Worst Case Precedents From Kosova

By Janusz Bugajski
While the world awaits the final decision on Kosova’s status, it is valuable to review the worst-case alternatives to an independent state. Non-independence and non-sovereignty may not only destabilize Kosova, unsettle the broader region, and necessitate longer U.S. military involvement, it would also serve as a negative global precedent.
Much has been said about state breakdown, territorial ungovernability, renewed insurgency, and escalating violence if Kosova were to be denied independence or if the process were indefinitely delayed. Not enough thought has been given to the negative precedents than an incomplete Kosova could serve in other conflict zones where the West maintains a strategic interest.
Russian officials and their proxies in entities such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia have relentlessly claimed that Kosova’s independence will serve as a precedent for their secession from Georgia and Moldova. But they deliberately fail to point out that Kosova’s non-independence would send even more powerful negative signals.
First, separatist leaders in the post-Soviet statelets will conclude that if they are to have any chance for independence, they must not allow any international organizations to intervene on their territories as was the case in Kosova. This will diminish the effectiveness of attempted international mediation, peace-enforcement, or state reconstruction in many crisis regions.
For instance, while the European Union, the United Nations, and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) have pushed for closer involvement in Moldova and Georgia, such proposals are likely to be resisted even more intensively by secessionist leaders.
Moves by some OSCE members to enhance the organization’s engagement will be thwarted, while EU proposals to replace Russian “peace-keeping” forces with a broader international military mission will be resisted.
This will serve Moscow’s interests, well expressed by President Vladimir Putin during his recent speech at a security conference in Munich. Putin argued that the activities of NATO, the EU, the US, and the OSCE in Russia’s neighborhood threaten regional stability and promote Washington’s unilateralism and expansionism.
Second, the potential for violence in and around Kosova could serve as a precedent for unfreezing “frozen conflicts” into open warfare in several former Soviet colonies. If Kosova’s non-statehood sparks mass protests, political radicalism, and a new insurgency, the lesson for other unrecognized entities would be self-evident. What cannot be achieved through negotiations can be more effectively won through political intransigence and open conflict.
Another possibility is that the governments in Chisinau (Moldova) and Tbilisi (Georgia) may conclude that a military assault on the breakaway regions could be successful in response to the latter’s unwillingness to compromise or to agree to any international involvement. The prospect for renewed bloodshed and “ethnic cleansing” would escalate and tensions throughout the region would sharply rise. Russia’s direct intervention to assist its comrades cannot be discounted and this could also pull Washington and Brussels into the conflict.
Third, a Kosova lesson of non-independence would be well received by various repressive governments. The restraints on dictatorships engaging in mass murder and even genocide, because of the possibility that they would lose legitimacy over a territory and bestow credibility on internal independence movements, would further evaporate.
For example, Russia’s murderous policies in Chechnya and China’s repressive practices in Tibet and Xingkiang would be further legitimized by any ruling over Kosova that precludes independence and sovereignty. Calls for separating populations that have been severely victimized by the central government could be more effectively dismissed as a result of any negative Kosova decision.
While preparations are being made for engaging the UN Security Council and bringing the Ahtissari plan for final status to a vote, Western negotiators must consider the likely global repercussions of their decisions. Simply claiming that Kosova sets no precedents in other conflict zones does not constitute a practical policy and it ignores the likelihood that numerous lessons will be drawn from any UN decision.