo stabilizes and assuming that there are no other serious crises elsewhere in the Balkans, this economically-oriented attention will focus on the creation of an economically equitable and just society, which requires poverty reduction, a necessary ingredient for long term stability. And it seems clear that Albania’s economic future rests more with the EU than with the US. Albania’s close connection with the US has been very important, in terms of security integration, as well as substantial economic assistance since the collapse of communism – including in excess of 350 million dollars through the Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) program. During the same period, however, EU assistance programs amounted to more than 1.3 billion euros supplemented by the fact that over 75% of Albania trade is with EU counties15 – principally Italy, Greece, Germany and France.
I see this trend towards the EU accelerating while the US continues to direct its interest elsewhere. There is, of course historical precedent for this type of development- as for example with the declining significance of Yugoslavia for US policy with the rise of d굥nte, and US relative disengagement from Albania following the Dayton Accords. This redirection may be further facilitated by an unfortunate but growing lack of cohesion in the Albanian-American community which seems to be able to unite in times of crisis but then has a tendency to fragment when slow but sustained pressure for economy development would be very useful. The relationship between Albania and the US will certainly remain strong, particularly with the continuing process of aligning Albanian forces with those of NATO. Still the relationship will be transformed in a way that should encourage Albania to redouble its efforts to engage the EU. This should not be read to mean that the relations between the US and Albania will necessarily weaken – but they will continue to evolve.
As with any relationship, there are of course possible further complications for American Albanian relations in the near and long term. One such possible complication is the upcoming national election in June, and the functioning of the new electoral reform legislation. The physical and procedural arrangements for the elections will be a matter of keen interest to the United States. The difficulties with the voter identification cards need to be addressed and, as has happened in the past, the preparations for the machinery to conduct the elections are moving at a slow pace. The State Department will pay attention to how the parties and political leaders conduct their respective campaigns.
Washington hopes that there will be more constructive dialogue among the parties and the candidates during the campaign, more transparency concerning the funding of party campaigns, and more democracy within the political parties. There also will be attention paid to the functioning of the recently passed lustration law, the legislation limiting immunity of state prosecutors, the ultimate resolution of the issues relating to the Gerdec tragedy, and recently heightened concerns over press freedom.
In addition, it is likely that the State Department will continue to encourage the Albanian government to vigorously address a litany of persistent problems including political and economic corruption, drug and human trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, the question of an independent and professional judiciary, minority issues, respect for the constitution, and the establishment of the rule of law in general, in the hopes of encouraging more substantial progress on these seemingly intractable issues. These issues are still prominently mentioned by the State Department itself in its Country Report of Human Rights Practices, and its Annual Trafficking of Persons Report, added to a series of other interested party and NGO reports (to which Washington pays some heed) including among others, the Commission of the European Communities Annual Progress Report, Amnesty International reports, Human Rights Watch reports, Transparency International reports, Reporters without borders reports, Freedom House reports, and the Economist intelligence unit reports. While there has been much praise for Albania’s progress, these reports continue to raise concerns including, for example the Economist Intelligence Unit report of January 19, 2009 which rated Albania, as it did last year, as a hybrid state falling between “flawed democracies” and “authoritarian states.” While we may not fully agree with all of theses assessments, attention should be paid to these periodic reports because these analyses have been produced by respected and influential sources whose conclusions have a voice and create international perceptions. In general the issues covered by the NGOs and other interested parties to which I have alluded are important to the consolidation of the rule of law – which impacts among other things further European integration, foreign investment, and relations between Albania and the United States.
So there clearly are challenges ahead and obviously some uncertainty in terms of the direction of President Obama’s general and specific foreign policy but, in the final analysis, while relations between the United States and Albania are in transition and will of course always be, they are currently quite strong and, subject to the level of attention paid to some of the issues mentioned above, will likely continue to strengthen during the new Obama administration.
Bernd J. Fischer is Professor and Chair Department of History Indiana University, Fort Wayne. Bernd Fischer is also Senior Associate researcher of Albanian Institute for International Studies (AIIS). The first version of this article was presented at AIIS security and Foreign Policy Forum on Foreign Policy agenda of new US Administrating. January 26, 2009.
14 I should mention that these views are my own and may or may not reflect those of the American embassy in Tirana and or the US Department of State.
15 Binaj, “An Analysis of United States-Albanian Security Relations,” p. 78.
