by Sokol Lleshi, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of New York Tirana
Background
The political systems in the Western Balkan region feature politicized public administrations, weak enforcement of rule of law norms, and inconsistent practices of political accountability. In general, the historical experience of the region is such that “democracy — both as an ideology and as political regime — has never become socially or institutionally embedded” (Vachudova 2019 as cited in Džankić, 2025, p. 74).
The EU enlargement policy, which is a key component of the EU foreign policy and an affirmation of the EU’s identity, enables a process of transformation of the political institutions and societies of the Western Balkans. However, the EU institutions have interacted primarily with the political elite of the region, who have been rather ambigious regarding their commitments to democracy and institutional reforms.
For quite some time, the EU itself manifesting “strategic ambiguity” (Džihić and Rauch, 2026, p. 6) regarding EU enlargement to the region, traded democracy for stability. This informal, yet influential EU’s policy stance on the Western Balkans rested on the illusion that stability and democracy are “inextricably linked” (Džankić, 2025, p. 75). Yet, precisely this stance has weakened the transformative power of the European Union.
Russia’s war against Ukraine since February 2022 made the EU realize that the European Union is at its core a peace project, which is based on liberal democracy, rule of law, and a single market. Therefore, the continuity of European Union relies on the recognition that radical shifts in geopolitics, such as geopolitical competition for influence in the Western Balkans with non-Western external powers, are intrinsically co-dependent with the actual transformative role of the EU to extricate the Western Balkan region from its limbo.
Socio-economic Convergence without Political Accountability
Although it may sound absurd to claim that the Western Balkans will achieve a sustainable socio-economic convergence with the EU, this particular policy goal of the EU with regard to the region has been central to supporting the integration of the regional economies into the EU single market. The Common Regional Market (CRM) framework that was established for the Western Balkans Six, within the mechanism of the Berlin Process, predates the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, the latter a roadmap and financial instrument for the economic integration of the region.
This particular economic policy of the EU towards the Western Balkans reflects a certain path dependency (Hooghe and Marks, 2019, p. 115) of previous similar policies. The Growth Plan for the Western Balkans is expected to have political effects by linking financial support with “Reform Agendas…[that] concern the political and the rule of law fundamentals” (Emerson and Blocksmans, 2025, p. 2). Although such a strategy may support adoption of norms concerning the rule of law and democratic institutions its effects will remain limited.
Without full membership as a final outcome (Morina, 2025, p. 2), the socio-economic convergence will not be sufficient to sustain politically accountable democratic institutions. The EU policies that pertain to the EU single market may incentivize domestic interest groups in the Western Balkans to demand a more efficient and professional public administration, legal predictability, and basic rule of law practices. Yet, the citizens will not be able to hold the executive accountable.
For the most part, when the EU and its institutions desist from interacting primarily with government elites, referred to as gatekeepers, and involve instead more inclusive political institutions, such as the parliament, political parties, and agencies of the state bureuacracy socio-economic convergence will be embedded into stable, democratic, and accountable political institutions.
Drifting away from the EU: Authoritarian Leverage of External Powers
In the absence of a successful enlargement of the EU to the Western Balkans, the geopolitical competition between the EU and the external powers such as Russia, China, or other external powers may radically move in favor of the latter. While the process of gradual integration remains insufficient to achieve the “political integration” (Risse, 2005, p. 292) of the Western Balkans into the EU, and as pro-EU constituencies in the civil society cannot compell the political elite to transform its norms and behavior in compliance with the EU values and practices, the Western Balkan countries will drift away from the European Union. The region will develop or reinforce economic, political, and cultural linkages with non-Western external powers.
Taking advantage of the financial crisis of 2008 and of the enlargement fatigue, external powers provided an alternative route to economic growth and modernization to the Western Balkan countries. The economic investments of the external powers in the Western Balkans are characterized as “corrosive capital” (Prelec, 2020). The ruling political elites allow corrosive capital investments which ultimately weaken political accountability and undermine sustianable economic growth by disregarding wider public interests and rule of law practices.
In the long run, if the overall goal of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans dissipates, the region will be mired in a constant and yet uncertain geopolitical competition between the European Union and the non-Western external powers.
Elite – Citizen Divisions and the Erosion of the EU Transformative Power
The European Union can bring about a sustainable process of state building in the Western Balkans as a result of the innovative instruments of the EU enlargement policy. This particular goal entails accountable democratic institutions, good governance and rule of law practices (Kmezić, 2019). However, the transformative power of the EU will erode over time if the EU does not transform the national parliaments of the candidate countries into arenas of policy making, democratic accountability, and political cooperation.
The EU institutions in cooperation with national parliaments and civil society organizations need to formulate and disseminate a communicative action that enables societal dialogue and political participation.Therefore, the actual process of monitoring, benchmark mechanisms and communicative action could respond to the ‘right to democracy’ of the Western Balkan societies by enforcing an externally-induced process of political accountability in the region.
If the EU enlargement policy is characterized by contradictions and inconsistencies then the divide between the citizens and the ruling elites will increase. Consequently, such a process will potentially undermine the prospects of EU membership of the Western Balkan countries and further entrench existing competitive authoritarian regimes. At best, the EU would be compelled to respond to political and social mobilization in favor of restoring the EU integration prospects of the region, provided that the citizens themselves have not yet succumbed to desolation.
Policy Recommendations
The European Union institutions need to constrain the exclusive influence of the executive and transform the legislature in each of the EU candidate countries as the focal point of political accountability and political cooperation.
An efficient and sustainable process of state building should be based on effective state bureaucracy and institutional mechinisms of horizontal accountability, as well as an autonomous and professionalized judiciary.
Socio-economic convergence is not sufficient if not supported by externally-induced processes of political accountability, which recognize the important role of pro-EU constituencies and civil society.
The process of the EU enlargement to the Western Balkans needs to be framed as a bulwark to geopolitical competition with other external powers, which undermines the European integration as a unique peace project and as a post-national political system.
The European Union, by upholding its commitment to the full membership of the candidate countries as the end goal of the enlargement policy, will avoid a further divide between the citizens and the political elite, which may instigate a deepening of democratic backsliding and authoritarian rule in the Western Balkans.
References
Džankić, J., (2025). The geopolitics of democracy in the Western Balkans. In J. Džankić, B. Kotevska, L. Mokrá (Eds.), The Geo(politics) of democracy in wider Europe. (pp. 73-84). European University Institute.
Džihić, V., & Rauch, T. (2026). From fatigue to fragile momentum: EU enlargement in the Western Balkans under geopolitical pressure. (Report). Austrian Institute for International Affairs.
Emerson, M. & Blockmans, S. (2025). How to radically simplify and streamline the EU enlargement process. (Policy Brief). CEPS.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2019). Grand theories of European integration in the twenty-first century. Journal of European Public Policy, 26(8), 1113-1133.
Kmezić, M. (2019). EU rule of law conditionality: Democracy or ‘stabilocracy’ promotion in the Western Balkans? In J. Džankić, S. Keil, & M. Kmezić (Eds.), The Europeanization of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? (pp. 87-109). Palgrave Macmillan.
Morina, E. (2025). Accelerate the Accessions: Why faster is better in EU enlargement policy. (Policy Brief). European Council on Foreign Relations.
Prelec, T. (2020). The vicious circle of corrosive capital, authoritarian tendencies, and state capture in the Western Balkans. Journal of Regional Security, 15(2), 167-198.
Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 291-309.
Vachudova, M.A. (2019). EU enlargement and state capture in the Western Balkans. In J. Džankić, S. Keil, & M. Kmezić (Eds.), The Europeanization of the Western Balkans: A failure of EU conditionality? (pp. 63-86). Palgrave Macmillan.
______________________
This article authored by Prof. Lleshi on this topic is part of a project implemented by the Albanian Institute for international Studies (AIIS) and supported by a grant from Open Society Institute – Sofia Foundation (OSIS) with the support of Open Society Foundations (OSFs).
