By Zef Preçi
TIRANA, Albania – At the end of April, in the presence of Albania’s prime minister and U.S. Ambassador to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle, the state-owned company Albgaz signed a 20-year agreement with Greece’s Aktor LNG USA for the supply of American liquefied natural gas (LNG). The government presented it as a geopolitical achievement.
Six months later, following reports by The Wall Street Journal, calls for an investigation by Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Prosecution (SPAK), and the Energy Ministry’s admission that it was still awaiting a feasibility study, the financial implications deserve serious examination.
Albania’s strategic partnership with the United States is an overriding national priority. Strengthening bilateral relations, including energy cooperation, serves Albania’s fundamental interests. But strategic cooperation cannot justify commercially questionable commitments. Agreements must protect the interests of both countries, including Albanian taxpayers.
The known terms are substantial: 1 billion cubic meters of gas annually for 20 years, beginning in 2030, with an estimated value of approximately $6 billion. The gas would initially come from the American company Venture Global through a Greek intermediary. Aktor executives have confirmed that the agreement contains a “take-or-pay” clause, while its lawyers have described it as legally binding and subject to international arbitration.
Under this arrangement, Albania could be required to pay for contracted quantities even when it cannot receive or consume them. Yet the price, pricing formula, minimum purchase obligation, recovery rights and state guarantees have not been disclosed.
Potential financial exposure could reach approximately $300 million annually. This is a commitment extending across future governments, undertaken without a competitive process, a published feasibility study or adequate parliamentary scrutiny.
The experience of neighboring countries is revealing. Romania rejected a comparable 20-year offer after its state-owned producer, Romgaz, estimated annual losses of €50 million to €310 million. Its nonbinding memorandum expired in February 2026 without a contract.
Negotiations involving Ukraine’s Naftogaz were discontinued, while Bulgaria signed only a memorandum. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a comparable arrangement involves a private industrial buyer assuming its own commercial risk.
Albania, by contrast, accepted a long-term state obligation without possessing a developed gas market or the infrastructure needed to consume the contracted quantities.
Until domestic facilities are developed, gas regasified in Greece would have to enter Albania through the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Yet the capacity reportedly reserved for Albania is only 0.16 billion cubic meters annually, approximately one-sixth of its contractual commitment. The Fier–Vlorë pipeline is not expected before 2030, while other LNG infrastructure projects remain at preliminary stages.
Albania could therefore enter 2030 with a binding payment obligation but without sufficient infrastructure to receive, consume or resell the gas. The take-or-pay clause would remain applicable.
Domestic demand presents another difficulty. Albania has no national gas distribution network, significant storage facilities or substantial gas-fired electricity generation.
According to estimates published by Monitor, absorbing 1 billion cubic meters annually would require approximately 750 megawatts of additional generation capacity and investments exceeding $1.2 billion to $1.5 billion, without secured financing or a final investment decision.
The planned 170-megawatt Roskovec thermal power plant is the only identifiable major potential consumer. However, its licensing has encountered difficulties, while local residents have challenged its environmental permits.
Its ownership also raises questions. DEPA Commercial holds 35 percent of the planned power plant and 40 percent of Atlantic SEE, the intermediary involved in the LNG arrangement. The same economic group thus has interests in both supply and consumption. Such relationships require transparency and scrutiny of potential conflicts of interest.
The agreement also raises questions about Albania’s alignment with European energy policy. While the European Union supports diversification away from Russian fossil fuels, its longer-term objectives emphasize reducing gas demand and accelerating decarbonization. Albania has instead undertaken a 20-year commitment without a functioning domestic market or credible alternatives for using the contracted volumes.
There is also a national security dimension. Albania introduced mandatory screening of foreign investments in sensitive sectors in 2025, followed by implementing regulations in April 2026. Yet no comparable security assessment of this long-term energy arrangement has been made public.
The financial risks extend beyond the purchase price. Albania has a costly history of international arbitration involving public contracts. The Agon Channel case alone resulted in an award of €110 million against the state.
According to Albania’s Supreme State Audit Institution, exposure to arbitration cases reached €184.7 million by September 2026, while cumulative losses from unsuccessful cases were estimated at €388.5 million.
A dispute over the Aktor agreement could impose further substantial liabilities on taxpayers, particularly if Albania eventually attempts to withdraw from its obligations.
Four immediate measures are necessary. First, the government must publish the complete contract, including its pricing formula, minimum purchase obligations, arbitration provisions and guarantees.
Second, no state guarantee should be issued before publication of the feasibility study and parliamentary examination of the financial implications.
Third, SPAK should promptly examine the circumstances of the agreement, as requested by the opposition. Such scrutiny must not be confused with opposition to American investment or cooperation with the United States. Its purpose is to establish whether the contractual terms protect Albania’s interests or disproportionately benefit the intermediary.
Fourth, any expansion of the agreement must be supported by independent economic assessments, competitive pricing, flexible volumes and reduced minimum payment obligations.
Albania’s alliance with the United States is indispensable. American involvement in strengthening the country’s energy security should be welcomed and encouraged. The issue is not whether Albania should cooperate with Washington, but whether this particular agreement offers a sound economic foundation for that cooperation.
Energy security cannot be achieved through obligations exceeding the country’s capacity to use the energy purchased. A country without a functioning domestic gas network cannot commit $6 billion to LNG imports and simply call it diversification. It must first establish where the gas will go, who will purchase it and who will bear the losses if the projections fail.
These questions should have been answered before the signing ceremony. They must be answered now, before additional guarantees are issued and the cost of withdrawal becomes prohibitive.
Albania’s experience with major public contracts offers a familiar lesson: agreements are signed at official ceremonies, but the financial consequences arrive years later, without ceremony, at the taxpayer’s expense.
