By Auron Tare
Sixty-two years ago, in October of 1944, the township of Saranda was the witness of an event that was extraordinary for military operations up until that time. The landing of British Allied Forces in the Bay of Kakome and their march into the township as liberators, alongside the partisan forces, constituted a remarkably important event for the history of Albania in World War Two. Up until today, Albanian history writing had described this landing as a coordinated action of the partisan and allied forces to liberate Saranda, commending the contribution made by the British Commandoes to assist the Albanian forces.
In October 2006, sixty-two years after the British landing at Kakome, a British Professor of Archeology Richard Hodges sought, through an article published in an Albanian daily, to inform public opinion here of the historical injustice rendered to the contribution by the Allied Forces to the liberation of this township. Professor Hodges claims that, in reality, the township of Saranda was liberated by the British and not by the partisan forces which were not deployed anywhere in the area when the landing occurred. According to the Professor, the idea that the township was liberated by the partisan forces is a historical manipulation by Enver Hoxha and Albanian history writing.
In fact, the fight for the liberation of Saranda and the British military operations in the zone in the Autumn of 1944, should be viewed from a broader angle, in a regional and Balkan context, and not as an effort to liberate a small provincial township of Albania.
In September 1944, it was obvious to all belligerent sides that the withdrawal of the German forces from Albania and other Balkan territories was only a matter of days away. The British officers attached to the partisan HQs or those of the Nationalist Forces, sent information back to their centre in Bari almost daily on the situation on the ground, relaying very detailed reports on all the movements of the German troops and on the political situation in-country. The Allied Forces Command in Bari were now very clear on the fact that the partisan formations had now gained complete control of the situation and the smaller Albanian townships were being liberated, one after the other, by assaults of the partisan brigades which were confronted with demoralized German forces, only interested in finding free routes along which to flee back to Germany as soon as possible. The war had been lost and no one harboured any doubts about its outcome. However, it seems that the military strategists and the politicians of all the victorious parties were busy with post-war calculations. And perhaps the landing of the British Commando Forces in the Bay of Kakome should be viewed in this context too.
The British Royal Navy sought, at all costs, to re-establish its naval hegemony in the Mediterranean and with this in mind it was interested in gaining control of all strategic points that would facilitate this aim. Certainly the post-war control over the Corfu Channel was one of its targets and the endeavors to gain control of this strategic point continued after the war too, subsequently bringing about the famous Corfu Incident which was to be transformed into a legal battle at the UN Security Council and the International Court of the Hague. The outcome of this was fifty years of severed relations with Britain.
Who liberated the township of Saranda in the Autumn of 1944?
The British Professor who has raised this new thesis that Saranda was liberated by the British Forces appears not to have a clear comprehension of the events that were unraveling in the Autumn of 1944 in Albania. Perhaps, due to the inaccurate reading of documentation, or for other purposes, Professor Hodges writes about a very ordinary conflict between the British troops and the partisan forces, something which he claims brought about the distortion of the story about the real liberators of this township, negating the contribution of the British to this fight.
A rapid leafing through British documents found in the archives of London, the Imperial War Museum and the Public Records Archive now open to researchers provides us with information that differs to that presented to us by the English Professor.
These documents plainly reveal that the Allied Command in Bari, responsible for all military operations in the Balkans, possessed surprisingly accurate information on the state of German troops in Albania. From daily reports the British knew that the German forces were organizing the evacuation of their forces and that it was only a question of days before they left Albania. The German forces in Saranda had absolutely no intention of holding on to this small provincial township, but, it appeared that they were waiting for final withdrawal orders, and for this reason they had to support the Corfu Garrison until their complete evacuation.
In the meantime, British officers deployed with the partisan or nationalist formations were now well aware of the fact that he Allied Forces had no plan to land on the Albanian coastline, despite all the favourable reports that were coming in from the field. During September 1944, the partisan forces, (according to British reports), controlled Konispol as well as the coastline road, hence blocking any attempt of the Germans to withdraw along these routes. With the fact in mind that Gjirokastra was also in the hands of the partisans, the only route out for the Germans was the Janina-Follorina route.
We present excerpts from the Secret Files of the Bari Command on the situation in Albania in September 1944.
Top Secret
Radiograms sent in “Bernard” from Bari to the Field
1944
September 16 No.26
From the report of SS/Sturmscharfuhrer Nagel for SS/Sturmbanfuhrer Seyler, S.D. Director, Shkodra.
3. “It is now more than clear that the majority of the SS Officers no longer have any faith in the German victories. Here is no doubt at all that they are all preoccupied with leaving this location as rapidly as they can.”
September 21 No.215
2. Political Situation
-Government of Tirana. Third Brigade is fighting street by street and the citizens and government militia are working together with the partisansŮ.
– The partisans have taken Konispol.
September 24 No.218
Military situation, September 24
1. Partisans
a) they now control the South of Albania, with the exception of Vlora and the Kor衭Berat road.
b) The 12th Brigade successfully wiped out the German Garrison at Borsh. A German vessel was destroyed, 30 Germans killed and many taken prisoner. Partisans control coastal road to the south and as far as Llogora, excluding Borsh.
From the above and other radiograms, the picture clearly emerges that the partisan forces controlled the situation in the south of the country and the taking of Saranda was imminent. So with this fact in mind, it is hard to believe that the partisan formations which controlled this entire zone, were incapable of taking a township like Saranda, or at least did not wait until the German forces had evacuated as they were already on the move. The repeated refusal of the Command in Bari to approve a landing in Albania, irrespective of the demands of the British officers in the field, makes the claim that, out of the blue the British Forces wanted to help the partisans liberate Saranda even harder to believe. The question then arises as to why, all of a sudden, the British wanted to liberate one of the smallest townships, without any weight in the balance of future events in Albania? What could the wiping out of a small and desperate German garrison, which wanted to get out of Albania at all costs, possibly have to offer the Allied Forces? The radiograms of the British officers, sent to Bari every day, stress that by this time there were only a few dozen Germans left still in the city of Vlora; Sazan Island has been deserted, but irrespective of the deployment of British naval ships in the area, no one showed any interest in liberating Vlora. Why then was Saranda chosen for the sole landing carried out by the British Forces in Albania?
The post-war control over the Channel of Corfu perhaps was to be the more lucid context in which to explain this unexpected landing of the British Commando Forces in that September of 1944 and not the liberation of a small township, insignificant on the larger scale of the War Theatre being enacted in Albania.
According to the statements of Enver Hoxha, the landing of Commandos of British Royal Navy at Kakome on 22 September 1944, had the approval of the General Staff of the National Liberation Army after an official request had been presented by the British Officer attached to the General Staff, Palmer. (One interesting fact is that the British filmed this landing). It appears that Enver Hoxha was uncertain about the real aims of the British forces and in his meeting with the British Officer Palmer, he clearly voiced this concern, at least in as far as he discloses this fact himself in his Memoirs, “Anglo-American Threat to Albania.”
In view of the fact that during all of his experience with the British during the War, Hoxha was always highly suspicious of their aims, it seems quite strange that he would accept to give them the glory of the liberation of Saranda. Perhaps the acknowledgement of this joint operation was a component part of his plans to indicate how cooperative he had been with the Allied Forces now that the war was drawing to an end. Irrespective of this he commits sufficient forces to operate in the field, issuing orders that the townshipo be liberated at all costs by the partisan formations, however, according to Hoxha’s Memoirs – he clearly demands that the British forces must leave from Saranda as soon as the military operation was over. The General Staff placed the 12th, 14th and 19th Brigades at the disposal of this joint operation.
The British Professor writes that the British also had their suspicions of the role of the partisans to launch a a joint attack, and subsequently, as the weather improved and with the backing of British aircraft, the troops of the Royal Navy undertook to carry out this action n on their own, without the aid of the Albanian partisans. “Waging yet another battle in the streets of Saranda and taking more than 620 German POWs, the British forces managed to liberate the township,” the British Professor writes. In fact the documents that Hodges refers to (if they were all to be made public), reveal clearly that the British forces supported the operation of the partisans, bombing the German positions up in the hills of Vromero, Lekuresi and Qafe Gjashte, and bringing their aircraft in, they wiped out the German coastal batteries once and for all, which had put up a concentrated resistance. Stressing that during the bombing by British aircraft, the famous Church of the Forty Saints was devastated, next to which German batteries had dug themselves in. The Commando Forces also bombed the road that links Saranda with Delvina to make it impossible for the German tanks to get through.
The documents below clearly indicate that the claims of the English Professor are very unclear and without grounds. The Allied Staff in Bari which sends out information to its officers in the field, is not at all indistinct, but precisely indicates the objective the partisans had to take Saranda.
Top Secret
Radiograms sent in Bernard” from Bari to the Field
1944
September 29 No.226
1. For your information only. Allied troops, only commando raid in strength. S.S Bde of 2 and 40 commandos with R.S.R havy weapons, 4.2 mortars pack 75 plus Bty 25 pounders No 11, Field Regt landed Splia, R.28 on 25th. Task to harass Hun in Saranda and cut road SARANDA -DELVINE. Partisan 12th and 14th Bdes co-operated with attack on DELVINE. Now developing full scale attack on SARANDA due go in on 28th but no news since WT link failed. Meantime commandos have been mopping up Hun positions in hills North of SARANDA
2. Reference your 161 of 8th : Awards SMILEY, JENKINS, submitted. No result as yet.
This document, sent in September of 1944 is more than clear and shows that the British were more committed to pounding and purging the hills surrounding Saranda and Delvina of German resistance, leaving frontal assaults up to the partisan formations against the German positions in the vicinity of the township. From data sent from the Allied Staff in Bari to the officers in the field, it can be accurately understood that the objective of the Mission of the Commandos was to harass the German troops and cut off communication along he Saranda-Delvina route and not a frontal attack over Saranda. This fact is also highlighted in an announcement sent to the First Army Corps, on military operations for the liberation of Saranda and Delvina.
29 September, 1944
The landing of British troops near Saranda which was announced by Radio Bari is only an operation with Commandos, in cooperation n with our forces. Operations over Saranda and Delvina began today. Day by day the German forces are withdrawing from Greece, via the Kor衭Follorin route. Gjirokastra and Berat remain in our hands.
ENVER
(To be continued in next issue)
