By Përparim Kalo
Tirana Times, October 29, 2026 – For the past five months, public debate in Albania has been dominated by two major developments: the so-called Flamingo Revolution and the student protests. While discussions have focused on the causes of the protests, their escalation from peaceful demonstrations into violent confrontations, the responsibilities of protesters and police, and demands for the resignation of the Prime Minister and his government, relatively little attention has been devoted to possible constitutional solutions.
The crisis has brought students and the Prime Minister into direct confrontation, while also involving Parliament, the President of the Republic, the Ombudsman and political parties. Demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation is a legitimate democratic right, guaranteed by the constitutional freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly.
Albania’s recent political history offers several examples of prime ministers resigning under political or social pressure. Fatos Nano resigned in 1991 amid general strikes, protests and a deepening economic crisis. Ylli Bufi resigned later that year following the crisis affecting the Government of Stability. Aleksandër Meksi stepped down in 1997 after the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes. Nano resigned again in 1998 following the unrest triggered by Azem Hajdari’s assassination and internal party conflicts. Pandeli Majko resigned in 1999 after losing the Socialist Party leadership contest, Ilir Meta in 2002 following disagreements with Nano, and Majko again later that year after political arrangements within the party.
Thus, Albania’s political history over the past 35 years demonstrates that resignation is hardly a taboo. Today, however, despite persistent demands from protesters and citizens expressing their views through social media and other platforms, there are no visible indications that the Prime Minister intends to resign.
The protests, taking place in a political climate influenced partly by demonstrations across several European countries and beyond, also reflect declining confidence in state institutions, particularly Parliament, which is accused of failing to represent the electorate. At the same time, the Prime Minister’s public statements indicate his determination to remain in office.
Under these circumstances, what constitutional mechanisms are available for removing the Prime Minister?
One possibility concerns the President of the Republic. Article 92(a) of the Constitution authorizes the President to address messages to Parliament. This institutional prerogative could encourage parliamentary debate aimed at identifying a political solution. However, the President has no constitutional authority to terminate the Prime Minister’s mandate or dismiss him independently. He may express concerns and encourage institutional reflection, but cannot remove the Prime Minister from office.
The principal constitutional mechanism is a motion of no confidence. Under Article 105, at least one-fifth of Parliament’s members may submit such a motion, accompanied by a proposal for a new Prime Minister. Its approval requires the votes of more than half of all members of Parliament. Following its adoption, the President decrees the dismissal of the incumbent Prime Minister and appoints his successor.
This mechanism, known as a constructive vote of no confidence, means that removing a Prime Minister requires the simultaneous formation of a parliamentary majority capable of electing a replacement. Consequently, it can succeed only if sufficient political will exists within Parliament, particularly among members of the governing majority.
A third possibility is a referendum. Article 150 provides for referendums concerning the abrogation of laws or matters of particular importance. Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for a referendum aimed at removing a Prime Minister, such a question could arguably be considered a matter of particular national importance.
In my view, however, even if organized, such a referendum would have primarily political significance. It could serve as an instrument of public pressure but would not produce any direct constitutional effect on the Prime Minister’s mandate.
There is also a practical difficulty. Although the Constitution recognizes the right to a referendum, the specific legislation necessary for its implementation has not yet been adopted.
The draft law “On Referendums”, currently undergoing consultation, seeks to expand the use of referendums as instruments of direct democracy. Based on Articles 150–152 of the Constitution, it envisages referendums concerning the abrogation or ratification of laws, matters of particular national importance, and consultative referendums or those with binding effects in expressly defined circumstances.
However, the draft does not introduce a mechanism comparable to a recall referendum, through which citizens could directly remove a Prime Minister or government from office.
If adopted in its present form, the proposed legislation would allow 50,000 citizens to request a referendum on a matter of particular national importance. This could raise the possibility of asking voters: “Do you agree that the current Prime Minister should continue to serve in office?”
Such a proposal raises important constitutional questions. Article 2 establishes that sovereignty belongs to the people and is exercised both directly and through representatives. Likewise, Article 150 recognizes referendums on matters of particular importance.
Nevertheless, these provisions must be considered alongside the constitutional rules governing the Prime Minister’s political responsibility. Under Albania’s constitutional system, this responsibility is entrusted to Parliament, which holds the authority to remove the Prime Minister through Article 105.
For this reason, I believe that a referendum expressing opposition to the incumbent Prime Minister would primarily have political significance rather than produce an automatic legal effect resulting in his dismissal.
Certainly, if a majority of citizens participating in a national referendum voted against the continuation of the Prime Minister’s mandate, the political implications could hardly be ignored. Such a result would increase pressure for resignation and could encourage members of Parliament, including those within the governing majority, to reconsider their positions.
At least one-fifth of Parliament’s members could then exercise their constitutional right to initiate a motion of no confidence, provided the constitutional requirements were satisfied.
A referendum could therefore become an important instrument of political pressure and influence parliamentary decisions. Nevertheless, it would not replace the constitutional procedure for removing the Prime Minister.
The distinction between political legitimacy and constitutional authority remains essential. A government may face a serious crisis of public confidence while retaining the parliamentary majority necessary to remain in office. Conversely, widespread public opposition does not automatically produce the legal consequences of a parliamentary vote of no confidence.
Ultimately, the Constitution places the decisive authority for removing a Prime Minister who refuses to resign in Parliament’s hands. The resolution of Albania’s current political crisis therefore depends on whether public pressure can translate into the political will necessary to activate the constitutional mechanisms available.
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About the Author
Përparim Kalo is an attorney-at-law and a former judge of the Constitutional Court of Albania.
